Stimson Poll: Vast Majority of Indians Believe Nuclear War Against Pakistan is Winnable

[Riaz Haq]

Vast majority of Indians, including those who oppose Prime Minister Narendra Modi, believe that nuclear war is "winnable", according to the results of a Stimson Center poll released recently. They want their country to build a bigger nuclear arsenal than China and Pakistan combined.  Responding to the clamor for more nukes,  Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in 2019 that Indian nuclear weapons were not kept as mere showpieces.  Strong belief about India's ability to win a nuclear war against Pakistan cuts across party lines with 91% of those who support Mr. Modi and 85% of those who don't.  Recently, a group of researchers at Rutgers University considered a hypothetical nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan as they believed such a conflict was the most likely. The group warned that an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange will be catastrophic for the region with tens of millions of immediate fatalities in the war zone, followed by hundreds of millions of starvation deaths around the globe. 

Indians Believe Nuclear War is Winnable. Source: Stimson Center

The poll also finds that the overwhelming majority of Indians are confident their military can defeat both China and Pakistan. They expect that the United States military would come to India's aid in the event of a war with China or Pakistan.  Stimson Center analysts believe that "Indian self-confidence may lead to mistaken popular views of Indian military prowess: India has considerable military capabilities against its most likely regional opponents. Yet Indian confidence that India would likely defeat China or Pakistan may exceed what a careful net assessment might warrant". 

Nuclear Arsenals of India, Pakistan and China. Source: The Economist

The nuclear arsenals of India, Pakistan and China are small but growing faster than those of other nuclear-armed countries, according to a report in The Economist magazine. The combined nuclear stockpiles of China (350 warheads), India (160) and Pakistan (165) now exceed British and French arsenals in Europe (around 500 in total). All three countries are now building their own nuclear “triads”: nukes deliverable from land, air and sea.  

The Stimson survey was conducted by phone with a random sample of 7000 Indians between April 13 and May 14, 2022. Below are its key findings as reported by Christopher Clary, Sameer Lalwani, Niloufer Siddiqui and Neelanjan Sircar:   

1. High levels of support for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who likely remains among the most popular national leaders in the world today; 

2. Extraordinary nationalist sentiment among Indians, at high levels compared to prior cross-national surveys using identical question wording; 

3. Troubling signs of intolerance toward India’s large Muslim minority, which helps provide context to recent controversies;  

4. Strong confidence in the Indian government’s ability to defend India against potential domestic and foreign threats;  

5. Expectations among a majority of Indian respondents that the U.S. military would support India in the event of a war with China or Pakistan; and 

6. Large majorities in favor of Indian numerical nuclear superiority against its adversaries. 

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[Riaz Haq]

A new survey has found an extraordinarily high level of self-confidence among Indians about being Indians.

https://www.therahnuma.com/survey-finds-new-indian-exceptionalism-p...

Similar national self-belief is called “American Exceptionalism” in the US, which appears to have been overtaken by this new “Indian Exceptionalism”, according to this survey.

The survey also found persisting distrust among Indians of the US. While a majority of Indians believe the US will come to India’s aid militarily in a conflict with China and Pakistan, a large minority of them do not — almost 4 out of 10 Indians think India will have to go it alone.

Further, the survey reaffirmed Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s return to peak popularity from the beating he received for his handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and the protest by farmers.

And, finally, the survey said Indians want to amass more nuclear weapons than any and all adversary countries.

The survey was conducted in 12 languages in 28 Indian states and six of eight union territories over April-May by CVoter, a leading Indian polling agency, for The Stimson Center, a Washington D.C.-based think tank with a robust South Asia department.

The poll contacted 7,000 voters by phone.

A massive majority of Indians, 90 per cent, said they believed “India is a better country than most other countries”.

Americans, who are widely understood to be more nationalistic than others and routinely tout American Exceptionalism, clocked in at 70 per cent in response to the same question in a survey in 2014.

“While American exceptionalism is a well-understood domain of study, self-perceptions of Indian exceptionalism are relatively under-explored,” said the writers of the survey findings released by Stimson on Wednesday.

The CVoter survey finding seems consistent with an earlier finding, conducted by a different agency, which found 80 per cent of Indian respondents strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement that India is better than most other countries. It was a global survey, and Indians came in second, behind Japan. And that was at the time of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government. This rising self-belief and confidence among Indians as a people has been growing, largely unnoticed at home by Indians and abroad by the rest of the world.

This self-belief extended to Indians’ perception of their country’s military prowess in the CVoter survey, 90 per cent, of respondents were confident India would probably or definitely defeat Pakistan. A smaller but significant portion of them, 72 per cent, felt the same level of confidence vis-a-vis China, which, according to military experts around the world, is a superior military power than India.

Asked if the US would come to Indiaa�s help militarily in the latter’s conflicts with these two countries, 56 per cent of respondents said its would be “definitely” or “probably” for China and 59 per cent for China. The survey noted that “a remaining large minority skeptical of US aid in such scenarios”.

The US did indeed come to India’s aid in the two conflicts with China, 1962 and 2020. But, as the survey noted, US contribution remained publicly unacknowledged by the Indian government, then (Congress government led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and BJP government now led by Prime Minister Modi). A former White House official felt compelled by the resounding lack of public expression of gratitude for US help in 2020 to put it on record at an annual security conference in New Delhi.

The survey also found that Modi’s popularity had rebounded from the mauling it received for his handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and the protest by farmers, with 71 per cent of respondents supporting him strongly or somewhat.

The Prime Minister’s rebounding popularity, and that of the ruling BJP, was found worrying by the writers of the CVoter-Stimson survey report.

[Riaz Haq]

What the Iranian scholar Albiruni said about Hindus, echoed centuries later by Vivekananda

In this excerpt from his book ‘Dharma’, Chaturvedi Badrinath examines the first ever dialogue between Islamic and Hindu thought.

https://scroll.in/article/938208/what-the-iranian-scholar-albiruni-...

Albiruni's observations on Hindus:


The Hindus believe that there is no country but theirs, no nation like theirs, no kings like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs. They are haughty, foolishly vain, self-conceited, and stolid. They are by nature niggardly in communicating that which they know, and they take the greatest possible care to withhold it from men of another caste among their own people, still much more, of course, from any foreigner. According to their belief, there is no other country on earth but theirs, no other race of man but theirs, and no created beings besides them have any knowledge or science whatsoever...

...all their fanaticism is directed against those who do not belong to them – against all foreigners. They call them mlechha, ie impure, and forbid any connection with them, be it by intermarriage or any other kind of relationship, or by sitting, eating, and drinking with them, because thereby, they think, they would be polluted.

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The earliest, indeed the very first, dialogue between a Muslim scientist and Hindu thought took place when Albiruni (971-1039) arrived in India in the second decade of the eleventh century in circumstances that were rather ironical. He came as a camp follower of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (967-1030). Whereas the chief purpose of Sultan Mahmud, the king of Ghazni, was to plunder the immense wealth in the form of gold and money at some of the more famous Hindu temples, the sole aim of Albiruni was to gain from the immense riches of Indian philosophies and the sciences.

That was probably also the time when Indian sciences had, on the whole, no longer anything of theoretical importance to add to their earlier great achievements. The most creative period of science in India was over by a century or two, perhaps. None of the sources Albiruni mentions in his Ta’rikh-ul-Hind was contemporary.

[Riaz Haq]

Christopher Clary
@clary_co
“sanctions have hit the Russian military industrial complex as key spare parts… can no longer be sourced... Russia will increasingly become dependent on China for outsourcing hardware manufacturing &in turn weapon supplies to India will be hit.”

https://twitter.com/clary_co/status/1560943134292443139?s=20&t=...


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India exercises strategic autonomy, worried at Russia’s ‘no limit’ China tilt
India News
Published on Aug 19, 2022 08:14 AM IST
National Security Advisor Ajit Doval made it clear to his Russian counterpart that India only takes decisions based on its national interests and questioned Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China as this directly impacted New Delhi’s security concerns.

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-exercises-strategic...

National Security Advisor Ajit Doval had a heart-to-heart conversation with his Russian counterpart Nikolai Patrushev in Moscow this week with both sides discussing developments in Indo-Pacific, Ukraine and addressing each other’s concerns in the unfolding security scenario in Asia. Doval also met the newly appointed Russian Deputy Prime Minister in-charge of weapon industries Denis Manturov.

During his Moscow visit, NSA Doval dispelled any Russian notion that India had distanced itself from its strategic partner of the past and moved closer to the western camp. He made it clear to his interlocutors that India only takes decisions based on its self-interests and national security concerns and is not bound to any camp.

However, NSA Doval also conveyed that India was concerned about Russia leaning toward China, which had a long-standing boundary dispute with India and had recently flared up by PLA’s unilateral actions in the East Ladakh sector in May 2020. He said to date the boundary issue has been hanging fire with China still to restore April 2020 status quo ante in the East Ladakh sector.

The two sides discussed the Chinese power projection post House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's August 2 Taiwan visit with Russia expressing concern over the rapid militarization of the Indo-Pacific. With Russian energy exports from Vladivostok being impacted by the growing China-US tussle in the Indo-Pacific, Moscow is concerned about the military response by Japan, Taiwan and US over the Chinese missile firing around Taiwan post Pelosi’s visit.

While the two NSAs exchanged notes over the developments in the Ukraine war, it is quite evident that the western sanctions have hit the Russian military industrial complex as key spare parts from Europe can no longer be sourced due to American sanctions. In this context, Russia will increasingly become dependent on China for outsourcing hardware manufacturing and in turn weapon supplies to India will be hit. The Ukraine war is now into its sixth month with neither the Russian nor the Ukrainian forces being able to make a decisive move towards its objectives and the conflict bleeding both the economies.

At the NSA level dialogue, the two sides discussed cooperation in atomic energy, space, trade, and investment with both countries worried about the developments in Afghanistan. Despite the Taliban being in power for an year, Afghanistan continues to be restive with no space for minorities, women and children. The Central Asian Republics are seeing increasing economic penetration by Beijing much to the chagrin of Russia with countries bordering restive Xinjiang already in the Chinese debt trap through the enticing Belt Road Initiative (BRI).

[Riaz Haq]

'Pakistan isn't Collapsing, India Should Focus on Silver Linings. Boycott or War Aren't Options'

https://youtu.be/GNapL0APNUY

In a 30-minute interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire to discuss his book ‘India’s Pakistan Conundrum’, Sharat Sabharwal ( ex Indian Ambassador to Pakistan) identified three preconceived notions that the Indian people must discard. First, he says it’s not in India’s interests to promote the disintegration of Pakistan. “The resulting chaos will not leave India untouched”.

Second, Indians must disabuse themselves of the belief that India has the capacity to inflict a decisive military blow on Pakistan in conventional terms. “The nuclear dimension has made it extremely risky, if not impossible, for India to give a decisive military blow to Pakistan to coerce it into changing its behaviour.”

Third, Indians must disabuse themselves of the belief that they can use trade to punish Pakistan. “Use of trade as an instrument to punish Pakistan is both short-sighted and ineffective because of the relatively small volume of Pakistani exports to India.”

https://youtu.be/GNapL0APNUY

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Historically, the relationship between India and Pakistan has been mired in conflicts, war, and lack of trust. Pakistan has continued to loom large on India's horizon despite the growing gap between the two countries. This book examines the nature of the Pakistani state, its internal dynamics, and its impact on India.

The text looks at key issues of the India-Pakistan relationship, appraises a range of India's policy options to address the Pakistan conundrum, and proposes a way forward for India's Pakistan policy. Drawing on the author's experience of two diplomatic stints in Pakistan, including as the High Commissioner of India, the book offers a unique insider's perspective on this critical relationship.

A crucial intervention in diplomatic history and the analysis of India's Pakistan policy, the book will be of as much interest to the general reader as to scholars and researchers of foreign policy, strategic studies, international relations, South Asia studies, diplomacy, and political science.

https://books.telegraph.co.uk/Product/Sharat-Sabharwal/Indias-Pakis...

[Riaz Haq]

India’s action to deliver pain in response to Pakistan’s terror should be calibrated. Because of the limitations on India’s ability to inflict a decisive blow on Pakistan through military means, examined in the next chapter, the actions available to India to punish/deter Pakistan’s terror activities fall in the tactical domain. Though lagging behind India in conventional military capability, Pakistan is in a position  to respond in kind to such actions. Therefore, an indiscriminate tactical response to Pakistan’s provocations can result in a tit for tat spiral, without corresponding results in India’s favour. Hence, while calibrated action against Pakistani posts/infrastructure facilitating infiltration/terror may be desirable, the policy of heavy firing across the LoC/IB in the J&K sector, adopted by India from time to time has invariably resulted in a stalemate of tit for tat killings of security personnel/civilians on both sides, without putting an end to infiltration/terror from Pakistan.

Sabharwal, Sharat. India’s Pakistan Conundrum (p. 290). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition. 

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Ironically, it was a military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, who liberalised the media scene in 2002, allowing private radio and TV channels. Since then, privately owned channels have multiplied. Pakistan now has over 30 Urdu and regional languages news channels, besides entertainment and religious channels. The number of internet users in Pakistan was reported to be around 76 million at the beginning of 2020, an increase of about 17% over the previous year.1 Though around 35% of the total population, this is a significant number in absolute terms. Social media users in Pakistan stood at around 37 million at the beginning of 2020.2 All this has ensured that a large segment of the population is not dependent on the state for information, including about other countries. In this context, access of a large number of people to the internet and social media cannot be overemphasised. As mentioned in Chapter 13, my speech on the Indus Waters Treaty made in Karachi in April 2010 was largely blacked out by the print and electronic media because of a signal  from the powers that be, but found its way into the local public discourse through the internet.
. 
Sabharwal, Sharat. India’s Pakistan Conundrum (pp. 336-337). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition. 

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Use of trade as an instrument to punish Pakistan is both short-sighted and ineffective because of the relatively small volume of Pakistani exports to India. Further, as examined in Chapter 13, use of water as an instrument of coercion is a highly overrated option.

Sabharwal, Sharat. India’s Pakistan Conundrum (p. 359). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

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Absence of dialogue and diplomacy between the two countries carries the risk of an unintended flare-up. With India increasingly convinced of its ability to coerce Pakistan militarily and Pakistan overestimating the leverage resulting from its growing China nexus and the downturn in India-China relations because of China’s aggressive behaviour in eastern Ladakh, an accidental escalation can occur. Restoration of ceasefire on the LoC/IB in the J&K sector in February 2021 was an important step towards shifting to a “management” mode from the free-fall phase of the relationship since 2016. As of this writing, the ceasefire was holding with a few exceptions. However, some additional steps such as upgradation of diplomatic representation to High Commissioners’ level and resumption of trade that would have contributed further to the shift towards a “management” mode, had not come about. The eight-track dialogue format used in every phase of structured dialogue since 1997 has outlived its utility. To begin with, Pakistan never bought wholeheartedly into India’s sagacious rationale that issues such as trade and people to people contacts should not be held hostage to solution of the more intractable political problems. Coming to the specific subjects, it is clear that demilitarisation of Siachen is not possible. without an understanding on the larger J&K issue and vastly improved trust between the two countries. A solution to Sir Creek requires a compromise by both sides, which is not possible until the relationship improves substantially. A roadmap for normalisation of trade, drawn up by the Commerce Secretaries in September 2012, already exists and can be used with suitable adaptation as and when the Pakistani establishment takes an enlightened view on the matter and overcomes the resistance of vested interests in sectors such as pharmaceuticals and automobiles. The revised visa agreement signed in September 2012 is available for implementation as a stepping stone to promotion of greater people to people contacts, but this too can happen only when the overall relationship looks up. As stated in Chapter 10, the Tulbul Navigation Project has become a non-issue.
 
Sabharwal, Sharat. India’s Pakistan Conundrum (pp. 353-354). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition. 

[Riaz Haq]

India sacks 3 air force (#IAF) officers for firing #missile into #Pakistan. Earlier, #India blamed a “technical malfunction” during routine maintenance. Military experts have warned of the risk of accidents or miscalculations by #nuclear-armed neighbors. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/23/indian-air-force-sack...

The Indian air force has said it has sacked three officers for accidentally firing a missile into Pakistan in March.

“A court of inquiry, set up to establish the facts of the case, including fixing responsibility for the incident, found that deviation from the standard operating procedures by three officers led to the accidental firing of the missile,” the air force said.

At the time of the accidental firing, India blamed a “technical malfunction” during routine maintenance.

Military experts have warned of the risk of accidents or miscalculations by the nuclear-armed neighbours, which have fought three wars and engaged in numerous smaller armed clashes, usually over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The incident raised questions about safety mechanisms.

Pakistani officials said the missile was unarmed and crashed near the city of Mian Channu, about 310 miles (500km) from the capital, Islamabad.

[Riaz Haq]

India's March 9 "accidental firing" of Brahmos nuclear-capable supersonic cruise missile into Pakistan has raised serious questions about the safety of the Indian nuclear arsenal. Do the people in charge of India's nukes have basic competence to handle such weapons? Was this really an "unauthorized" or "accidental" firing? Why was there a long delay by New Delhi in acknowledging the incident?  Could Pakistan be blamed if it assumed that extremist right-wing Hindu elements had taken control of the missile system in India and fired it deliberately into Pakistani territory? Has the Indian government risked the lives of 1.6 billion people of South Asia?

https://www.southasiainvestor.com/2022/03/can-modis-india-be-truste...

[Riaz Haq]

Nuclear Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pakistanprofile

The Nuclear Arsenal, an Overview

Pakistan developed nuclear weapons outside of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Pakistan’s nuclear program dates back to the 1970s and was spurred on by India’s first nuclear test in 1974. Pakistan is estimated to have a nuclear arsenal of about 165 nuclear warheads.

Delivery Systems

Short-Range Ballistic Missile (<1,000 or less km)

Hatf-1: Short-range, solid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of 70-100 km.
Abdali (Hatf-2): Flight-tested six times; entered service in 2005. Nuclear role ambiguous; 180-200 km range; single warhead.
Ghaznavi (Hatf-3): 290 km range.
Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4): 750 km range.
Shaheen-1A (Hatf-4): Under development, an improved variant of the Shaheen-1. First tested in 2012, may see deployment in 2017. Listed by Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris as having a 900 km range, but following its first test it was reported to be a medium-range missile.
Nasr (Hatf-9): Under development; 70 km range. Each NASR launcher, however, contains 4 missile tubes primarily for conventional payloads. With a range too short to attack targets within India, some analysts believe the Nasr is intended for battlefield use against Indian troops.
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (1,000-3,000 km)

Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6): 1,500-2,000 km range.
Shaheen-3 (Hatf-10): Under development; underwent two successful tests in 2015. Another successful test took place in January 2021.The Pakistani government said the missile was capable of delivering a nuclear or conventional warhead for 2,750 km.
Ghauri-1 (Hatf-5): 1,250-1,500 km range.
Ghauri-2 (Hatf-5a): Medium-range liquid propellant missile under development with an expected range of at least 1,800 km.
Ababeel: Under development; 2,200km range; reportedly capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)

It is speculated, albeit loosely, that the Taimur missile, with a range of 7,000 km, is an ICBM under development.

Cruise Missiles

Babur (Hatf-7): ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles; 350 km range (Pakistani government claims 700 km). A Babur IA missile was tested in February 2021, with a claimed range of 450 km.
Babur-2: ground-launched cruise missile; 700 km range; deployment status unknown.
Babur-3: sea-based cruise missile; 450 km range; deployment status unknown.
Ra’ad (Hatf-8): nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile; status unknown; yet to be deployed as of 2020.
Ra'ad-2: nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile; range of greater than 350 km; revealed in March 2017 and tested in 2020.
Submarines, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), and Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM)

Pakistan does not currently possess SLBMs. Following the launch of India’s INS Arihant submarine in 2009, the Pakistan Navy announced its intention to build a nuclear submarine of its own, and in 2012 the Navy announced it would start construction. According to the Navy, the submarine is an ambitious project, will be designed and built indigenously, and will take between 5 and 8 years. It not yet clear if Pakistan is attempting to complete the nuclear triad.
According to Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, and Julia Diamond, there are indications that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapon for deployment on submarines. Pakistan’s announcement that it would stand up a Naval Strategic Force Command in 2012 also points to an interest in developing sea-based capabilities.
There was a confirmed test of the nuclear-capable Babur cruise missile from a mobile underwater platform in January 2017. It may be converted for use on submarines.
In April 2018, Pakistan announced that it had conducted a second successful flight test of its Babur-3 nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile which has a range of 450 km.

[Riaz Haq]

Nuclear Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pakistanprofile


Strategic Bombers

Pakistan’s available delivery vehicles include dual-use fighter aircraft, reportedly the U.S.-origin F-16A/B and French-origin Mirage 2000 fighter jets. The planes were not transferred for the purpose of delivering nuclear bombs, but Pakistan is believed to have modified them for that mission. Both were deployed in 1998.
F-16A/B: ~24 nuclear-capable F-16A/Bs; ~24 nuclear bombs; plane has a 1,600 km range.
Mirage III/V: ~12 nuclear-capable Mirage III/Vs; ~12 nuclear bombs or Ra’ad cruise missiles; plane has a 2,100 km range.
Fissile Material

Specific estimates of Pakistan's stockpiles of fissile material are difficult to determine, given uncertainty about Pakistan's uranium enrichment capacity.
In contravention of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has supplied Pakistan with 4 nuclear power reactors, the Chasnupp-1,-2,-3, and-4. The fourth reactor, the Chasnupp-4, went critical in March 2017. In addition, China has supplied Pakistan with Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) for use in these reactors.
Highly Enriched Uranium

As of the beginning of 2019, Pakistan is estimated to possess approximately 3.7 ± 0.4 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
Plutonium

As of the end of 2016, Pakistan is estimated to possess 280 kg of weapons-grade plutonium.
By the end of 2015, Pakistan was operating four reactors that produce plutonium for weapons at Khushab. Khushab-I began operations in 1997/98, Khushab-II in 2009/10, Khushab-III in early 2013, and Kushab-IV in 2015.
Pakistan separates the plutonium from the spent reactor fuel at the Rawalpindi New Labs facility, which has two reprocessing plants. Another reprocessing facility may be being constructed at Chashma as of 2015.
Proliferation Record

The foundation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was aided by the theft of nuclear technology and know-how from the European company URENCO by scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who became a leading figure in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons establishment. Khan is also believed to have received a nuclear weapon design from China. Although U.S. intelligence was aware of Pakistan’s illicit program, the United States continued to provide military assistance and foreign aid to Islamabad up until 1990 when President George H. W. Bush decided that he could no longer certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. U.S. sanctions related to Pakistan’s nuclear program were dropped after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when the United States decided to pursue closer relations with Pakistan as part of the U.S. declared “war on terror.”
Abdul Qadeer Khan had also developed a black market network of suppliers to procure technology and know-how for Pakistan’s secret nuclear weapons program and then transformed that network into a supply chain for other states. Iran, Libya, and North Korea were all clients and other states might have been as well. After the interception of one of his shipments to Libya in October 2003, Khan appeared on Pakistani television in February 2004 and confessed to running the network, which transferred items ranging from centrifuges to bomb designs.
The Pakistani government denied any complicity in or knowledge of the network and confined Khan to house arrest. Although reportedly serving as an intermediary to foreign governments, the Pakistani government has not made Khan available to direct interviews by other states. General concern exists that remnants of the network might still be functioning.
Pakistan instituted new export control laws following the public exposure of Khan’s network in 2004, including the establishment of the Strategic Export Control Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Pakistan's control list now includes dual-use materials in an effort to meet the regulatory standards of export control regimes.

[Riaz Haq]

3 cheers for INS Vikrant & 3 questions for India’s leadership on naval doctrine

by Shekhar Gupta

https://youtu.be/3GbgmJM4Ygw

Key points:

1. Indian aircraft carrier is powered by American General Electric turbines

2. Russian MIG 29s require a lot of maintenance. These will be replaced with French Rafales or US F-18s in future.

3. Chinese aircraft carriers are totally indigenous (including engines, weapons, and aircraft) are much bigger

4. China has developed "aircraft carrier buster missiles" to deal with hostile nations' Navies.

5. Indian Navy hid its aircraft carriers from Pakistani submarines during 1965 and 1971 wars.

6. Indian-American analyst Ashley Tellis questions the utility of Indian aircraft carriers in the absence of India's geopolitical aims and its Naval Doctrine.

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Ashley Tellis on submarines vs aircraft carriers

https://youtu.be/6BficVBrqls


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The Unusual Carrier Killer Capability Of The Chinese Navy’s Strategic Bomber - Naval News

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/10/the-unusual-carrier-ki...


China’s recent test of a hypersonic ‘Orbital Bombardment System’ has been characterized as a ‘Sputnik moment’. The world is only just waking up to Chinese advances in strategic weapons technologies. Among a raft of new weapons, which increasingly do not have direct equivalents in the West, are anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). One of these, an air-launched version, appears to include a hypersonic maneuvering missile.