"Last Chance" For Peace in Pakistan Taliban Talks

[Riaz Haq]

"I am sure the whole nation would be behind the government if and when we launch a military operation against the terrorists - but I want to give peace a final chance," Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif told members of  Pakistan's parliament in a televised speech on January 29, 2014.

So why did Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decide to make the "final chance" offer of talks to the TTP just when it seemed his government was ready to launch a military operation to root out the Pakistani Taliban? Let's explore the answer this question in some detail.

Poll Numbers on TTP:

While the number of Pakistanis who support the Taliban is very small and shrinking, there are still significant numbers of people who are opposed to using military force against them.

Pew Poll May 2013

The most recent poll data on this issue is from a Pew Poll conducted in May 2013. It showed that only 17% of respondents said they have a favorable view of the TTP while 56% have an unfavorable view of them.  However, only 35% of the people support the use of military force against them while 29% oppose it.

Chances of Talks Success:

There is a very slim chance of success of Pakistan's talks with the TTP. Why? Because there have been several failed attempts earlier to bring peace through talks with the them.

First such agreements was concluded between Nek Mohammad and Pakistani military in Shakai Valley in 2004. Both sides agreed to peace with the understanding that the Taliban will not host foreign fighters and they will not attack Pakistani military or civilians. In return, the government offered compensation to the families of those killed, pay off TTP's debts to Al Qaeda and release Taliban prisoners. While the government held to its part of the bargain, the Taliban did not. The deal broke down almost immediately; Mohammed claimed he never agreed to identify or hand over any Al Qaeda militants and the Taliban began killing tribal elders who helped broker the agreement.

Shakai Valley deal was followed by peace agreements at Sararogha in 2005 and then Swat in 2009. Both of these deals also failed because of the Taliban non-compliance. The TTP intensified violence against civilians after each of these details.

Talks Are a PR Exercise:

Both the Pakistani Taliban and the government see talks as an opportunity to gain support of the fence-sitters, those who dislike the Taliban but are unwilling to support military action against them.

The Taliban will try and show their willingness to talk to get "Shariah" implemented "peacefully" in Pakistan. Their aim will be to strengthen the resolve of those who support them to bring "Shariah" while swaying the fence-sitter to join their side.

Taliban "Shariah" is fake. Say No to Taliban "Shariah"

Pakistani government needs to demonstrate to the fence-sitters that it, too, wants to give peace a chance before resorting to military force as a last resort. The government must also persuade people that the Taliban "Shariah" has nothing to do with the real Shariah of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) who came as a blessing for the entire world (Rematul lil Alameen).  Far from being a blessing to the world, the Taliban are a curse on humanity. They are simply using the talk of "Shariah" as a Trojan horse to win power for themselves. Pakistani leaders need to remind the people of what the Taliban did in Swat in 2009 after agreeing to peace in the name of  "Nizam-e-Adl" when they tortured and killed large numbers innocent civilians and bombed girls' schools. The people need to be repeatedly shown the death and destruction of tens of thousands of lives wrought by the Taliban in all parts of the country over the last decade.

Summary:

If history is any guide, the chances of success of the current peace talks between Pakistan government and the Taliban are slim to none. While it would be great to be proved wrong, I think it's time for Pakistani government and the people to prepare for a long, sustained campaign to rid the country of the TTP terrorists. If Pakistan fails to defeat the Taliban, they will destroy Pakistan.

Here's a video discussion on the subject of Pakistan-TTP Talks:

https://vimeo.com/86290127


Can Pakistan-Taliban Talks Succeed Will India-born Nadella Turn Mic... from WBT TV on Vimeo.

Related Links:


Haq's Musings

Nawaz Sharif's Silence on Taliban Terror in Inaugural Speech

Pakistan Can Learn From Sri Lanka's Defeat of LTTE


Taliban vs. Pakistan


Yet Another Peace Deal and Shia Blockade


Taliban Insurgency in Swat


Musharraf's Treason Trial


General Kayani's Speech on Terror War Ownership


Impact of Youth Vote and Taliban Violence on Elections 2013


Imran Khan's Social Media Campaign


Pakistan Elections 2013 Predictions 


Why is Democracy Failing in Pakistan?


Viewpoint From Overseas-Vimeo 


Viewpoint From Overseas-Youtube 

[muhammad arshad ghuman]

allah pa bharosa rakhain

[Riaz Haq]

Here's Wall Street Journal on Taliban's tightening grip on Karachi:

...Karachi is likely to pay a steeper price if efforts by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government to forge a peace deal with the al Qaeda affiliate's leadership in tribal areas collapse and a military operation is launched there.

"If the peace talks fail, we fear that a big terrorism wave will hit Karachi," said Raja Umar Khattab, a senior officer in the counterterrorism Crime Investigation Department of the Karachi police.

The Pakistani Taliban are a national threat, with Karachi providing the group a vital financial lifeline. Money raised in Karachi from extortion, land-grabbing, kidnapping and robberies is sent to the group's leadership in the tribal areas along the Afghan border, security officials said.

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"Everyone now is at a loss about who will step into Chaudhry Aslam's shoes," said Omar Shahid Hamid, a senior counterterrorism officer now on leave. "He had become a symbol, someone who is standing up to [Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan]

In January, the militant group attacked police officers, shot and killed three journalists, repeatedly bombed paramilitary Rangers who are helping carry out the crackdown, gunned down three polio-vaccination workers, and slit the throats of six devotees visiting a shrine. Karachi police said 27 officers were killed in January, after 168 were killed last year.
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Last year, five different police chiefs served Karachi, disrupting the battle against crime. The current chief, Shahid Hayat, said that at any given time, he had about 7,000 officers available to be deployed on the streets, out of a total force strength of 27,000—9,000 officers are kept on personal security duty for politicians and other officials.

It is only in recent weeks, he added, that the operation has shifted focus to jihadi groups such as TTP.

"I'm being asked to control Karachi with such small numbers of police," said Mr. Hayat. "Policemen are being killed day in, day out. But we're still fighting."

More than 13,000 people have been arrested in the sweep since September, in more than 10,000 raids by police and the paramilitary Rangers force, the provincial Sindh government said. But officials and residents said it has left largely untouched the poor outlying neighborhoods that remain under TTP control, encircling the city, including one adjacent to the new U.S. Consulate compound.
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TTP dominates 33 of Karachi's 178 administrative units—known as union councils— security officials said.....

In the areas it controls, TTP is levying a tax on residents and businesses, said a businessman in Sohrab Goth, a Taliban-run neighborhood just north of the city center.

The militant group has set up courts in neighborhoods to resolve disputes, which give written judgments, handling matters that include disagreements over land ownership and regulating levels of theft from power lines that they allow, residents said.

"The Taliban milk money from their own communities," the businessman said. "They have calculated the worth of every person here."

For instance, on a monthly income of 40,000 rupees ($380), TTP takes a levy of 1,000 rupees. Concentrate blocks made for use in construction—a major business in the Pashtun areas—are sold for 18 rupees each, of which three rupees goes to the Taliban. The businessman said TTP's hold had hardened over the past year.

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304558804579374...

[Riaz Haq]

Too much hate in #Pakistan? NO! Survey: 70-80% experience love on daily basis? #ValentinesDay http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/map-the-co... … pic.twitter.com/eK8JxBI7JU

[Riaz Haq]

Here's a Hindu report on Pakistan's National Internal Security Policy (NISP announced by Ch Nisar Ali Khan:

Pakistan’s first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP) apart from addressing critical issues related to threat perceptions ranging from street crimes to nuclear terrorism, envisages a deradicalisation programme which involves looping madrassas into mainstream education.

The policy tabled by Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan in the National Assembly recently, is aimed at protecting the national interest of Pakistan and includes three key elements — a dialogue with all stakeholders, isolation of terrorists from their support systems and enhancing deterrence and capacity of the security apparatus. The NISP said dialogue offered a political means to end internal disputes but this is not the only option though it is the most preferred way to bring peace and reconciliation. Doors were open for negotiations with all anti-state and non-state groups within the limit of the Constitution and without compromising the primary interests of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state.

The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), designated as the focal organisation for coordinating counter terrorism efforts in Pakistan, in consultation with other institutions supporting NISP, will develop and coordinate a National De-Radicalization Programme Design. The policy envisages the integration of mosques and madrassas in the national and provincial educational establishment by mapping and then mainstreaming and integrating the existing and new madrassas and private sector educational institutions.

The policy said a large number of terrorists, either are, or have been students of madrassas where they were brainwashed to take up arms against the state. Therefore, the madrassa and mosque remains an important point of focus for any government policy to stem the spread of extremism in Pakistan. The policy recognised a need to develop a national narrative based on tolerance, harmony and the right of the people to make religious, political and social choices. De-radicalisation programmes will be conducted in jails for prisoners and terror convicts.

The madrassa system cannot be excluded from the internal security parameters of the country, the policy stated. Controlling funding of the terrorists is a major challenge especially when the curriculum in these madrassas does not prepare the youth for the job market.

It is proposed to tighten control over foreign funding to non-governmental organisations and madrassas by involving banks, the Federal Board of Revenue and taxation departments to monitor the flow of money to suspected organisations.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/pakistan-plan...

http://newsweekpakistan.com/national-internal-security-policy-and-t...

[Riaz Haq]

Newsweek Pakistan Op Ed on National Internal Security Policy by Ejaz Haider:

REVIEWING PAKISTAN’S NEW SECURITY PARADIGM.
Pakistan’s federal cabinet approved the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) on Feb. 25.

The document has taken about eight months to prepare. Its draft was completed end-November/early-December, and was to be placed before the cabinet on Jan. 20 but was taken off the agenda. Press reports at the time said that the draft was not discussed because of certain shortcomings. However, the Ministry of Interior rejected the news reports and said that given the schedule of the interior minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, it was decided the draft would be tabled for the cabinet’s approval in the next meeting.

This draft was shared with me in the last week of December. I wrote a brief review of it and sent it to the interior minister on Jan. 3. The review only included my quick thoughts about certain areas of the policy. Given the interior minister’s interest in getting my input, the review was essentially meant as talking points rather than as an extensive critique. While that meeting never materialized because the minister and I kept missing each other, I held on to what I had written, as also the NISP draft, because it had been shared with me in confidence, and the contents of both the NISP and my review could not be made public.

However, now that the policy has been approved and some of its salient points have come into the public domain, I can share those talking points while still keeping from the public the details of the draft as received by me.

The policy divides itself into three parts: Strategic, Operational, and Secret. This classification is difficult to figure out because many operational strategies must be kept secret while the conceptual part of any policy must be up for debate. Put another way, while the overall thrust of a policy and its direction is a public document and can be debated, as also the institutions and organizations created thereunder, operational details are a different matter altogether and often must stay away from unauthorized public eye. The classification, as given by the NISP, is therefore hard to understand. Below, I reproduce the thoughts I had sent to the minister. The text remains the same except where I have explained some terms for which I had used abbreviations earlier.

Some Thoughts on the NISP Draft As Received:

The attempt to formulate an NISP is commendable. While Pakistan has tried to deal with its internal security threat through counterterrorism military operations (CT Mil Ops), it has failed so far to develop a comprehensive national security strategy (NSS) which could help direct operational strategies. The NISP, as the draft document concedes, is one aspect of a broader NSS. Nonetheless, it is an important step in terms of a review of the internal security situation. Without such a review, there can be no effective response to the threats we are currently facing. The direction is right, the will is manifest. What is required is a clear identification of the problem and its many facets. I will put it broadly and roughly as below:

National internal security policy

Descriptive: Clear identification of the problem; and Scope and extent of the problem.

Prescriptive: Formulation of strategy; three tiers of strategy (short-, medium- and long-term); fire-fighting (short-term; police reforms/CT efforts); overhaul of laws and the criminal justice system (short- to medium-term); narrative-building (short-, medium- and long-term).

The current draft attempts to cover these areas, which is encouraging. I will try here to follow the sequence of the document as numbered and raise some additional points.

I fully agree with the concept of “isolating” the terrorists from their support systems. I have been agitating this point since 2003, referring to it as the ‘strategy of dislocation.’ In fact, this will be the capstone of any NISP. But precisely for that reason its short- to medium- to long-term prescriptive aspects need to be clearly spelled out. Second, there can be no disagreement over enhancing the capacity of the security apparatus. However, it is absolutely crucial that the steps taken to do that are not misguided. The devil, as always, is in the detail. A good example is the Punjab government’s well-intentioned but ill-directed policy to enhance the province’s CT capacity. Third, the idea of dialoguing ‘with all stakeholders’ sounds good but (1) we must be clear about how we define the ‘stakeholders,’ and (2) what is the timing of such a dialogue. A simple example will be that, if in theory we want to dialogue with those who are fighting the state, we have to see whether we are doing this from a position of strength or weakness. The first is legit; the second, a big NO. Similarly, we have to see whether we can, in fact, divide these groups by talking to some and fighting others. That too is a legit strategy. Then again, and I can’t overemphasize this point, even if we decide to talk, that by no means—repeat, by no means—absolves the state from enforcing its writ. I stress this point because there seems to be a sense, deeply flawed, that we either talk or we fight and if we are talking, the state should put a moratorium on its functions. Nothing can be further from truth.
The draft mentions that “Global terrorism and armed conflict in Afghanistan have changed the internal security paradigm of Pakistan.” This, at best, is partial truth. At worst, it is this argument that has confused the Pakistanis and helped sustain the question of whether this is our war. Also, it’s historically incorrect. Extremist terrorism inside Pakistan preceded 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S.-led coalition. The enabling environment, in terms of what I’ve often called a supra-state mindset, was already there. The U.S. invasion has given it a fillip. Understanding and expressing this truth is crucial for formulating and implementing the correct CT strategies. The core aspect of the NISP, namely, “isolating” the terrorist from his support systems will only work if we accept that a combination of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization policies (ironically started by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) at home and a security policy that rested on supporting and encouraging extremist groups has led to the creation of a mindset that rejects the nation-state and aspires to the ideal of the Ummah which never was but, nonetheless, continues to fire the imagination of people. [N.B.: imagine the consequences of this supra-state approach for border management which the NISP correctly identifies as a vital component of security. This is just one example.] Acknowledging our ‘contribution’ to today’s problems is an important start for course correction. While identifying the flaws in the policies of the U.S.-led coalition, we must refrain from apportioning all the blame to the rest of the world.
The NISP’s identification of nontraditional threats—extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy—needs to explain the linkages between these categories, especially the first three. I say this because some political leaders and parties, Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf being the most prominent, try to compartmentalize them. This has policy implications. For instance, Khan argues that while we must talk to the Tehreek-e-Taliban, there can be no dialogue with the sectarian terrorists. This argument presupposes that the Taliban and sectarian terrorists are two separate categories. This is factually incorrect: almost all the various groups are rabidly anti-Shia. They share the same ideology with Pakhtun groups that comprise the Taliban core. Groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi form the backbone of the Taliban fighting cadres in the federally-administered tribal areas as well as in the settled areas of the Punjab and other provinces. The NISP needs to make these linkages clear to put matters in perspective.
I now come to “Vision,” numbered 5 in the draft. The idea of protecting “civil liberties” while mounting an effective CT response is the most troublesome area, given the tension between securing the state and society at large and safeguarding individual liberties. It is commendable that the NISP is alive to this. However, this deals with the application of law and I’d recommend that the Ministry of Interior take the initiative and put together a group of eminent jurists to review the current legal regime in this regard. Opinions and approaches differ even among jurists so this won’t be an easy exercise to conduct. Also, this tension cannot be fully eliminated, which requires that any such regime must have adequate checks and balances.
Threat perception, Paragraph 7: The mention of the possible use of biochemical weapons is an important inclusion. This threat may not be immediate but it cannot be dismissed in the future. Training toward countering this threat is, therefore, very important. The draft says the Ministry of Defense is dealing with this “adequately.” I do not necessarily agree with this assessment. Another area of disagreement is about responsibility inside the borders. The lead agency in dealing with all internal threats must be the Ministry of Interior. All other agencies/departments/ministries, with required capacity, must be commandeered by the Ministry of Interior, depending on the nature of the threat, to retain the integrity of the chain of command. This is also important for a coordinated quick response. However, the Ministry of Interior, as currently configured, has no capacity to perform this umbrella function.
Paragraphs 8, 9, 10 under the head of threat perception are poorly formulated and repetitive. To say that terrorists “lurk in shadows [sic] and thrive on a strategy of invisibility and ambiguity” is a no-brainer. Of course, that’s what they do because there is no other way of doing what they do. The important point is not what they do and how they do it but how we can swat them despite their invisibility. Similarly, it is a tough sell to create direct causality between economic woes and terrorism. While some correlation between the two, in some cases, cannot be dismissed, there are too many other factors impeding economic growth to put the entire blame for lack of economic growth on terrorism. For instance, in Sri Lanka, even at the height of the JVP and later LTTE terrorism, tourism kept thriving. There are other examples. But more than that, one can argue that despite current levels of terrorism, Pakistan’s economy would look much better if we didn’t have the energy crisis, did not mismanage the economy for multiple other reasons, and could enforce contractual obligations with a better judicial system.
“Policy Objectives,” paragraphs 11 to 29: No. 12 says: “To peacefully resolve and manage disputes with hostile elements by ensuring rule of law.” I am not sure if I understand this. Hostile elements can be varied and any response(s) will depend on what kind of threat they proffer. Also, by their very nature, hostile elements begin by undermining the law of the land. The application of that law to them or to get them to accept law’s diktat may not always be a function of peaceful resolution of disputes. Other paragraphs, too, are general and, in some cases—like No. 18: comprehensive arms-control regime across the country—talk about doing something which is desirable but not necessarily doable in the short- to medium-term. Similarly, No. 22 stresses integrating mosques and seminaries into the national and provincial “educational establishment” [sic] without reference to previous efforts/application of laws and with no mention of the fact that even mainstream schools teach syllabi that are only marginally better than the denomination-specific fiqh education imparted in the seminaries. I stress this point because No. 19 talks about constructing a narrative to counter extremism and No. 20 emphasizes promoting pluralism, freedom, democracy, and a culture of tolerance. It should be obvious that these are connected policy objectives and any policy intervention must be designed such that it moves from the easier to the more difficult. Another important aspect of any policy intervention is that it should select the areas in a way that allows intervention to have spin-off benefits in areas that have not been intervened into directly. An example of this could be that while the government might face resistance in getting the seminaries to change syllabi, the CT capacity to track the funds that make them create havoc merrily can put the required squeeze on them. That is what creates synergies. We can discuss this at greater length but my overall advice would be to reformulate the policy objectives on the basis of two broad categories the NISP lays down in the Policy Framework, correctly, as the soft and hard components. That will help get rid of redundancies in the Policy Objectives and place them under the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ components.
The Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP) component of the NISP is fine as far as identification of areas of intervention is concerned. But as noted earlier, the devil is in the detail and the draft is unclear about what strategies will be adopted to achieve the objectives of the soft component. Of course, the draft itself cannot detail those strategies and one assumes that subsequent work will be done in the areas identified, which is compatible with the objectives of the NISP. Two points are, however, important. The soft component has areas where strategies will have short- to medium- to long-term objectives. Ditto for results. What I said above apropos of policy interventions obtains here as well. Honest implementation of what is doable will ultimately lead to what is desirable. Moreover, given resource and other constraints, it is better to do some work effectively rather than stretching oneself thin and ending up doing badly all-round.
That brings me to the ‘hard’ component of the NISP, the Combined Deterrence Plan (CDP). This is a very important component because it begins here and now and then moves to the medium- and long-term. The NISP correctly identifies redundancies in the security and intelligence infrastructure but then goes on to create more. Some quick points: (1) The Ministry of Interior must be the lead ministry in dealing with internal security, along the lines of Homeland Security. The NISP mentions this but I am advocating a more comprehensive role for it. Currently, it does not have the capacity for that; (2) There’s a lot of emphasis on NACTA and its role reference both the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ components of the NISP. NACTA is a dysfunctional body for reasons that you know well. Its reconfiguration, as laid down in the NISP and the policy’s annexures, is not going to make it more effective. It will be money wasted. Yet another important point with reference to NACTA is its placing. It was conceived to be the lead agency but was thrown by the wayside because the Ministry of Interior wanted to control it. The Ministry of Interior should play the lead role for which it is currently not configured. If the Ministry of Interior has to take the lead then NACTA could serve as its secretariat, just like the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) does for the National Command Authority (NCA). But, this is only possible if the Ministry of Interior is remodeled; (3) CT policing is the task for the police. The NISP talks about the lack of capacity of the police. But that requires looking into police reforms, not creating special CT forces outside of the police; (4) An allied point is that without effective (normal) policing, even the best CT efforts cannot be entirely effective. If your police are good, your CT efforts will bear fruit. To think that the police can languish in the pit while we can create spanking CT units external to the police is a complete misconception. This is what I referred to at the outset vis-à-vis efforts by the Punjab government to enhance its CT capacity; (5) Corollary 1: police needs to be reformed (we can discuss the modalities); Corollary 2: CT units must be raised from within the police and those elements that might be seconded to the police from, say the Special Service Group, must operate under the command of the police. This is part of best practices across the world; (6) policing is a provincial subject; terrorism is a countrywide menace. The NISP talks about a Federal Rapid Response Force (FRRF) and Provincial Rapid Response Forces (PRRF). I wouldn’t recommend such duality. Firstly, there is no need to create a new FRRF; the current FIA can be used for that purpose with necessary legal amendments in its charter and terms of reference. Secondly, such a federal force should have unity of command across the federating units and its specialized units can be based in all four federating units. That makes the PRRFs redundant. For better coordination, the current PSP cadre can be utilized to command the provincial and federal forces; (7) We seem to have, since Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s time, this flawed concept of CT as some kind of James Bond activity. Fire-fighting is just the tail end of any CT activity. While the fire-fighting units should be highly trained along the lines of Special Forces, the people directing them have nothing to do with guns. They will involve computer experts, communication experts, forensic experts, lawyers, investigators, financial experts, etc. The police’s capacity for policing and CT is at the low end because the force is heavily weaponized with no sub-specializations. Getting SSG and Army personnel for CT functions is, therefore, a nonstarter. There’s nothing in their training to make them perform CT policing functions. What we need are smart, highly-educated young experts, men and women, who fit into the different specialized roles imperative for effective CT functions. None of them requires guns; they require brains. But it is their work which will lead to preemptive action, i.e., the proactive role the NISP has correctly stressed.
These are just some points. They require to be fleshed out in greater detail. Each point will require its own modalities. My effort here was simply to highlight some aspects for further discussion.

http://newsweekpakistan.com/national-internal-security-policy-and-t...

[Riaz Haq]

Here's NY Times columnist David Brooks on security as a bigger problem than poverty in developing world:

If you’re reading this, you are probably not buffeted by daily waves of physical terror. You may fear job loss or emotional loss, but you probably don’t fear that somebody is going to slash your throat, or that a gang will invade your house come dinnertime, carrying away your kin and property. We take a basic level of order for granted.

But billions of people live in a different emotional landscape, enveloped by hidden terror. Many of these people live in the developing world.

When we send young people out to help these regions, we tell them they are there to tackle “poverty,” using the sort of economic designation we’re comfortable with. We usually assume that scarcity is the big challenge to be faced. We send them to dig wells or bring bed nets or distribute food or money, and, of course, that’s wonderful work.

But as Gary A. Haugen and Victor Boutros point out in their gripping and perspective-altering book, “The Locust Effect,” these places are not just grappling with poverty. They are marked by disorder, violence and man-inflicted suffering.

“The relentless threat of violence is part of the core subtext of their lives, but we are unlikely to see it, and they are unlikely to tell us about it. We would be wise, however, to not be fooled — because, like grief, the thing we cannot see may be the deepest part of their day.”

People in many parts of the world simply live beyond the apparatus of law and order. The District of Columbia spends about $850 per person per year on police. In Bangladesh, the government spends less than $1.50 per person per year on police. The cops are just not there.

In the United States, there is one prosecutor for every 12,000 citizens. In Malawi, there is one prosecutor for every 1.5 million citizens. The prosecutors are just not there.

Even when there is some legal system in place, it’s not designed to impose law and order for the people. It is there to protect the regime from the people. The well-connected want a legal system that can be bought and sold.

Haugen and Boutros tell the story of an 8-year-old Peruvian girl named Yuri whose body was found in the street one morning, her skull crushed in, her legs wrapped in cables and her underwear at her ankles. The evidence pointed to a member of one of the richer families in the town, so the police and prosecutors destroyed the evidence. Her clothing went missing. A sperm sample that could have identified the perpetrator was thrown out. A bloody mattress was sliced down by a third, so that the blood stained spot could be discarded....
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The primary problem of politics is not creating growth. It’s creating order. Until that is largely achieved, life can be nasty, brutish and short.

Haugen is president of a human rights organization called the International Justice Mission, which tries to help people around the world build the institutions of law. One virtue of his group is that it stares evil in the eyes and helps local people confront the large and petty thugs who inflict such predatory cruelty on those around them. Not every aid organization is equipped to do this, to confront elemental human behavior when it exists unrestrained by effective law. It’s easier to avoid this reality, to have come-together moments in daytime.

Police training might be less uplifting than some of the other stories that attract donor dollars. But, in every society, order has to be wrung out of exploitation. Unless cruelty is tamed, poverty will persist.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/opinion/brooks-the-republic-of-fe...

[Riaz Haq]

Here's National Geographic on comparison of Pakistan with Colombia:

Few Pakistanis get to visit Colombia, a country quite physically and culturally distant from their land of abode. Yet as I discovered from my visit to Colombia’s capital Bogota this week, there is much which Pakistanis can learn from this land of coffee, cocaine and coal. So what are the similarities between these two ostensibly disparate lands, separated by geography, ethnicity and religion? A troubling common thread between Colombia and Pakistan pertains to the issue of terrorism and guerrilla insurgency. For the past few decades, both countries have been fighting locally grown, ideologically driven, terrorist militias, which receive some degree of foreign support but also thrive on drug money and various forms of extortion and kidnapping. Both countries are also currently involved in controversial peace processes with the insurgents that remain far from achieving their aim but are likely to continue.

Colombia’s experience with fractured politics and terrorism predates Pakistan’s predicament. The country achieved independence from colonial Spain in 1819 — long before Pakistan was even dreamed of. Yet soon thereafter, the unified territory of “Gran Colombia’ fell apart, and Venezuela and Ecuador seceded from the land as independent states in 1830 – the same year that the great revolutionary and colonial liberator Simon Bolivar died in the northern Colombian city of Santa Marta. Like Colombia, Pakistan also has experience with secession – Bangladesh’s independence in 1973, only 26 years after independence from Britain.
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Pakistan has to also learn from the Colombian experience that negotiations are only workable with such groups if there is some unified negotiation hierarchy and influence across the guerrilla population who are involved in terrorist activity. Unlike the FARC, the Taliban have so many factions that negotiations over specific actions become hard to enforce. Once there is some clarity on the enforcement power of the negotiators, it is worth considering whether the terms of a peace plan might undermine the overall functionality of the Pakistani state. For example, any points of negotiations regarding marginalization of minority sects such as Shias who constitute 20% of the population would lead to ruin. The FARC are willing to join the political process within Colombia if their basic demands for land and resource management regimes are met. Would the Taliban be willing to do so if given limited degree of governance in particular parts of the country so as to prevent imposition of their worldview in some form over all of Pakistan? How might there be enforcement of their sphere of influence under a peace plan? Expansionary tendencies will need to be monitored carefully in both peace processes.

Disparate as they may seem on the surface, Colombia and Pakistan have much to gain from exchanging notes with each other on dealing with their intractable insurgencies. In a globalized world where arms and drugs can flow freely across the miles, surely lessons on governance and peace-building should find no barriers.

http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2014/03/31/colombia-pakistan/

[Riaz Haq]

Here's a view of Pakistani-American Faiysal AliKhan, Carnegie Fellow, on Taliban's youth:

Speaking softly, Faiysal AliKhan points to an underlying truth he sees in tribal areas of his native Pakistan. “There is an intergenerational aspect to this conflict which is often not talked about. We talk about socio-economic, gender issues, but we don’t talk about who hostile groups engage with – they engage with youth, not elders, not anyone else.”

“There’s no militant leader over 30 or 35 years old, and their foot soldiers are even younger,” adds AliKhan, founder of the Foundation for Integrated Development Action, a Pakistani organization that works predominantly with youth in the southern Frontier Province and surrounding tribal areas

For AliKhan, engaging young people is missing in the strategic approaches being advanced by civil society, government and political parties. “Even the community itself doesn’t take on board young peoples’ opinions,” he notes.

In Pakistan, especially the tribal areas, nearly 55 percent of the population is below 30-years of age. As Pakistan’s efforts to extend military and civilian authority in the tribal areas intensify, AliKhan’s organization is in a unique position to offer informed observations on youth and their tendency to be recruited by hostile groups, which he likens to attraction held by gangs.

“Take the seventh son of a tribal family who has no status in the family and doesn’t come from a prominent tribe – what is his future?” says AliKhan. “Who are his role models? Are there any positive role models? Not really.” Accordingly, with few opportunities, this youth is very likely to align himself with a hostile group, which provides many opportunities.

Number one, there is an economic opportunity; you have the ability to earn in your own backyard and need not seek work abroad or another city,” says AliKhan. “Number two, you get status, otherwise the seventh son has no status. And thirdly, another aspect in looking at these variables is looking at it like a gang. There’s an appeal for a young person to be part of a hostile group, you’re wearing your turban a certain way, you have guns – becoming Taliban gives this youth a voice, status.”

The son of a family with both business and military backgrounds, AliKhan was awarded a degree in Business Administration and Politics from the United Kingdom’s University of Kent in Canterbury and spent his early college years at Hampshire College in Massachusetts. Having family experience with some of the largest joint ventures in Pakistan, AliKhan is accordingly mindful of creating an enabling business environment in Pakistan and the importance of service delivery. With the success of their commercial activities, the AliKhans invested in making a social impact.

It was his grandfather, who was born in Dera Ismail Khan in the Northwest Frontier Province, that helped spark his interest in his ancestral area. AliKhan wanted to bring his learning from the private sector back to his grandfather’s birthplace. When a local government ordinance was issued in the tribal areas to empower grassroots governance in 2004, AliKhan established FIDA, which means “devotion” in the local language. “We felt we could get involved in terms of helping to build better governance structures, said AliKhan, “We thought, how could we affect service delivery based on our business successes — how could we institutionalize what we had learned?”

http://creative-associates.us/2010/06/pakistan-relief-organization-...

[Riaz Haq]

Here's a Christian Science Monitor report on teaching of science at a major madrassa in Pakistan's FATA region:

Anwarul Haq, a frail, bespectacled cleric, sits before a class of attentive students in Darul Uloom Haqqania, one of Pakistan’s many madrassas, or Islamic seminaries. His class of 1,400 students is the most senior of 4,000 enrollees at Darul Uloom, an hour's drive from Peshawar.

The students follow a 500-year-old curriculum adopted across South Asia. The oversized book used in Mr. Haq's class, a collection of ahadith, or sayings attributed to the prophet Muhammad, is centuries old and written in Arabic. Commentary written in Urdu in present-day India fills the margins.

“This country was built on Islam, the idea of following God's teachings. Here we are learning how to do that,” says Haq.

RECOMMENDED: How much do you know about Pakistan? Take this quiz.

What students learn, and don’t learn, in thousands of such private seminaries is a matter of concern for Pakistan’s government. Under a national security policy unveiled last month, Pakistan aims to bring madrassas under tighter state control, update their curricula to tone down extremist views, and introduce subjects like mathematics and science. The goal is to turn out graduates capable of getting decent jobs who won’t be tempted to join the Taliban or other militant groups.

“Graduates stand in between two worlds,” says Nafisa Shah, a lawmaker from the ruling Pakistan Muslim League. When they don't get jobs, she says, “they become vulnerable [to recruitment by militants].”

Pakistan currently has a tenuous ceasefire with homegrown Taliban militants and has released scores of suspected militants and accomplices in confidence-building measures. Still, terrorist attacks have continued by splinter groups the Taliban claim not to control. On Apr. 9, 21 people were killed in a blast at a fruit market in Islamabad.

Advanced degrees

Fears that Pakistan’s madrassas are breeding grounds for extremism are nothing new. After 9/11, the US government funded a $100 million madrassa reform program that met widespread hostility and failed to make much headway.

Clerics have scoffed at the government’s new security policy and point out that they’ve already instituted the kind of reforms the government advocates. Darul Uloom offers advanced specializations in Islamic law that Pakistan’s universities accept as Master's degrees, and runs computer labs for students.

Other madrassas have also upgraded their curriculum so that students, who spend much of their time memorizing the Quran, get a broader secular education. Most pupils are from poor backgrounds: madrassas offer free education, housing, and food.

Moreover, experts say the threat of militancy comes mostly from what students learn in their spare time, especially in hundreds of underground madrassas that are beyond the reach of both the clerics and the state. ...

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2014/0415/Pakista...

[Riaz Haq]

Here's a Gulf News story on Pakistan modernizing its civilian intelligence bureau (IB):

Islamabad: Pakistan has decided to equip its largest civilian intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), with state-of-the-art spying equipment to keep an eye on other domestic agencies as well as terrorist activities.
Reliable sources told Online that billions of rupees have been spent on acquiring the modern surveillance equipment from a German Company, ULTIMACO, to turn the IB into a super modern agency.
According to sources Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, learning from his past experience, has taken this measure to not only to keep an eye on terrorism and subversive activities but also to keep an eye on activities of other intelligence agencies, which are not bound to report to civilian government.
In the past, some military-aligned agencies have kept key information hidden from the civilian govts.

The new equipment would also be used for IP interception, LT call monitoring and G-mail, Viber and BB monitoring.
The extension in service of DG IB Aftab Sultan has also been made in this respect. He is said to be an honest and reliable officer whom the govt trusts and wants that the project be completed under his supervision.
Sources said that Interior Minister Ch Nisar Ali Khan has been directed to monitor this project.
Khan, in several of his media talks, had expressed concerns that only the IB keeps them in the loop while most of the civilian and military agencies do not give them any direct information, which resulted in problems in tackling terrorism incidents.

http://gulfnews.com/news/world/pakistan/pakistan-to-equip-spies-wit...