Who Won the India-Pakistan War of 1965?

[Riaz Haq]

How did Gurdaspur, an overwhelming Muslim majority district of Punjab, end up in India?

What was its significance for Kashmir? What role did Nehru and Abdullah play in Kashmir prior to the war of 1965?

Front Page of Australia's Leading Newspaper on Sept 11, 1965

Who started the India-Pakistan War in 1965? What was Operation Gibraltar? Why did Pakistan initiate Operation Gibraltar?

Why did India cross the international border to attack Lahore and Sialkot on Sept 6, 1965?

What was India’s strategy? What was Pakistan’s strategy?

Did either country succeed in achieving its objectives in 1965? Did the 1965 war make India get a tighter grip on Kashmir?

Viewpoint From Overseas host Faraz Darvesh discusses these questions with panelists Ali H. Cemendtaur and Riaz Haq (www.riazhaq.com)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W_VAqyClS-0

https://vimeo.com/182288648

Did India beat Pakistan in the 1965 war from Ikolachi on Vimeo.

Related Links:

Haq's Musings

FM Manekshaw on Pakistani Military's Performance in 1971

1965 War: The Inside Story

Pakistan Army at the Gates of Delhi

Demolishing India's War Myths

Kashmir Uprising Against Indian Military Occupation

[Riaz Haq]

#India swiftly rejects #UN request for a visit to the disputed territory of #Kashmir. #KashmirUnrest #Modi

http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-india-un-kashmir-20160913-snap-s...


India on Tuesday rejected a request by the United Nations’ human rights chief for a visit to gather information on the disputed territory of Kashmir, where security forces have been accused of using excessive violence in trying to quell unrest.

Zeid Raad Hussein, the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, called for “access that is unconditional to both sides of the Line of Control,” the boundary between India and Pakistan that runs through Kashmir.

Speaking to the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva, Hussein said his request was granted by Pakistan, which accuses Indian forces of human rights violations in the Himalayan territory that the countries have skirmished over for seven decades.

“I believe an independent, impartial and international mission is now needed crucially and that it should be given free and complete access to establish an objective assessment of the claims made by the two sides,” Hussein said.

In the main government hospital in Srinagar, the summer capital of Indian-administered Kashmir, more than 800 people have been treated for eye injuries caused by the pellets, which are made of metal and encased in a thin rubber coating. Many of them have lost at least partial eyesight.

The violence continued Tuesday when two people were killed, including a 19-year-old man, and dozens injured in clashes with security forces who were enforcing a rare curfew on the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha.

Authorities imposed the curfew across all 10 districts of Kashmir to thwart plans by separatist groups to march to the local offices of the United Nations, Indian news media reported.

India and Pakistan each control portions of Kashmir but claim the territory in its entirety. Separatists in the Muslim-majority territory have taken up arms to seek independence from Hindu-dominated India or a merger with Pakistan.

Under a controversial security law, Indian authorities enjoy broad powers to crack down on unrest in Kashmir. Human rights groups have assailed tactics used by security forces, accusing paramilitary police of firing pellets that have injured or blinded peaceful demonstrators and even children sitting in their homes.

“These weapons are inherently indiscriminate and always carry the risk of causing serious injury to people who are not engaging in violence,” said Amnesty International’s India director, Aakar Patel. “There is simply no proper way to use these weapons, and they should be prohibited.”

On Sept. 2, Indian officials approved an alternate to the pellets – a shell packed with a compound derived from chili peppers – that it said would be used only in rare cases. But Amnesty said more than 100 cases of pellet injuries were reported at hospitals in Srinagar in the first week of the month.

[Riaz Haq]

Commander ordered capture of Point 5353 in Kargil war

By Praveen Swami

http://www.thehindu.com/2004/06/30/stories/2004063006391100.htm

NEW DELHI, JUNE 29 . Indian soldiers had attempted to capture Point 5353, a strategically-important peak in the Dras sector, in the first days of the Kargil war. New evidence that such an assault took place blows apart contradictory claims by the former Defence Minister, George Fernandes, and top military officials that the feature does not lie on the Indian side of the Line of Control.

An investigation by The Hindu has gained access to orders issued to Major Navneet Mehra of the 16 Grenadiers Regiment, ordering him to lead an assault on Point 5353, so named for its altitude in metres. It is the highest feature in the Dras sector, and allows the Pakistani troops to observe National Highway 1A, as well as an alternative Dras-Kargil route that is now under construction.

Major Mehra's men were asked to evict the Pakistani intruders on Point 5353 by 6 a.m. on May 18, 1999. The officer's plan was to set up three fire bases along the base of the peak to support the infantry assault by two groups.

Although backed by some artillery, both groups faced a difficult climb, under direct fire from both the Pakistani positions on Point 5353 and Point 5165.

However, Major Mehra's despatches note, his commanding officer, Col. Pushpinder Oberoi, gave specific orders "to go for it at any cost." Col. Oberoi's troops failed to execute his instructions. Ill-equipped for the extreme cold, and not properly acclimatised to the altitude, the troops withdrew after suffering 13 casualties. The attack was finally called off at 3 a.m. on May 19, 1999.

After news broke that the Pakistani troops occupied Point 5353, the Indian Army denied that the peak had ever been held by India, or, indeed, was on its side of the LoC. A press release issued on August 11, 2000, asserted that the "point was never under our control either before or after Operation Vijay in Kargil." Mr. Fernandes seemed to disagree. Asked about the status of Point 5353 at a subsequent press conference, he insisted that "every inch of the land is under our control."

Mr. Fernandes' subsequent statements added to the confusion. Speaking to an audience in Mumbai, he said "Point 5353 is the point over which the LoC goes. Fact is, our troops had never occupied that."

However, on January 1, 2001, the Press Information Bureau issued a photograph of Mr. Fernandes standing on what it claimed was Point 5353. Later, the PIB was forced to sack a junior staffer for "an administrative error."

War-time media reports, based on Army briefings, suggest that further efforts to take the peak were made from July 21, 1999, well after the fighting had officially ended. While these efforts were unsuccessful, the available evidence suggests that then-56 Brigade Commander Amar Aul responded by occupying two heights on the Pakistani side of the LoC, 4875 and 4251.

sSubsequently, the local commanders hammered out a deal, where both agreed to leave points 5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875 unoccupied.

Towards October-end, for reasons still not clear, the 16 Grenadiers were ordered to take Point 5240 and the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles Point 5353. While the 16 Grenadiers' attack proceeded as planned, despite bad weather, the 1-3 Gurkha Rifles, for reasons still not clear, never made their way up to Point 5353. When the Pakistani troops detected the Indian presence on 5240, they promptly reoccupied Point 5353.

[Riaz Haq]

#Indian defense analyst Pravin Sawhney: Fighting tactical battles for one-upmanship. #Rafale and #S400 would certainly help Indian Air Force, but would not tilt the operational level balance in #India’s favor in conflict with #Pakistan https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/fighting-tactical-battles... via @thetribunechd

The issue, thus, is about tactics and operational level of war. The Pakistan military, learning from the Soviet Union, has always given importance to the operational level. This is why in the 1965 and 1971 wars, despite being more in bean-counting of assets, India never won in the western sector. Proof of this are the ceasefire line and the Line of Control, which otherwise would have been converted into international borders.

The situation, regrettably, remains the same today. Separate doctrines of the Army and the Air Force, and with each service doing its own training is evidence that no amount of modernisation would help if the focus of service chiefs remains on tactics. For example, after the Balakot operation, a senior Air Force officer told me that the PAF would not last more than six days. He believed in tactical linear success. What about the other kinetic and non-kinetic forces which impact at the operational level?

This is not all. Retired senior Air Force officers started chest-thumping about the Balakot airstrike having set the new normal. Some argued that air power need not be escalatory, while others made the case for the use of air power in counter-terror operations like the Army. Clearly, they all were talking tactics, not war. Had India retaliated to the PAF’s counter-strike, what it called an act of war, an escalation was assured. It is another matter that PM Narendra Modi had only bargained for the use of the IAF for electoral gains. 

Talking of tactics, Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa spoke about relative technological superiority. Perhaps, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman would not have strayed into Pakistani airspace if his MiG-21 Bison had Software Defined Radio (SDR) and Operational Data Link (ODL). The SDR operates in the VHF, UHF, Ku and L bandwidths and is meant to remove voice clutter. The ODL provides the pilot with data or text, in this case from the ground controller. The officer, separated from his wing-man, and without necessary voice and data instructions, unwittingly breached the airspace and was captured by the Pakistan army. There are known critical shortages of force multipliers in addition to force levels in the IAF. Surely, the IAF Chief can’t do much except keep asking the government to fill the operational voids. But, he could avoid making exaggerated claims since his words would only feed the ultra-nationalists, and support the Modi government’s spurious argument of having paid special attention to national security.

The same is the case with Rafale and S-400. These would certainly help, but would not tilt the operational level balance in India’s favour. For example, the IAF intends to use S-400 in the ‘offensive air defence’ role rather than its designed role of protecting high-value targets like Delhi, for which it was originally proposed. For the protection of high-value targets, the Air Headquarters has made a strong case to purchase the United States’ National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS). This is ironic, because while S-400 can destroy hostile ballistic missiles, NASAMS can’t do so. It can only kill cruise missiles and other aerial platforms. The thinking at the Air Headquarters is that since there is no understanding on the use of ballistic missiles — especially with Pakistan — both sides are likely to avoid the use of ballistic missiles with conventional warheads lest they are misread and lead to a nuclear accident. So, NASAMS may probably never be called upon to take on ballistic missiles.

Given the direction of the relationship between the India and Pakistan, this assumption may not be the best to make when procuring prohibitively expensive high-value assets.

[Riaz Haq]

Pakistan has never actually attacked India proper.

Pakistan’s actions have always been in Kashmir, which it believes is an occupation, and legitimate theater for action.

India twice attacked Pakistan across the International Border in 1965 and 1971.

No country other than #India recognizes #Kashmir to be part of India. The international community rejects India's claim on Kashmir.

Listen to this #JNU Professor Nevidita Menon explain why Kashmir is not and has never been part of India.

https://youtu.be/KWp1E8xrY5E

[Riaz Haq]

Kashmir letters cast doubt on claims Nehru blundered by agreeing ceasefire
Exclusive: papers kept classified for decades reveal India’s first PM acted on advice from most senior general


https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/08/kashmir-letters-cast-...

In his message to (Prime Minister) Nehru dated 28 November 1948, (General Sir Francis Robert Roy )Bucher warned of fatigue among Indian troops in Kashmir, adding that an “overall military decision was no longer possible”.

“Army personnel evince two weaknesses, lack of training in the junior leaders, tiredness and ennui in the other ranks … In brief, the army needs respite for leave, training, and vitalising.”

Nehru, in response, raised concerns over reports that Pakistan intended within weeks to bomb Indian positions from the sky. Meanwhile, Pakistan was building roads to maintain and advance its positions.

In another letter to Bucher sent on 23 December 1948, Nehru wrote: “It is clear to me that we cannot rely on Pakistan remaining on the defensive.” He added: “In the event of Pakistan continuing their persistent shelling and offensive operation and our not being able to check this there, there is every likelihood of war taking place with Pakistan.”

In a later letter dated 28 December, Bucher made his position clear: “I am afraid we cannot take military action to stop every road-building operation by Pakistan. May I suggest a political approach to this problem.”

The war ended on 1 January 1949 with a ceasefire arranged by the United Nations, and later that year Nehru provided special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, giving the region autonomy.


Over the decades, India and Pakistan have fought three more wars over the Kashmir issue and the ensuing border dispute. However, the measures in article 370 provided by Nehru were seen by Kashmiris as crucial to protecting their rights in the India-controlled parts of the Muslim-majority state, and also reduced tensions with Muslim-majority Pakistan.

But in 2019, under the leadership of Hindu nationalist Modi, Delhi formally revoked the state’s constitutional autonomy, in an attempt to integrate it fully into India. The decision tightened the government’s grip over the region and stoked anger and resentment.

The ruling Bharatiya Janata party justified its decision by suggesting Nehru had made a mistake, blaming him for not seeking to grab more territory from Pakistani forces. The India home affairs minister, Amit Shah, in 2019 said the decision to reach a UN-mediated compromise was Nehru’s “biggest mistake”, criticising it as a “Himalayan blunder”.

“What was the need to announce a ceasefire when we were about to win the war?” Shah said.

However, the Bucher papers, as they are known in India, suggest Nehru was acting on informed advice from his military officers.

Bucher, a British officer, was chosen by post-independence India to become commander-in-chief of the Indian army due to his familiarity with Indian military operations and his ability to bridge the gap between British and Indian military personnel. He served between 1948 and 1949 until his retirement and was the last non-Indian to hold the top military post.

[Riaz Haq]

C-130's Havoc! How Pakistan's 'Modified Bomber' Wreaked Havoc On Indian Positions After A 'Disastrous' Paradrop by Ritu Sharma


https://www.eurasiantimes.com/c-130s-havoc-how-pakistans-modified-b...

The wars in the Indian sub-continent have been dissected threadbare, but there have been little-known operations done by the American-made C-130s during the 1965 India-Pakistan war. The cargo aircraft supplied to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was modified to become a bomber and raid the Indian runways.

The other important mission carried out by the C-130 fleet was the audacious para commando attack planned by Pakistan. The commandos were inserted by C-130B to cripple three frontline airbases of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in Punjab – Pathankot, Halwara (near Ludhiana) and Adampur (near Jalandhar).

The US Air Force (USAF) is now considering the dispersed nature of warfare that it will experience in the Indo-Pacific against China. It is turning its airlifters, C-130J, into traditional bombers and giving them more offensive capabilities. The PAF made the modification in 1965.

On the intervening night of 30-31 August 1965, the general atmosphere in the Indian subcontinent was tense. News of Pakistan’s military build-up along the border hinted at impending war. The IAF ordered its units to arm all its fighter jets and bombers on September 1, 1965.


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On the same day, PAF’s Sabres entered the Indian airspace and hit the Pathankot airfield. This strike resulted in the destruction of eight IAF aircraft on the ground at Pathankot. The Sabres were heading towards Adampur and Halwara airbase but were stopped by the IAF’s Hawker Hunter fighter jets.
On September 6, the PAF’s raid on Pathankot airbase inflicted large damage. The IAF had also suffered an early setback over Chhamb and had lost four Vampires. This was supposed to have left the IAF in disarray.



Till 6th September, the lack of significant activities on PAF’s side was intriguing the IAF. However, it was just a lull before the PAF put its most audacious plan into action. The Pakistanis dropped paratroopers at Pathankot, Adampur, and Halwara in the intervening night of 6-7 September. Three C-130 aircraft of PAF dropped 60 Special Service Group Commandos each in the wee hours.

The three groups of 60 paratroopers each were dropped in the vicinity of each airbase. Each group was led by one or two officers and a junior commissioned officer (JCO).

The drop was successful, but the Pakistan commandos ran into unforeseen difficulties. A concerted effort by civilians and the Punjab Police resulted in the apprehension of most of the Commandos.
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C-130 Bombers Modified
As the war proceeded, the Pakistan Air Force modified the C-130s to drop bombs. C-130 bombers targeted Indian tanks and guns in Ramgarh of the Sialkot sector. As part of its riposte strategy, the Indian Army had made advances in the Sialkot sector in response to Pakistan’s advent in Jammu and Kashmir.

In addition, Indian tanks advanced in the Chawinda region. Both areas resulted in two of the biggest tank battles in the history of the Indian subcontinent.

Two C-130s PAF came out in support of their forces and dropped nine tons of bombs each on the night of 15 September. On the following night, a single C-130 strike was repeated against Ramgarh, destroying Indian tanks and guns as well as ammunition and fuel dumps.

Seven officers of the Transport Wing were awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat, and 2 JCOSs the Tamgha-e-Jurat.

Some estimates suggest that the IAF flew over 4,000 combat sorties and the PAF a little over 2,000. The Indian account of the 1965 war suggested that the IAF lost 36 aircraft while still parked on the ground.

On the other hand, in aerial dogfights, the IAF lost just 14 aircraft while shooting down 18 Pakistani jet fighters. Pakistan ended the war, having depleted 17 percent of its front-line strength, while India’s losses amounted to less than 10 percent.