Pakistan's 2nd Strike Capability and Nuclear Triad

[Riaz Haq]

General Khalid Kidwai, the man who headed Pakistan's strategic forces for 15 years, has said his country is close to having nuclear "second strike capability" with a "sea-based platform".

 Kidwai said the 2750 Kilometer range Shaheen 3 ballistic missile has been developed in response to reports of India's plans to locate nuclear bases in Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Indian ocean.

On the tactical nuclear missile Nasr with a range of just 37 miles, Kidawi said it was intended to deter India's "Cold Start" doctrine which sought to exploit gaps between Pakistan's conventional and nuclear capabilities.

Kidwai was speaking at a 2015 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington DC recently.

Before answering questions from former US Defense official Peter Lavoy who moderated the discussion and the audience, Kidwai made the following points in his introductory remarks:

1. One nuclear power is trying to teach another a "lesson" at the line of control in Kashmir

2.  Conflicts must be managed for socio-economic development in South Asia.

3. Managing conflict is not revisionism--it's common sense.

4.  Fear of nuclear war can maintain peace and enable socio-economic development

 5. Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons are a response to India's offensive doctrine.

6.   It's unfortunate that the debate has degenerated into lesser issues of command and control and nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands.

7. Discriminatory access to technology is wrong-headed. It does not contribute to managing conflict.


Here are some Q&As from the session:


Question (Lavoy) : History of Pakistan's nuclear weapons...greatest accomplishment and biggest regrets

Answer (Kidawi) : No regrets. I am a "satisfied soldier". Greatest achievement: More comprehensive satisfaction of taking scientific experiments to complete operationalization with a variety of nuclear weapons. It has ensured peace in South Asia. War as an instrument policy is out.

Question: How do you regard nuclear weapons...extension of conventional war fighting?

Answer:  They are seen as deterrent, not as primary war-fighting capability.

Question: What's the logic of Nasr with such a short range?

Answer:  US has short-range nukes. Pakistan is not unique. Our adversary was seeing gaps in Pakistan capability to find space to launch conventional strikes. Nasr filled the gap to deter "cold start doctrine".

Question: Concern is about intermingling of conventional and strategic making nuclear war more likely, not less likely.

Answer:  If tactical nukes make India think twice, if not ten times, then they make sense. It's to stop India's bluster of massive retaliation and not provoke mutual destruction.

Question: The other side of the range, Shaheen 3, what is its actual range?

It's 2750 Km.

Answer: Logic is to respond to reports of development of Indian bases in Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Indian ocean. Pakistan has no need to go beyond the 2750 Km range.

Question: Shaheen 3's political dimension is troubling with capability to hit other countries in the Middle East (Israel?)


Why is Pakistan's 2750 Km troublesome while India's 10,000 to 12,000 Km not troublesome?

Q&As with the Audience:

Question: Is Pakistan's nuclear program open-ended? How many is enough?

Answer:  It's not open-ended. It's to assure minimum deterrence.

 Question: Saudis have often hinted at access to Pakistan nuclear weapons?

Answer:  You should ask the Saudis why they are saying that. I can tell you that Pakistan will not be a source of nuclear weapons technology for any country.

Question: When would Pakistan have transparency of its nuclear program, like numbers of weapons? 


Answer: No government of Pakistan will reveal number of weapons. It'll maintain ambiguity.

Question: Other nuclear weapons states call their weapons "weapons of peace"? Should you worry about their use in war?

Answer: Pakistan's nuclear weapons are bedrock of Pakistan's security.

Question: Will Pakistan develop nuclear submarine as 2nd strike capability.

Pakistan will develop 2nd strike capability to maintain balance with India.

Question: Will Pakistan's 2nd capability be sea-based?

Answer: Yes.

Question: How will you coordinate army navy and air force commands in terms of nuclear weapons?

Answer: SPD is the coordination authority using elaborate C4ISR and transportation.

Question: You need a quiet submarine to avoid detection. Can you do it?

Answer: Yes, we are close to it. We'll have it in the next few years.

Question (Lavoy): Can Pakistan afford it?

Answer:  There are a lot of fantastic figures quoted about Pakistan's defense spending. But Pakistan's nuclear costs are a fraction of total defense expenditures which are in the range of 3 to 3.5% of GDP.

Question: Will Pakistan sign international treaties?

Answer: Maybe in the next few years.

Question: What is Pakistan's plans in space?

Answer:  Unfortunately, Pakistan's space program is lagging behind. SPD's interest in space program is in ensuring C4I2SR for our military needs.

Question: Pakistan's image after AQ Khan episode has not improved. What is Pakistan doing about it?

Answer: We are making serious efforts to join NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group).

 Question (from Voice of Vietnam): Pakistan is China's only ally. Can Pakistan use its ties with China to promote peace in Asia?

Answer: I disagree that Pakistan is China's only ally. But Pakistan and China have been close friends since 1960s. Our alliance with China is not against any country but to promote peace.

Question (Lavoy): Have you asked your military colleagues to cut ties with terrorism that could start the war you are trying to avoid.

 Answer: I disagree with the premise of the question. The situation we are in was thrust upon Pakistan. First lack of resolution of Kashmir issue and then superpower conflict in Afghanistan have led to militancy and terrorism we are dealing with.

Here's the full video of the session with Gen Kidawi:

https://youtu.be/CNZCw0BXKyE





I think senior American analyst and South Asia watcher Stephen Cohen summed up the current situation in South Asia when he said: "The alphabet agencies—ISI, RAW, and so forth—are often the chosen instrument of state policy when there is a conventional (and now a nuclear) balance of power, and the diplomatic route seems barren."

I see little likelihood of full-scale war between India and Pakistan. The best way for the two nuclear armed neighbors to proceed is sustained diplomatic engagement to resolve all outstanding issues including Kashmir. If the diplomatic route remains barren, there will be continuation of covert and proxy wars in the region.

Related Links:

Haq's Musings

Pakistan's Shaheen 3 Can Hit Deep Inside India and Israel

Pakistan Building Nuclear Submarine?

India's Israel Envy

Pakistan Space Program

Revolution in Military Affairs

Pakistan Defense Production Goes High-Tech

Drones Outrage and Inspire Pakistanis

RMA Status in Pakistan

Cyber Wars in South Asia

Pakistan's Biggest Ever Arms Bazar

Genomics and Biotech Advances in Pakistan

India's Israel Envy: What if Modi Attacks Pakistan

Eating Grass: Pakistan's Nuclear Program

Kerry Challenges Modi With Hard Evidence

[Riaz Haq]

#China vows to deepen maritime security ties with #Pakistan: report http://tribune.com.pk/story/859341/china-vows-to-deepen-maritime-se... …

BEIJING: China on Thursday vowed to deepen maritime security, anti-terrorism, security and military cooperation with Pakistan to further strengthen their ‘all-weather’ strategic ties.

The “pledge” was made by Chinese Central Military Commission Vice Chairperson General Fan Changlong during his meeting with Pakistan Navy Chief Muhammad Zakaullah in Beijing.

Fan said China hopes to enhance coordination and cooperation with Pakistan on regional security affairs.

“China is willing to deepen cooperation with Pakistan in anti-terrorism, maritime security and military technology,” Fan said.

China together with Pakistan will push for the construction of the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor within the construct of China’s “Belt and Road” initiatives.

Zakaullah said that Pakistan will work with China to deepen logical cooperation between the two armed forces.

Previously, the Pakistan naval chief said that Pakistan Navy and PLA Navy are strengthening their existing maritime cooperation, keeping in mind the changing regional international scenarios.

Yesterday (Wednesday) Zakaullah met with Commander of the PLA (Navy) Admiral Wu Shengli and said that the navies of Pakistan and China have been cooperating for decades.

He said that military cooperation between the two countries is extensive and it covers equipment, personnel exchanges and joint exercises.

Zakaullah said Pakistan strongly supports PLA Navy’s enhanced role in the international arena.

[Riaz Haq]

Here's an excerpt from a piece in Diplomat on "India and Pakistan Locked in a Nuclear Naval Arms Race"

...Rehman highlights a few other interesting points about the naval nuclear dynamics in the Indian Ocean:

India’s pursuit of a sea-based nuclear strike force is the next logical step in its quest for an assured retaliatory capability.
To enjoy an effective sea-based deterrent vis-à-vis China, India’s other prospective nuclear adversary, New Delhi has to develop larger SSBNs with greater missile carriage capacity and more powerful nuclear reactors.
Pakistan’s naval nuclear ambitions are fueled primarily by the sense of a growing conventional, rather than strategic, imbalance between New Delhi and Islamabad.
By dispersing low-yield nuclear weapons across a variety of naval platforms, Islamabad aims to acquire escalation dominance and greater strategic depth and to reduce the incentives for a preemptive strike on its nuclear assets.
Interestingly, Rehman also underlines that, “the submarine-based leg of India’s nuclear triad will have a major impact on the nation’s existing command-and-control arrangements.”

Writing for The Diplomat, Amit R. Saksena, already elaborated on this point back in January. “For a sea-based asset, where deterrence is primarily achieved by long-term radio silence, and launching control is delegated to seniority on board the vessel, the existing command and control model is not applicable,” Saksena emphasized.

India’s nuclear warfare policy is predicated on a No First-Use (NFU) doctrine; consequently, New Delhi needs to field a credible second-strike capability.

“Just like Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons (TnWs), New Delhi will essentially be delegating launch control to field officers on board the submarine, massively increasing the probability of incidental firing,” according to Saksena.

Furthermore, he points out another issue. “India, like Pakistan, is known to keep its nuclear warheads de-mated from the delivery mechanisms. For the INS Arihant to fulfill its operational responsibility, SLBMs mounted with nuclear warheads will have to be deployed on the vessel.”

Rehman does not discuss this issue in any detail. Nor, despite highlighting the problem, does he elaborate on what a new command and control model for India’s strategic forces might look like.

However, the report contains an interesting section on what lessons Islamabad and New Delhi can derive from naval nuclear operations during the Cold War, as well China’s future role in shaping naval nuclear policies in the Indian Ocean.

At the end of the report, which is worthwhile reading in its entirety, Rehman concludes that “the present period offers a precious window of opportunity for both New Delhi and Islamabad to shape, rather than be shaped, by the emerging naval nuclear regime in South Asia.” Yet the window for the implementation of new confidence-building measures between the two countries is shrinking rapidly.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/india-and-pakistan-locked-in-a-nucle...

http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/09/murky-waters-naval-nuclear-...

[Riaz Haq]

The story with India and Pakistan is they still have growing nuclear arsenals. These limited technical agreements have not produced the kind of foundation for that broader relationship that some of the analysis talking about Iran seems to expect.

SIEGEL: What do you make of the argument that countries that acquire nuclear arsenals, even if they sound remarkably belligerent before that time, tend to behave fairly responsibly once they do have nuclear arsenals?

O'DONNELL: Well, I mean, to that I can only say look at the example of North Korea. You know, it's one of the most irresponsible states in the world. It's always making nuclear threats. If a state has nuclear weapons, that doesn't automatically guarantee a certain format of behavior.

SIEGEL: And the India-Pakistan conflict - I mean, do you think of it as one that actually has the potential of turning into a nuclear exchange anytime in the even distant future?

O'DONNELL: I don't see that getting to the level of a nuclear exchange. However, what concerns me is that there is not a sustainable, ongoing dialogue to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan. What has happened in recent years is that both sides adopt a tough stance and start escalating, and they both wait for the United States to come in and provide both of them the face-saving exercise that the United States will intervene and bring them both down. There are not mechanisms to de-escalate once a crisis emerges.

SIEGEL: Yeah.

O'DONNELL: That is what I find most concerning about the situation there.

SIEGEL: That addressing the question of nuclear weapons can be a remarkably compartmentalized and technical development and really have no implications for a more peaceful relations between countries.

O'DONNELL: I think that India and Pakistan developed nuclear weapons out of both of their own sense of security threat. And for there to be some measures of reducing nuclear tensions, this has to be part of a broader political dialogue involving what both of their own threat perceptions are, and also, I argue, including China as well because China is very much part of the South Asian strategic environment. It's very much a player in the region.

SIEGEL: Do you see any parallels between Iran today and Pakistan and India at the point where they were intent on developing nuclear weapons?

O'DONNELL: The main parallel I see with Iran - up until really the Obama administration came in, the activities it was conducting up to that point seemed to me very reminiscent of what India was doing - the position it had up until it conducted testing in 1998. For a long period - say, from about the mid '80s and up until 1998, what India did was it had the capability. It had all the material. It had the knowledge. It had, you know, the missiles all sitting disassembled in its basement. By doing that, it meant that it would not be sanctioned as it was after 1998 for conducting the nuclear tests. However, it could in some ways behave like a nuclear-weapon state. It could throw its weight around a bit more. And I wonder if Iranians who are, you know, running the program did look at India's experience as a guide.



http://www.npr.org/2015/03/30/396405005/iran-talks-shed-light-on-nu... 

[Riaz Haq]

#Pakistan to buy 8 #Chinese attack submarines. Biggest ever multi-billion dollar arms export deal for #China http://on.wsj.com/1ameN1S @WSJ

Pakistan’s plan to buy eight Chinese submarines is likely to be one of China’s biggest arms deals and to intensify an emerging undersea contest in the Indian Ocean.

The deal, confirmed by a senior Pakistani defense official, is also expected to be among Pakistan’s biggest-ever weapons purchases.

Rear Admiral Mukhtar Khan, additional secretary in Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence, revealed the plan at a meeting of parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence on Tuesday, according to an official record of the meeting.

The official record quoted him saying that “the National Security Committee (NSC) has approved, in principle the project to acquire eight Chinese submarines. Financial negotiations for the same are in advance stages.”

The National Security Committee is the top decision-making body for defense issues, with both civilian leadership—including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif—and the military chiefs sitting on this committee.

Pakistan Navy officials declined to comment. An official in the press office of China’s Defense Ministry referred questions on the submarine deal to local defense industry representatives but declined to say which ones were involved.

A senior Pakistani government official said that discussions were ongoing, but the financial and technical details of the deal won’t be publicly discussed until negotiations are wrapped up and it has actually been signed.

China and Pakistan have had close relations for decades based largely on their mutual suspicion of India, and China has long been one of Pakistan’s main arms suppliers.

Hua Chunying, a Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman, didn’t respond directly when asked about the submarine deal on Thursday but said: “China and Pakistan are traditional friends and neighbors.”

She said that China abided by its principles and international standards when selling arms.

She also said that Chinese President Xi Jinping was looking forward to paying a state visit to Pakistan “as soon as possible” and both sides were in close contact on that issue. She didn’t give a date for the visit.

Military experts and defense industry publications say the deal is most likely for Pakistan to buy China’s diesel-powered Yuan class attack submarines, which are also known as Type 039A or Type 041.

However, some earlier reports have suggested that Pakistan could purchase another Chinese diesel-powered attack submarine called the Qing class, or Type 032.

Pakistan’s navy currently operates five French-designed Agosta class submarines, two purchased in the 1970s and three in the 1990s, according to the navy’s official website.

“I think the reasoning for Pakistan, is, as always, competition with India,” said James Hardy, Asia Pacific editor of IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly.

“These subs would be attack subs so conventionally armed [antiship missiles and torpedoes rather than nuclear armed] and would be designed to complicate any Indian blockade operations around Karachi or elsewhere in the event of a war. ”

China’s global arms exports more than doubled between the five-year period ended in 2009 and the five-year period ended in 2014, according to an annual report on weapons transfers published last month by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

China was Pakistan’s biggest arms supplier between 2010 and 2014, accounting for 51% of Pakistani weapons imports. The U.S. was in second place with 30%, according to the report.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-to-buy-eight-chinese-submarine...

[Riaz Haq]

Pakistan To Buy 8 Submarines From China

He (Analyst Haris Khan) said the Type-214 deal was the centerpiece of the naval aspect of the AFDP, and that the first submarine would have been delivered in 2015. The naval aspect of the AFDP especially is in total disarray, he said.

It is unknown if the Type-214 was shelved until finances become available (some industry officials believe this was at least the intention at the time the deal collapsed), but attention subsequently switched to acquiring six AIP-equipped submarines from China.

Due to the need to decommission the Agosta-70s, Khan believes any refurbished submarines will be required to be "sailing under a Pakistani flag within 12 months."

Acquiring Turkish Type-209s remains possible, and despite Pakistan's predicament, Khan says "Under the present circumstances I don't see any collaboration between Pakistan and Turkey since Pakistan will only be locally producing Chinese submarines."

Whether the Chinese submarines are the S-20 export derivative of the Type-039A/Type-041 Yuan-class submarine, or a bespoke design, is unclear. But the Yuan has also been mentioned, and according to government officials the deal was supposed to be secured by the end of 2014.

If the deal transpires, Khan said it will be the largest ever Sino-Pakistani deal. He believes the submarines will each cost $ 250 million to $325 million.

Neither the Ministry of Defence nor the Navy would shed further light when asked. No answers were forthcoming to requests regarding the timeframe of the deal, whether the two Agosta-70s will finally be retired now the number of planned Chinese submarines has increased to eight, clarification on acquiring surplus Western submarines, or the status of the Type-214 acquisition efforts.

Should the Chinese deal go through, it will be a considerable relief, and be especially significant for the nuclear deterrent.

Pakistan inaugurated its Naval Strategic Force Command in 2012 in response to India's rapid nuclearization.

A potential force of 8 AIP-equipped Chinese subs and the three Agosta-90Bs "is a quantum leap in existing capabilities," said Mansoor Ahmed of Quaid-e-Azam University's Department of Defence and Strategic Studies.

Though acknowledging nuclear-powered attack boats are far more capable, he believes "An AIP [diesel-electric submarine] offers Pak the best bang for the buck. But it has to be supplemented with a commensurate investment in [anti-submarine warfare] capabilities to neutralize developments on the Indian side."

He said this will lay the groundwork for having a permanent sea-based deterrent equipped with plutonium-based warheads fitted to cruise missiles, "which is expected to be the next major milestone in Pakistan's development of a triad."

Ahmed acknowledges this "would pose fresh challenges for ensuring effective and secure communications at all times with the submarines for both India and Pak in addition to having a mated-arsenal at sea that would require pre-delegation of launch authority at some level for both countries.

"This would be an altogether new challenge that would have to be addressed for an effective sea-based deterrent."

Nevertheless, AIP-equipped conventional submarines "provide reliable second strike platforms, [and] an assured capability resides with [nuclear-powered attack and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines], which are technically very complex and challenging to construct and operate compared to SSKs, and also very capital intensive."

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2015/04/0... 

[Riaz Haq]

The Balance of Terror
Who’s Afraid of Iran’s Big Bad Bomb? by Uri Averny

According to foreign experts, Israel has several hundred nuclear bombs (assessments vary between 80-400. If Iran sends its bombs and obliterates most of Israel (myself included), Israeli submarines will obliterate Iran. Whatever I might think about Binyamin Netanyahu, I rely on him and our security chiefs to keep our “second strike” capability intact. Just last week we were informed that Germany had delivered another state-of-the-art submarine to our navy for this purpose.

Israeli idiots – and there are some around – respond: “Yes, but the Iranian leaders are not normal people. They are madmen. Religious fanatics. They will risk the total destruction of Iran just to destroy the Zionist state. Like exchanging queens in chess.”

Such convictions are the outcome of decades of demonizing. Iranians – or at least their leaders – are seen as subhuman miscreants.

Reality shows us that the leaders of Iran are very sober, very calculating politicians. Cautious merchants in the Iranian bazaar style. They don’t take unnecessary risks. The revolutionary fervor of the early Khomeini days is long past, and even Khomeini would not have dreamt of doing anything so close to national suicide.

According to the Bible, the great Persian king Cyrus allowed the captive Jews of Babylon to return to Jerusalem and rebuild their temple. At that time, Persia was already an ancient civilization – both cultural and political.

After the “return from Babylon”, the Jewish commonwealth around Jerusalem lived for 200 years under Persian suzerainty. I was taught in school that these were happy years for the Jews.

Since then, Persian culture and history has lived through another two and a half millennia. Persian civilization is one of the oldest in the world. It has created a great religion and influenced many others, including Judaism. Iranians are fiercely proud of that civilization.

To imagine that the present leaders of Iran would even contemplate risking the very existence of Persia out of hatred of Israel is both ridiculous and megalomaniac.

Moreover, throughout history, relations between Jews and Persians have almost always been excellent. When Israel was founded, Iran was considered a natural ally, part of David Ben-Gurion’s “strategy of the periphery” – an alliance with all the countries surrounding the Arab world.

The Shah, who was re-installed by the American and British secret services, was a very close ally. Teheran was full of Israeli businessmen and military advisers. It served as a base for the Israeli agents working with the rebellious Kurds in northern Iraq who were fighting against the regime of Saddam Hussein.

After the Islamic revolution, Israel still supported Iran against Iraq in their cruel 8-year war. The notorious Irangate affair, in which my friend Amiram Nir and Oliver North played such an important role, would not have been possible without the old Iranian-Israeli ties.

Even now, Iran and Israel are conducting amiable arbitration proceedings about an old venture: the Eilat-Ashkelon oil pipeline built jointly by the two countries.

If the worst comes to the worst, nuclear Israel and nuclear Iran will live in a Balance of Terror.

Highly unpleasant, indeed. But not an existential menace.

However, for those who live in terror of the Iranian nuclear capabilities, I have a piece of advice: use the time we still have.

Under the American-Iranian deal, we have at least 10 years before Iran could start the final phase of producing the bomb.

http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/04/03/whos-afraid-of-irans-big-bad...

[Riaz Haq]

Here's a description of Israeli subs capable of firing nuclear cruse missiles:

Right now, three Dolphin II-class submarines are under construction at Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems shipyards in Kiel. Once the submarines complete their trials and head towards the Mediterranean, they will become the most powerful Israeli submarines ever.

More than 225 feet long, the diesel-electric Dolphin II class is part attack submarine, part nuclear strike ship and part commando taxi.

They’re also painted in an unusual combination of black, blue and green colors. That’s “meant to make the ship less visible, and thought to be especially effective in Mediterranean waters,” Defense News noted after recently publishing new photographs of the fat, oddly-shaped boats in dry dock and on sea trials.

In terms of weapons, the three boats of the Dolphin II class—the Tannin, Rahav and a third unnamed submarine—contain 10 torpedo tubes capable of launching fiber optic cable-guided DM-2A4 torpedoes. Germany has already handed over the Tannin, which is preparing for its journey to Israel.

Four of these tubes are larger 26-inch tubes—the size is rare for a Western-built submarine—capable of launching small commando teams or firing larger cruise missiles. The remaining six tubes measure at 21 inches.

Although not admitted by the Israeli government, the Dolphin II is widely believed to soon possess nuclear-tipped Popeye Turbo cruise missiles. The submarine’s armament includes non-nuclear anti-ship Harpoon and anti-helicopter Triton missiles.

In 2012, German news magazine Der Spiegel interviewed several German defense ministry officials, all of whom were under the assumption that Israel intends for these submarines to carry nuclear weapons. The missiles can also be launched “using a previously secret hydraulic ejection system,” the magazine reported.

The photographs at Defense News also reveal horizontal planes for trailing communications gear and sonar buoys. But the classified propeller is covered by a tarp to keep out prying eyes.

For sensors, the Dolphin II comes with the German-made CSU-90 active radar, a PRS-3 passive ranging sonar and a FAS-3 flank sonar. These sensors are in addition to an Israeli-made surface search radar.

Of course, submarines need to be stealthy—and the Dolphin II is indeed quiet. The trick is in the submarine’s air-independent propulsion fuel cells, which provide power under the surface as the diesel engines—used for running on the surface—rest and recharge.

This system is quieter than the nuclear-powered engines on American and Russian submarines, which must constantly circulate engine coolant. Nuclear submarines are virtually unlimited in terms of range, and are better used for deep-water operations. But Israel has no need for nuclear-powered subs when quiet diesel subs can do the same job.

The Dolphin II’s top speed maxes out at 20 knots when submerged. But the maximum distance before needing to be refueled is around 9,200 miles at a speed of eight knots underwater. This puts the submarines in range of Iran.

And that’s why Israel is investing in an up-armed submarine fleet. The Israeli military wants to maintain its undeclared nuclear strike force. Given Israel’s small size, a nuclear deterrent promises massive retaliation if Israel’s homeland is threatened.

Plus, submarines are very useful for littoral operations off the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/08/21/israels_doomsda...

[Riaz Haq]

#India rejects #American proposal for joint navy patrols in South #China Sea ahead of Ashton Carter visit to #Delhi. http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/shows-of-str... …

India’s firm rejection of a proposal to jointly patrol the South China Sea with the US Navy has averted, at least for the time being, a risky entanglement. But the simmering tensions over control of the contested waterway are intensifying and could result in a clash that would affect India’s oil exploration and navigation through the area.
The impending decision by the UN Arbitral Tribunal over China’s expansive territorial claims sets the stage for Beijing to intensify its efforts to establish control over all reefs and features. As a part of that manoeuvre this week China inaugurated a light house on submerged Subi Reef near the Philippines. Anticipating such stepped up Chinese control and militarisation, the US has increased Freedom of Navigation operations and flights, making South China Sea the arena for trial of strength between the traditional power and the challenger.
What is astounding is that China has built up its military control over most of South China Sea in less than three years, and that too right before the eyes of its neighbours and the US Navy. It has constructed artificial islands and then covered them with airfields and military installations, setting up missile batteries and over-the-horizon radar coverage designed to give it dominance over the entire body of water.
Countries disputing Chinese claims have turned to the US for help, while the Philippines has even sought legal injunction through the UN Tribunal, which is expected to hand down a decision in coming months. Although China has already rejected the tribunal’s authority, the US suspects China is hurrying up fortifying its presence in contested islands. The US has warned about China’s ongoing construction activity going further east but seems unable to do much about it other than urging it to stop militarisation. What all of Asia once accepted as disputed territory has now become a de facto Chinese lake.
While the US has declined to take a position on the legality of competing territorial claims, it cannot overlook the Chinese advances. While its ports and airfields, constructed on seven artificial islands, provide the power projection capability needed to cow wary neighbours, the establishment of an Air Defense Zone will give Beijing control over the skies. The US and Japan may refuse to accept this – and get away with it – but most nations will play it safe and comply, giving China de facto control over the South China Sea’s waters and airspace.
To date, China has not sought to prevent passage by any vessel (barring one occasion when an Indian navy ship was given radio warning while sailing out of Vietnam), but its overwhelming military presence on artificial islands could allow it to eventually require that others seek Beijing’s permission to sail through the South China Sea.

----

If India joins the US in a joint patrol of the South China Sea, it should be prepared to see a joint Sino-Pakistani naval patrol along its western seaboard, knowing full well that such tit-for-tat escalations seldom produce a positive outcome. That said, Indian leaders need to be prepared to establish some red lines, particularly if Beijing’s muscle-flexing imperils New Delhi’s freedom of navigation in and above the South China Sea.

[Riaz Haq]

#American Defense Sec to visit #Delhi to sign security, logistics and intelligence cooperation deals with #India 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/article8261843.ece …

Ashton Carter's impending visit comes as focused efforts are on to make progress in concluding the 3 outstanding defence pacts between the two countries.

U.S. Defence Secretary Ashton Carter will be visiting India in April and focused efforts are under way to make progress in concluding the three outstanding defence agreements between the two countries, sources have told The Hindu.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had said during his visit to Washington in December 2015 that India was “in principle” agreeable to these pacts but some more clarity was required from the U.S. side. Both Indian and American officials had then said that progress could be expected in 2016.

Will follow Modi’s visit 

Mr. Carter will be travelling to India within weeks after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the U.S. on March 31 and April 1, to attend the nuclear security summit.

Mr. Carter’s visit to India will take place against the backdrop of continuing tensions in the South China Sea. India and the U.S. had in January 2015 announced a joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. U.S. continues to accuse China of “militarising” the region. 

Needling by North Korea

The recent North Korean nuclear adventurism has prompted U.S. allies such as South Korea and Japan to seek higher U.S. presence in the region. The U.S. had repeatedly said in recent weeks that it would not hesitate to intervene to ensure the security of its Asian partners and now China has accused the U.S of militarising the region.

America has not specified what it expects India to do in East Asia, pointed out Richard M. Rossow, Wadhwani Chair in U.S. India Policy Studies at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. “The recent rumor of a joint patrol in the South China Sea certainly raised interest among the strategic community, though realistically it seems unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future,” he said.

‘Foundational agreements’ 

Termed ‘foundational agreements,’ the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for geospatial intelligence have been pending for at least a decade now and will be the focus during Mr. Carter’s visit.

The U.S. has signed these agreements with most of its strategic partners. Dominant sections within the political and strategic community in India have argued that signing of these agreements will lock the country in an irreversible embrace with the U.S. India and the U.S. have already signed one foundational agreement -- General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).

Time to move forward on pacts

Indian sources told The Hindu that there is increasing acceptance within the military and strategic community that it is time to move forward on these agreements. “For India-U.S. defence cooperation to be effective and optimal, these agreements can be of great help,” one said.

“The political resistance from the Left that stopped these agreements in 2006 is not relevant now. Also arguments against these agreements have weakened as India-U.S. defence cooperation has grown by leaps and bounds in the last ten years. The time is just ripe to move forward,” Mr. Rossow said.

‘Parrikar deflects it to MEA’ 

Mr. Rossow, however, feels that Mr. Parrikar has not sufficiently pulled his weight in favour of the foundational agreements and cooperation with the U.S. in general according. “For the most part, when the strategic community tries to do something, he tends to deflect it to the MEA” he said.

[Riaz Haq]

Pakistan Navy on March 29 announced that it has successfully test-fired a cruise missile that is capable of being launched from a submarine. Defence experts believe that it has brought Pakistan closer to India, its main rival.

https://topyaps.com/pakistan-navy-missile

The Pakistani Navy revealed that the missile launched was the submarine version of ‘Babur’ missile and was test fired from an underground platform with a range of striking at 450 kms. They also revealed that the missile can carry various payloads and has enhanced its nuclear second-strike capability.

This is the second test of a missile of Babur class. The first test was reported in January last year and international defence analysts believe that this class of missiles was built by the inputs provided by the Chinese and Ukrainian navies.

The cruise missiles have a peculiar advantage over ballistic missiles. The former are smaller and hence can be launched from the torperdo tubes of the submarines. This could be the reason why Pakistan has started to modify its existing fleet of three French-designed Agosta-98 submarines. These Babur class missiles can also be launched by eight diesel-electric submarines that Pakistan is buying from China.

The test has raised serious concerns in New Delhi as the missile’s low-altitude profile makes it best for ‘sneak’ attacks along India’s vast coastline. This has also raised an alarm over Indian Navy’s depleting fleet of submarines and the nearly-obsolete anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

The Indian Navy still uses the outdated British Sea King helicopters for scanning the seas and launching quick attacks. These almost 50-years-old helicopters need to be replaced soon as they are an important part of the AWS capability.