Yom-e-Takbeer: US Efforts to Stop Pakistan Nuclear Tests in May, 1998

[Riaz Haq]

"Believe me when I tell you that my heart is with you. I appreciate and would even privately agree with what you're advising us to do (abandon nuclear tests)", said Pakistan's Ex Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on May 16, 1998

The order to conduct Pakistan's nuclear tests came from Mr. Nawaz Sharif who was Pakistan's prime minister in 1998. It came on May 28, just over two weeks after India's nuclear tests conducted May 11 to May 13, 1998. Pakistan went ahead with the tests in spite of the US pressure to abstain from testing.  US President Bill Clinton called Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif immediately after the Indian tests to urge restraint.  It was followed up by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's visit to Islamabad on May 16, 1998.

In his 2010 book titled "Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb", Secretary Talbott has described US diplomatic efforts to dissuade Pakistan in the two weeks period between the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Here are a few excerpts of the book divided into four sections covering Clinton's call to Sharif, Talbott's visits to the Foreign Office (FO), general headquarters (GHQ) and Prime Minister's House:

Clinton's Call to Sharif: 

Clinton telephoned Sharif, the Pakistani PM, to whet his appetite for the planes, huge amounts of financial aid, and a prize certain to appeal to Sharif—an invitation for him to make an official visit to Washington.

“You can almost hear the guy wringing his hands and sweating,” Clinton said after hanging up.

Still, we had to keep trying. Our best chance was an emergency dose of face-to-face diplomacy. It was decided that I would fly to Pakistan and make the case to Nawaz Sharif.

Meeting at Foreign Office in Islamabad:

On arrival in Islamabad, we had about an hour to freshen up at a hotel before our first official meeting, which was with the foreign minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, and the foreign secretary (the senior civil servant in the ministry), Shamshad Ahmad.

When we got to the foreign ministry, we found that the Pakistani civilian leaders had finally figured out how to handle our visit, and the result was a bracing experience. My two hosts rolled their eyes, mumbled imprecations under their breath, and constantly interrupted.

They accused the United States of having turned a blind eye to the BJP’s preparations for the test.

As for the carrots I had brought, the Pakistanis gave me a version of the reaction I had gotten from General Wahid five years earlier. Offers of Pressler relief and delivery of “those rotting and virtually obsolete air- planes,” said Gohar Ayub, were “shoddy rugs you’ve tried to sell us before.” The Pakistani people, he added, “would mock us if we accepted your offer. They will take to the streets in protest.”

I replied that Pakistanis were more likely to protest if they didn’t have jobs. Gohar Ayub and Shamshad Ahmad waved the point aside. The two Pakistani officials were dismissive. The current burst of international outrage against India would dissipate rapidly, they predicted.

Visit to General Headquarter (GHQ) in Rawalpindi:

We set off with police escort, sirens blaring, to (Chief of Army Staff) General Karamat’s headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Karamat, who was soft-spoken and self-confident, did not waste time on polemics. He heard us out and acknowledged the validity of at least some of our arguments, especially those concerning the danger that, by testing, Pakistan would land itself, as he put it, “in the doghouse alongside India.”

His government was still “wrestling” with the question of what to do he said, which sounded like a euphemism for civilian dithering. There was more in the way Karamat talked about his political leadership, a subtle but discernible undertone of long-suffering patience bordering on scorn.   For example, he noted pointedly “speculation” that Pakistan was looking for some sort of American security guarantee, presumably a promise that the US would come to Pakistan’s defense if it was attacked by India, in exchange for not testing. “You may hear such a suggestion later,” Karamat added, perhaps referring to our upcoming meeting with Nawaz Sharif. I should not take such hints seri- ously, he said, since they reflected the panic of the politicians. Pakistan would look out for its own defense.

What Pakistan needed from the United States was a new, more solid relationship in which there was no “arm- twisting” or “forcing us into corners.” By stressing this point, Karamat made clear that our arguments against testing did not impress him.

Meeting at Prime Minister's House:

I shared a car back to Islamabad with Bruce Riedel and Tom Simons to meet Nawaz Sharif.

What we got from the Prime Minister was a Hamlet act, convincing in its own way—that is, I think he was genuinely feeling torn—but rather pathetic.

On this occasion Nawaz Sharif seemed nearly paralyzed with exhaustion, anguish, and fear. He was—literally, just as Clinton had sensed during their phone call—wringing his hands. He had yet to make up his mind, he kept telling us. Left to his own judgment, he would not test.

His position was “awkward.” His government didn’t want to engage in “tit-for-tat exchanges” or “act irresponsibly.” The Indian leaders who had set off the explosion were “madmen” and he didn’t want “madly to follow suit.”

But pressure was “mounting by the hour” from all sides, including from the opposition led by his predecessor and would-be successor, Benazir Bhutto. “I am an elected official, and I cannot ignore popular sentiment.” Sharif was worried that India would not only get away with what it had done but profit from it as well. When international anger receded, the sanctions would melt away, and the BJP would parlay India’s new status as a declared nuclear weapons state into a permanent seat on UN SC. I laid out all that we could do for Pakistan, although this time I tried to personalize the list a bit more.

Clinton told me two days before that he would use Sharif’s visit to Washington and Clinton’s own to Pakistan to “dramatize” the world’s gratitude if Sharif refrains from testing. This point aroused the first flicker of interest I’d seen. Nawaz Sharif asked if Clinton would promise to skip India on his trip and come only to Pakistan. There was no way I could promise that. All I could tell Nawaz Sharif was that Clinton would “recalibrate the length and character” of the stops he made in New Delhi and Islamabad to reflect that Pakistan was in favor with the United States while India was not. Sharif looked more miserable than ever.

Toward the end of the meeting, Sharif asked everyone but me to wait outside. (Foreign Secretary) Shamshad (Ahmad) seemed miffed. He glanced nervously over his shoulder as he left. When we were alone I gave the prime minister a written note from Secretary Albright urging him to hold firm against those clamoring to test.  The note warned about the economic damage, to say nothing of the military danger, Pakistan faced from an escalating competition with India. Sharif read the note intently, folded the paper, put his head in his hands for a moment, then looked at me with desperation in his eyes.

At issue, he said, was his own survival. “How can I take your advice if I’m out of office?” If he did as we wanted, the next time I came to Islamabad, I'd find myself dealing not with a clean-shaven moderate like himself but with an Islamic fundamentalist “who has a long beard.” He concluded by reiterating he had not made up his mind about testing. “If a final decision had been reached I'd be in a much calmer state of mind. Believe me when I tell you that my heart is with you. I appreciate and would even privately agree with what you're advising us to do.”

Summary:

It is clear from Secretary Talbot's description that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did not want to go forward with the nuclear tests but he had no choice.  Fearing that he would be removed from office if he decided not to conduct atomic test, he told Talbott, “How can I take your advice if I’m out of office?”  Summing up the failure of the US efforts to stop Pakistan's nuclear tests, US Ambassador to Pakistan Ann Patterson said the following in a cable to Washington in 2009 :  "The Pakistani establishment, as we saw in 1998 with the nuclear test, does not view assistance -- even sizable assistance to their own entities -- as a trade-off for national security vis-a-vis India".

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[Riaz Haq]

Nuclear energy of Pakistan
As it’s rightly said that Pakistan is confident but never complacent regarding nuclear safety and security
by Rabia Javed


https://nation.com.pk/28-May-2020/nuclear-energy-of-pakistan


Advocating the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Stephen Hawking once said, “I would like nuclear fusion to become a practical power source. It would provide an inexhaustible supply of energy, without pollution or global warming.”

Pakistan’s nuclear energy program started in 1954, largely inspired by then US President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech in December 1953. During his address Eisenhower emphasized on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the field of agriculture, medicine, and electricity generation.

Over the years, Pakistan’s civilian nuclear energy programme has contributed to its socio-economic uplift. Furthermore, there is an ample room available for Pakistan to enhance its nuclear power generation capability to meet growing energy demands.

Pakistan has played a very important role in utilizing the peaceful nuclear energy sector in various domains. Peaceful applications are best utilized in power generation, minerals exploration, developing high-yield stress tolerant crops, cancer treatment, designing and fabrication of industrial plants and equipment and human resource development for many years.

Pakistan has used its Centres of Excellence to promote and share best practices in nuclear security through three affiliated institutes: the Pakistan Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security (PCENS), the National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS), and the Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (PIEAS). Along with this, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) was established under the Ordinance III of 2001 for regulation of nuclear safety and radiation protection. In 1994, Pakistan also signed convention on nuclear safety which requires states to established regulatory bodies separated from those involving the promotion of nuclear energy. PNRA, since its development, has demonstrated excellence as a role model for safety culture at national and international levels by adopting various precautionary measures.

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Appreciating the "positive role" played by Pakistan in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology, IAEA assisted Pakistan to establish Veterinary Residue Laboratory, which now carries out food safety tests ofinternational standards. The new laboratory can test meat and other food products and certify that they do not contain veterinary drug residues that exceed safety limits.

Nuclear technology is playing a crucial role in cancer treatment. So far, 18 cancer hospitals – spread across Pakistan’s four provinces and the capital, Islamabad – are working on cancer treatment. These hospitals alone, working under the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, are responsible for 80% of cancer treatment in the country. The IAEA stands ready to assist Pakistan in strengthening capacities for key elements of a cancer control programme. These include prevention, early detection, diagnosis and treatment, and palliative care.

On the eve of global summit on nuclear security in Vienna, Pakistan provided a thorough glance to its ‘stringent’ nuclear safety mechanisms. This event was attended by diplomats around the world. A booklet was presented by Pakistan titled ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Regime,' released alongside IAEA’s third International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) - with the aim to demonstrate Pakistan's “commitment and contribution to the global objectives of civilian nuclear utilization.” Such a step was taken with an aim to counter the myths, disinformation, misperceptions and unfounded propaganda against the country’s peaceful nuclear energy programme. The booklet outlines that there is an urgent need to recognise the best practices Pakistan has in place for safety of its peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

[Riaz Haq]

Why #Pakistan Risked Everything To Build #Nuclear Weapons? It became a high priority after #India defeated Pakistan in 1971 to create #Bangladesh. Pakistan now has a nuclear “triad” of delivery systems based on land, in the air and at sea. https://news.yahoo.com/why-pakistan-risked-everything-build-1400003... via @YahooNews


The sea component of Pakistan’s nuclear force consists of the Babur class of cruise missiles. The latest version, Babur-2, looks like most modern cruise missiles, with a bullet-like shape, a cluster of four tiny tail wings and two stubby main wings, all powered by a turbofan or turbojet engine. The cruise missile has a range of 434 miles. Instead of GPS guidance, which could be disabled regionally by the U.S. government, Babur-2 uses older Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) and Digital Scene Matching and Area Co-relation (DSMAC) navigation technology. Babur-2 is deployed on both land and at sea on ships, where they would be more difficult to neutralize. A submarine-launched version, Babur-3, was tested in January and would be the most survivable of all Pakistani nuclear delivery systems.

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Pakistan’s nuclear program goes back to the 1950s, during the early days of its rivalry with India. President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously said in 1965, “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”

The program became a higher priority after the country’s 1971 defeat at the hands of India, which caused East Pakistan to break away and become Bangladesh. Experts believe the humiliating loss of territory, much more than reports that India was pursuing nuclear weapons, accelerated the Pakistani nuclear program. India tested its first bomb, codenamed “Smiling Buddha,” in May 1974, putting the subcontinent on the road to nuclearization.

Pakistan began the process of accumulating the necessary fuel for nuclear weapons, enriched uranium and plutonium. The country was particularly helped by one A. Q. Khan, a metallurgist working in the West who returned to his home country in 1975 with centrifuge designs and business contacts necessary to begin the enrichment process. Pakistan’s program was assisted by European countries and a clandestine equipment-acquisition program designed to do an end run on nonproliferation efforts. Outside countries eventually dropped out as the true purpose of the program became clear, but the clandestine effort continued.

Exactly when Pakistan had completed its first nuclear device is murky. Former president Benazir Bhutto, Zulfikar Bhutto’s daughter, claimed that her father told her the first device was ready by 1977. A member of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission said design of the bomb was completed in 1978 and the bomb was “cold tested”—stopping short of an actual explosion—in 1983.

Benazir Bhutto later claimed that Pakistan’s bombs were stored disassembled until 1998, when India tested six bombs in a span of three days. Nearly three weeks later, Pakistan conducted a similar rapid-fire testing schedule, setting off five bombs in a single day and a sixth bomb three days later. The first device, estimated at twenty-five to thirty kilotons, may have been a boosted uranium device. The second was estimated at twelve kilotons, and the next three as sub-kiloton devices.

The sixth and final device appears to have also been a twelve-kiloton bomb that was detonated at a different testing range; a U.S. Air Force “Constant Phoenix” nuclear-detection aircraft reportedly detected plutonium afterward. Since Pakistan had been working on a uranium bomb and North Korea—which shared or purchased research with Pakistan through the A. Q. Khan network—had been working on a uranium bomb, some outside observers concluded the sixth test was actually a North Korean test, detonated elsewhere to conceal North Korea’s involvement although. There is no consensus on this conclusion.

[Riaz Haq]

#Pakistan (score 47) ranks 19 on #NTIIndex for #nuclear materials security, ahead of #India (score 41) at 20. https://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/2020_NTI-Index_...

Australia ranks first for its security practices for the fifth
time among countries with weapons-usable nuclear
materials and for the third time in the sabotage ranking.
In the ranking for countries without materials, New
Zealand and Sweden tie for first. Most improved among
countries with materials in 2020 is Pakistan, which was
credited with adopting new on-site physical protection
and cybersecurity regulations, improving insider threat
prevention measures, and more.

[Riaz Haq]

In "The Way of the Knife", Mark Mazzetti says the CIA proposed using Blackwater to kill Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan in 2001 during a meeting with Dick Cheney.

Blackwater's Erik Prince said in an interview with Vanity Fair, "If it went bad, we weren't expecting the chief station, the ambassador or anyone to bail us out".

https://books.google.com/books?id=ak09_BVX1wMC&newbks=0&pri...

https://twitter.com/clary_co/status/1382313419232194566?s=20

[Riaz Haq]

Renowned British #economist #Keynes warned the world in `1924 against using #economic #sanctions. Both the deterrent and the compellent effects of #US sanctions have fallen dramatically amid rampant overuse. #Afghanistan #Iran #Russia #Syria #Pakistan https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jan/20/keynes-warned...

Promoting economic stimulus at home while enforcing deprivation abroad is a self-defeating way to seek world stability

Nicholas Mulder is assistant professor of history at Cornell University and the author of The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022)

he United States has come to rely on economic sanctions more than ever before. Following its retreat from Kabul in August, Washington has maintained economic pressure on the Taliban. The treasury’s freezing of $9.5bn in Afghan state assets has left that impoverished country facing starvation this winter. Two weeks ago, US officials warned Iran, already under heavy economic pressure, that it will face “snapback” sanctions unless Tehran restrains its nuclear ambitions.

Most prominent of all is the sanctions threat that the Biden administration issued against Russia last month. In the face of a large Russian military buildup on the borders of Ukraine, Joe Biden announced on 8 December that Vladimir Putin will face “severe consequences, economic consequences like none he’s ever seen or ever have been seen” if he escalates into open conflict.

In all three cases, advocates of economic pressure argue that sanctions will deter aggressive action and compel better behavior. But the reality is that both the deterrent and the compellent effect of US sanctions have fallen dramatically amid rampant overuse.

Sanctions were created as an antidote to war. Today, they have become an alternative way of fighting wars
Iran has been under US sanctions on and off since 1979. It has such longstanding experience resisting external pressure that further coercion is unlikely to work. Putin’s Russia has adapted to western sanctions imposed since 2014 by building up large financial reserves, promoting agricultural self-sufficiency, and designing alternative payments systems.

Western supporters of sanctions now face a gridlock that is in part of their own making. Instead of cooling tensions, their implacable and impulsive resort to the economic weapon has aggravated the very conflicts that it is meant to resolve.

Sanctions were created as an antidote to war. Today, they have become an alternative way of fighting wars, perpetuating conflicts but not defusing them. To understand how the policy of economic pressure has reached this impasse, it helps to go back to its historical origins.

A century ago, in the aftermath of the first world war, sanctions were created as a mechanism to prevent future conflict. During the war, the allies imposed a devastating blockade on their enemies, Germany and Austria-Hungary. This kind of economic war against civilians was not a new phenomenon. It dated back to antiquity and played an important part throughout the 19th century, from the Napoleonic wars to the American civil war.

[Riaz Haq]

#US Sec of State #Kissinger to #Indian FM in 1976: "#Pakistan cannot balance conventional weapons. If they get 10, 15 #nuclear weapons, it will bring equality between #India & Pakistan. Your acquisition of nuclear equipment has created (this) situation" https://www.bbc.com/urdu/pakistan-60191769

f I were the Prime Minister of Pakistan, I would do what (Zulfiqar Ali) Bhutto is doing."

US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made the remarks in a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Rao Chavan in the wake of pressure from the United States not to build a nuclear weapon on Pakistan following India's nuclear test.

The conversation stems from a secret memo that is one of thousands of leaked US foreign policy documents.

During the meeting in New York on the morning of October 8, 1976, Kissinger added, "The strange thing is that Pakistan cannot balance conventional weapons. If they get 10, 15 nuclear weapons, it will bring equality between India and Pakistan. Your acquisition of nuclear equipment has created a situation in which, once again, an equation that is not possible with conventional weapons is

But despite all this, the US attitude towards Pakistan in acquiring nuclear weapons remained strong.

"We are trying to get him (Pakistan) to give up this idea," Kissinger told the Indian foreign minister. I have told Pakistanis that if they are willing to give up their nuclear program, we will be able to increase their supply of conventional weapons.

India and Pakistan's nuclear advance spans nearly fifty years. Thousands of U.S. documents leaked over the past half-century show that Washington has always had a soft spot for India in its journey to acquire nuclear weapons, but for Pakistan, such as pressure, aid cuts and other sanctions. Steps taken.

, IMAGE SOURCEAFP
India and Pakistan's nuclear advance spans nearly fifty years. Thousands of U.S. documents leaked over the past half-century show that Washington has always had a soft spot for India in its journey to acquire nuclear weapons, but for Pakistan, such as pressure, aid cuts and other sanctions. Steps taken.

Whether it was Bhutto's government or General Zia-ul-Haq who overthrew him, these problems were solved only when the US needed Pakistan.

India built its first research reactor in 1956 with the help of Canada and the first plutonium reprocessing plant in 1964, while Pakistan set up the Atomic Energy Commission in 1956 with the idea that it would be an 'atom for peace' announced by the Eisenhower administration. 'Participated in the program.

In 1960, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became Minister of Minerals and Natural Resources in Ayub Khan's cabinet, Dr. Ishrat H. Usmani was appointed Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Osmani initiated many important programs and founded institutions. One of his main tasks was to train talented young people and send them abroad for training.

In mid-1965, Bhutto vowed to equal India's nuclear capability: 'If India makes a bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, we will go to bed hungry, but we have to make our own bomb. We have no other choice.

But later that year, after banning arms supplies to Pakistan, President Lyndon Johnson cut off US military aid to Pakistan in the wake of the Pakistan-India war.


In the next 16 years, until 1982, Pakistan received very little help from the United States.

On September 9, 1965, US Secretary of State Dan Rusk sent a memorandum to President Johnson stating, "The bitterness between Pakistan and India makes it extremely difficult to maintain good relations with both countries. If we had to choose one of these, India would be better off because of its huge population, industrial base, democracy and other capabilities. However, we can never fully support the policy goals of India or Pakistan.

[Riaz Haq]

Rabia Akhtar
@Rabs_AA
Pakistan’s journey to the bomb was Machiavellian, by necessity, not choice. Surrounded by existential threats and denied every avenue of peaceful nuclear cooperation, Pakistan did what every nuclear power has done: it exploited gaps, leveraged networks, and outmaneuvered a discriminatory regime. Let’s be clear: no nuclear program in the world is fully indigenous. Every nuclear state built its deterrent with some form of external help, covert assistance, or overlooked violations.

Pakistan’s sin was not proliferation, it was succeeding outside the sanctioned club. We should never be apologetic about the decisions that safeguarded our sovereignty. In a world where might makes right, Pakistan simply refused to be left vulnerable. That is survival. #YomeTakbeer

https://x.com/Rabs_AA/status/1927748623938281832

[Riaz Haq]

FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
1/ Pakistan’s Nuclear Smuggler: The Untold Seth Abid Story

Seth Sheikh Abid Hussain remains one of Pakistan’s most enigmatic figures, a man whose billion-dollar gold smuggling empire may have secretly facilitated the country’s nuclear weapons program. Born in 1935 in a village near Kasur, his journey from humble trader to international criminal mastermind reveals the complex intersection of organised crime and national security in Cold War-era Pakistan.

https://x.com/FrameTheGlobe/status/1928147879035559999

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
2/ Abid’s transformation began in 1950 when his father relocated the family from their modest animal hide business to Karachi, establishing a small gold and silver shop in the bustling Sarafa Bazaar. It was here that young Abid first encountered fishermen smuggling gold from Dubai, recognising a chance to provide affordable gold to Pakistan’s impoverished masses, a mission that would define his early criminal philosophy.

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
3/ By the late 1950s, Abid had forged a partnership with Qasim Bhatti, an experienced fisherman who understood the coastal smuggling routes. Together, they systematically transformed the loose network of individual smugglers operating along Pakistan’s coast into a disciplined, hierarchical organisation. This was the birth of Pakistan’s first truly professional smuggling syndicate.

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
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4/ Abid’s criminal empire succeeded because it operated as a sophisticated family enterprise built on trust and ethnic networks. His brother Haji Ashraf, fluent in Arabic, managed the crucial Dubai operations that served as the primary gold procurement hub. His son-in-law Ghulam Sarwar established connections with Indian smuggler Harbans Lal in Delhi, creating a cross-border network that defied the political tensions between the two nations.

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FrameTheGlobe
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3h
5/ The international scope of Abid’s operations extended far beyond South Asia. In London, Charles Maloney, a British Airways employee, facilitated the movement of goods and likely provided intelligence on security measures. Abid’s annual Hajj pilgrimages served a dual purpose, religious obligation and strategic business meetings with Arab operators in the Persian Gulf, cementing alliances that would prove crucial for both his gold trade and later nuclear activities.

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rameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
6/ Abid revolutionised organised crime in Pakistan through his franchise model, empowering agents primarily from the Gharki Dayal and Awan communities to operate localised smuggling hubs throughout Punjab’s border villages. This decentralised structure made his network resilient against law enforcement raids while maintaining quality control and profit margins. Each franchise operated with considerable autonomy while adhering to Abid’s operational standards and paying tribute to the central organisation.

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
7/ By 1963, Abid’s notoriety had achieved international recognition. When Indian authorities arrested his brother-in-law carrying 44 gold bricks in Delhi, the Times of India prominently featured the case and dubbed Abid Pakistan’s “Gold King.” This media attention seemed to embolden Abid, who began to cultivate his public image as a Robin Hood figure who smuggled gold to help Pakistan’s poor avoid high government taxes and duties.

[Riaz Haq]

FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
8/ The zenith of Abid’s criminal empire came with his estimated fortune of $780 million, making him one of Pakistan’s 30 wealthiest individuals. His investments spanned real estate ventures including Green Fort, Eden Villas, and Eden Gardens, alongside sophisticated operations in stocks, metals, and currency markets. His wealth generated folklore, stories circulated that he once paid government employees’ salaries during a fiscal crisis and offered to clear Pakistan’s national debt in exchange for his portrait on currency.

https://x.com/FrameTheGlobe/status/1928147896878145559

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
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3h
9/ Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s 1974 crackdown marked the beginning of what became known as the “Bhutto Wars.” The dramatic raid on Abid’s Lahore residence uncovered Rs 12.5 million in cash, Rs 4 million in gold, Rs 2.5 million in Swiss watches, and an extensive fleet of vehicles and horses used for cross-border smuggling. Pakistani newspapers declared it “the biggest smuggling case in Pakistan’s history,” and Bhutto personally declared Abid the country’s most wanted man.

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
10/ The massive manhunt that followed demonstrated both the Pakistani state’s determination to capture Abid and his remarkable ability to evade authorities. His network of safe houses, loyal operatives, and corruption within law enforcement kept him ahead of pursuers for years. The 1977 raid on his girlfriend’s apartment, which occurred mere minutes before his scheduled arrival, became legendary among Pakistan’s criminal underworld as an example of Abid’s almost supernatural ability to avoid capture.

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rameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
11/ The intersection of Abid’s criminal enterprise with Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions began in the mid-1970s when international sanctions severely restricted the country’s access to nuclear technology. Pakistan’s nuclear program, initiated under Bhutto and accelerated under General Zia ul-Haq, required sophisticated equipment and materials that were increasingly difficult to obtain through legitimate channels. Abid’s existing smuggling infrastructure suddenly became invaluable for circumventing international restrictions.

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
12/ The most dramatic claim about Abid’s nuclear contributions involves the alleged smuggling of an entire nuclear reprocessing plant from France concealed within a shipping container. While this specific story may be embellished, credible sources suggest that Abid’s network was instrumental in acquiring centrifugal designs and specialised materials from international black markets. His established relationships with European contacts and proven ability to move sensitive cargo undetected made him an ideal partner for Pakistan’s nuclear procurement efforts.

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
13/ Following Bhutto’s overthrow in 1977, General Zia ul-Haq’s military government quietly transformed Abid from public enemy to strategic asset. By 1985, intelligence sources reported his involvement in smuggling nuclear equipment and technological designs from France, marking a fundamental shift in his relationship with the Pakistani state. This collaboration represented a pragmatic alliance, Zia needed Abid’s smuggling expertise, while Abid gained protection from prosecution and legitimacy for his operations.

[Riaz Haq]

FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
14/ Abid’s nuclear contributions likely extended beyond single transactions to ongoing support for Pakistan’s weapons program throughout the 1980s. His network’s ability to procure dual-use technologies, specialised metals, and precision equipment while avoiding international monitoring systems made him an invaluable asset to Pakistan’s nuclear establishment. While scientists like A.Q. Khan received public recognition, Abid operated in the shadows, his contributions known only to a select few within Pakistan’s security apparatus.

https://x.com/FrameTheGlobe/status/1928147915303768553

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
15/ The transformation of Abid’s public image from criminal to patriot reflected Pakistan’s complex relationship with organised crime during the nuclear era. His supporters argued that his smuggling activities served national interests, providing Pakistan with technologies necessary for defense against regional threats. Critics contended that legitimising criminal networks, regardless of their contributions to national security, undermined the rule of law and created dangerous precedents for state-criminal collaboration.

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
16/ Abid’s personal life revealed the tragic costs of his criminal empire. Most of his children were born with hearing disabilities, leading him to establish the Hamza Foundation in 1964 to support deaf and mute children. His philanthropy extended to distributing approximately Rs 100 million annually in Ramadan rations, creating a complex legacy that blended criminality with genuine charitable work.

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
17/ The empire began its terminal decline with the November 2, 2006 assassination of Seth Ayaz, Abid’s beloved son and designated heir, by security guard Rizwan at the family-owned Airlines Society in Lahore. The attack killed five people and wounded six others, devastating both the family and the criminal organisation. Abid suspected a broader conspiracy aimed at destroying his empire. The loss of Ayaz, followed by his daughter Farhah Mazhar’s mysterious death in 2022, marked the effective end of the dynasty.

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FrameTheGlobe
@FrameTheGlobe
18/18 Seth Sheikh Abid Hussain died on January 8, 2021, at age 85, taking many of his secrets to the grave. His legacy remains deeply ambiguous, a criminal who may have served crucial national interests, a smuggler whose networks potentially enabled Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, and a patriarch whose empire crumbled under the weight of personal tragedy. While official histories may marginalise his contributions, Abid’s story illuminates the shadowy intersection of organised crime and national security in post-colonial Pakistan.