State of Pakistan's Relations With Iran and India

[Riaz Haq]

What does Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan hope to accomplish during his Iran visit? What are the key issues bedeviling Iran-Pakistan relations? Cross-border terrorism alleged by both? Pakistan's relations with the Gulf Arabs? CPEC? Afghanistan? Gwadar? Chabahar? Indian RAW's use of Iran to launch terror attacks in Pakistani Balochistan? Who calls the shots in Iran? President Rouhani or the hardline Iranian Revolutionary Guard leaders?

Why is Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi continuing to threaten Pakistan with use of force, including use of nuclear weapons? Is this part of his election campaign to appeal to his base? Or will this intimidation go beyond elections if he wins a second term? Is Pakistan Prime Minister's hope of better ties with India under BJP just a mirage? Are analysts like Moeed Yusuf right about India waiting it out to achieve overwhelming superiority to eventually dictate term to Pakistan?

Viewpoint From Overseas host Faraz Darvesh discusses these questions with Misbah Azam and Riaz Haq (www.riazhaq.com)

https://youtu.be/seNerO7_KsM

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Chabahar vs Gwadar Ports

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[Riaz Haq]

#Beijing-backed #Pakistan port opens as hub for #Afghanistan trade. #Gwadar challenges #India's interests in region (#Chabahar) , but #China's ROI remains unclear. #CPEC #Trade #Iran #CentralAsia #CAREC https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Beijing-backed-Paki...

[Riaz Haq]

Iran Primer: Iran and the Gulf States - Tehran Bureau | FRONTLINE | PBS


https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/10/iran-...

Modern Iranian leaders -- from shahs to ayatollahs -- have sought a dominant role in the Gulf region because of Iran's economic and demographic weight, as well as the value of Persian Gulf oil shipping lanes. In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran was the preeminent Gulf power and guarantor of U.S. national interests in the region.
Iran's 1979 revolution dramatically altered Tehran's regional stance. Revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for the overthrow of existing pro-American monarchs in the Gulf. Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran pulled the Gulf Arabs and the United States into the brutal eight-year conflict, mostly on Baghdad's side.

The end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, and the rise of more pragmatic leadership in Tehran led to an easing of tensions between Iran and the Gulf Arab states. The two subsequent "Gulf wars" in 1991 and 2003 weakened Iraq, thereby strengthening Iran's relative regional power. Iran's relationship with the smaller states of the lower Persian Gulf has historically been centered on trade. The emirate of Dubai has emerged as Iran's most vital Gulf trade partner and an occasional outlet to skirt sanctions.

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The future

* An Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities could spark a wider regional war with dramatic repercussions for the Persian Gulf region, leading to a skyrocketing oil prices, and potential conflict between Iran and America's key Gulf Arab allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

* The world's major oil players have largely abandoned Iran, but are active in Iraq. If Iraq achieves its ambitious oil targets, it could surpass Iran as the Gulf's second largest producer within a decade. This would have repercussions for the regional balance of power.

* The Iran-Dubai trade relationship will be tested by sanctions and U.S. pressure. But historic links are too deep to imagine a drastic reduction in trade, even though Iranian merchants may not feel as welcome as in the past.

[Riaz Haq]

China-Iran pact boosts #Pakistan’s trade hub dream. Pakistan is happy over #India’s exit from #Iran and #China’s entry into Iran and hopes this emerging Iran-China strategic cooperation can become a ‘CPEC Plus’ for the region. #CPEC - Asia Times https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/china-iran-pact-boosts-pakistans-trad...

A Balochistan government senior official who requested anonymity told Asia Times that the China-Iran deal could improve security conditions in Balochistan’s restive regions, including those that border on Iran. There are currently as many as two million ethnic Baloch in Iran; the insurgents have historically received support from various outside actors.

“We hope and trust that the incursion of miscreants from the Pak-Iran border at Sistan-Baluchistan province would end as a result of infrastructure and connectivity developments in Iran,” he said.

He said that the Gwadar port and other CPEC projects in Balochistan would “pick up pace” if the security problems were resolved. “The CPEC’s security input could come down massively if the situation normalized to some extent,” he said.

Mushahid Hussain Syed, a Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) senator, told Asia Times that China-backed economic activities in Iran would contribute to stability in Balochistan and by association the CPEC’s progress.


“With a proactive Chinese role in Iran – both being good friends of Pakistan – Pakistan’s Western flank will be secured, hopefully helping stability in Balochistan and strengthening the role of Gwadar port in promoting regional connectivity with China, Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asian Republics,” Mushahid said.

“The Iran-China strategic agreement is good for the region and positive for Pakistan’s interests as it strengthens regional economic connectivity of which Pakistan is the emerging hub due to the CPEC and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” Mushahid said.

He suggested that Gwadar port, the multi-billion-dollar centerpiece of the Beijing-financed CPEC, will be pivotal for transit and trade with the wider region including Afghanistan and Central Asian nations such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

That’s clearly what Islamabad hopes. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa recently touted the government’s new economics-oriented vision during the inaugural Islamabad Security Dialogue, which was held nearly coincident with the formal announcement of the Iran-China pact.

Bajwa’s narrative is in line with Beijing’s regional trade-promoting aim, which was further underlined in its new strategic trilateral coordination between Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Turkey. Still, whether Beijing foresees Pakistan as the hub of its Iran pact is debatable.

[Riaz Haq]

Can President Ebrahim Raisi turn Iran’s economic Titanic around?
By Nadereh Chamlou

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/can-president-ebra...

According to the International Monetary Fund, Iran’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)—accounted for 1.86 percent of the world’s GDP (PPP) in 1980. By 2021, its share had declined to 0.8 percent. Within the same timeframe, South Korea’s share rose from 0.6 to 1.7 percent and Turkey’s from 1.2 to 2 percent. This means that Iran has lost considerable economic power on the global stage in comparison to where it was in 1980. Economic underperformance combined with a near trebling of Iran’s population has also led to a per capita income that has barely grown in three decades and one that falls short of its comparators.

Low growth, high inflation, and widespread un- or underemployment have diminished the purchasing power of many income deciles, causing widening income inequality. Iranians below the national poverty line have doubled in the past three years, now encompassing 35 percent of the population. There are daily reports of a decline in the purchase of basic food staples, such as a 50 percent drop in meat, dairy, eggs, and fruits. Even more affordable imported rice, rather than the domestic variety, is being sold one cup at a time rather than in bulk as was done before. There is a shortage of affordable housing, and an average of 40 percent of Iranians—and as high as 70 percent in Tehran—are “house-poor,” i.e. spend the lion’s share of their income on housing, leaving them exposed to sudden poverty in case of cost of living shocks. The anxiety about an ever-increasing uncertain future has also created a mental health crisis.

Unemployment among the educated youth is as high as 40 percent, and one in three Iranians is eager to emigrate. Since the revolution, Iran has become a leading country in brain drain. For instance, in just one category and in 1399 alone (the last Iranian calendar year: March 2019-March 2020), some 250,000 nurses left Iran. It’s a critical number for a country with one of the earliest and worst coronavirus outbreaks in the Middle East. Supreme Leader Khamenei has weighed in by issuing a stern warning against those who encourage the skilled to emigrate, calling it treason.

Officials are quick to blame Iran’s economic underperformance on decades of sanctions imposed by the United States, which have indeed impacted and distorted Iran’s economy. Yet, a 2021 paper co-authored by Hashem Pesaran, Iran’s most renowned economist, faults predominantly domestic policies. The study examines foreign exchange fluctuations and output growth as the leading indicators since 1989. It finds that 80 percent of foreign exchange fluctuations and 83 percent of variations in output growth cannot be explained by sanctions. These “most likely relate to many other latent factors that drive the Iranian economy,” writes Pesaran. Indeed, “state-dominated institutions, heavy-handed bureaucracy, and a banking sector plagued with problems are Iran’s self-imposed sanctions,” concurs Roozbeh Pirouz, a British-Iranian entrepreneur.

The Islamic Republic’s economic model, as designed and implemented by its founders, has failed to fulfill in the last forty-three years any of the grandiose promises that Ayatollah Khomeini made to the Iranian people, such as affordable housing, free utilities, and the eradication of poverty.

[Riaz Haq]

#Pakistan's arrest of anti-#China militant felt from #Beijing to #Tehran. "Pakistan hopes that China will put pressure on #Iran over the issue of its support of #Baloch militancy" #CPEC #SaudiArabia #India - Nikkei Asia https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Terrorism/Pakistan-s-arrest-of-ant...

Meanwhile, Imam's arrest, the details of which remain a mystery, could have geopolitical implications. Although the BNA says he was caught in Turkey, most experts and security officials interviewed by Nikkei agree he had been operating out of Iran.

Kiyya Baloch believes it is no accident that Imam's detention was announced as Beijing brokers an Iran-Saudi rapprochement. "Pakistan hopes that China will put pressure on Tehran over the issue of support of Baloch militancy through its newly formed role of a peace broker," he added.

Experts say Tehran does not consider anti-Islamabad groups enemies and sees them as potentially useful allies against other hostile groups. But Luke Przybyszewski, president of the Abhaseed Foundation Fund, a Polish group of Middle East experts, said the situation presented by the arrest of Imam has created some room for mediation by Beijing.

"It's not a black-and-white situation in which Beijing would resort to just disciplining Iran," he told Nikkei, "but rather could see this as another diplomatic opportunity to increase its regional role."

Przemyslaw Lesinski, an expert on Afghanistan and Iran at the War Studies Academy in Warsaw, said Beijing would like to see regional proxy conflicts come to an end. "We can be quite certain that China will put pressure not only on Iran but also on other [players] in the region, too," he said, suggesting Beijing would be a beneficiary of security cooperation between Tehran and Islamabad.