Is Saudi Arabia Ready For Reform?

[Riaz Haq]

Saudi society has long been dominated by the overzealous religious police, known as mutawa or mutaween, who strictly enforce the Saudi version of the Islamic Sharia Laws. The most visible manifestations of such enforcement include the almost total gender segregation, conservative dress code in public, and interruption of business for prayers five times a day.

There are some recent signs that the Saudi government is moving toward broader social reform by beginning to create new mutawa-free spaces within the Kingdom where the rules are different. King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) is one such space. Not only is the university co-educational, it has no dress code, nor does it allow the mutaween to enforce their rules. By offering greater freedom, the university is attempting to attract the best and the brightest academics, researchers and students from around the globe to create a world-class institution.

This is how the University describes itself: "The principles of academic freedom ensure that faculty members and researchers may conduct research and publish the results without undue hindrance or control. As an international university with many partners, KAUST recognizes the importance of academic freedom and the challenges presented by taking account of the various intellectual property regimes in the home countries of KAUST partner institutions."

IBM is one of the many international partners of KAUST. According to Businessweek, KAUST agreed to buy an IBM supercomputer, which is an essential tool in the research projects that IBM and the Saudis are targeting for their first collaboration. Among other things, the two teams will collaborate on a study of the nearby Red Sea, which they believe will help improve oil and mineral exploration. "[The supercomputer] is a magnet for smart people, and it makes it possible for us to solve big problems," says Majid F. Al-Ghaslan, KAUST's interim chief information officer.

Not content with KAUST to spur change, the Saudi ruler King Abdullah is now pushing the creation of four new special cities, according to the New York Times.

The first of these four cities is King Abdullah Economic City-KAEC (pronounced "cake"), a 65-square-mile development along the Red Sea. With a projected population of two million, the city is a Middle Eastern version of the “special economic zones” that have flourished in places like China.

Here is how New York Times describes the implications of the planned Saudi effort:

If the plan works, at best it would transform Saudi Arabia into a technologically advanced society controlled by a slightly more tolerant religious autocracy. Or it could provoke militant violence and government crackdowns. “What they are trying to do is very difficult,” said Bernard Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University who has written extensively on Saudi Arabia. “Someone telling you to go pray — that in-your-face religion — that’s not going to be permitted in these cities. It’s a more ecumenical Islam. But it’s a slippery slope. Once you start, you’ve basically opened up the door to a certain degree of diversity and tolerance.”

KAEC is expected to be followed by three other cities: Knowledge Economic City near Medina, the second holiest city for Muslims; Prince Abdulaziz bin Mousaed Economic City, 450 miles north of Riyadh, which will focus on agribusiness; and Jazan Economic City, proposed to create industrial jobs for Saudis living near the border with Yemen, where al Qaeda is believed to be very active.

The fact that Saudi leaders recognize the need to change was articulated recently by Sir William Charters Patey, the British ambassador in Riyadh until May 2010, in a interview with Arab News as follows: “They accept that you can’t just go on the same old way. Some of the assumptions that underpin Saudi Arabia...may not be enough to see them into the future.”

The Saudi rulers understand that oil could no longer be taken for granted. It currently accounts for 60 percent of GDP and 90 percent of revenue. Moreover, the country’s population is forecast to double over the next three decades and the Kingdom will need to generate income from other sources by then.

Patey said that the strategy, “a sensible and pragmatic one,” was to use the Kingdom’s current energy advantage to diversify into industries that are energy intensive. Saudi Arabia, he said, had also embarked on an ambitious strategy of developing a knowledge-based economy.

Change will eventually come to Saudi Arabia, but many questions remain about the process. Can the Saudi rulers escape the inevitable backlash from the adherents of the extreme Wahabi ideology that they have exported to other Muslim nations such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen? Will there be a process of political liberalization to match social and economic reforms? What will be the pace of this change? Will such change come peacefully? Can the current Saudi government manage this transition without unleashing widespread instability in Saudi Arabia, the Middle East and the wider Islamic world? How will the Saudi Kingdom's western allies and its neighbors react to such instability?

It's hard for any one, including the Saudis, to answer these and other similar questions now. The only thing that can be said with any certainty at this time is that the change is inevitable, and the face of the Middle East and Islamic world will change dramatically by the end of the 21st century.

Related Links:

Haq's Musings

Quality of Higher Education in India and Pakistan

Is Pakistan Emulating Saudi Arabia?

Jihadis Growing in Tenth Year of Afghan War

Pakistan Must Defeat Agents of Intolerance

Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy: "Islam and Science Have Parted Ways"

Clash of Ideas in Islam

[Riaz Haq]

Recently, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif confirmed that a “threat to Saudi Arabia will evoke strong reaction from Pakistan” during a meeting with the top defence-related brass, which was convened after the Kingdom’s offensive against the Houthi rebels in Yemen started. While a lot of Pakistanis are not in favour of going into what they perceive as a sectarian conflict, they fail to recognise both the strategic and economic implications if Pakistan does not support the Saudi Arabia-led offensive against the Houthi rebels. Firstly, the PML-N led government has every right to take this decision based on the number of representatives it has in parliament. However, what needs to be understood is that it’s not just the government, but also the military establishment which is backing the whole offensive due to strategic compulsions.

The two arguments against the engagement of Pakistani troops in Yemen and Saudi Arabia are: why engage our troops in a foreign country when we are fighting our own war; and why be part of a sectarian conflict? The truth is that a nation’s foreign policy is not driven by emotions but is based on long-term economic and strategic security concerns. Pakistan has taken part in Arab conflicts in the past. Fighter pilots from the Pakistan Air Force had flown Royal Saudi Air Force jets to repel an incursion from south Yemen in 1969. One should also remember that there are 400 Pakistani military trainers present in the Kingdom, already training Saudis on border management against the Islamic State on the Iraqi border.

The recent decision to support Saudi Arabia in this conflict is backed both, by the military and civilian leaderships, which see the stability of Saudi Arabia in Pakistan’s interest for two reasons: millions of Pakistanis work in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries with the highest number being in Saudi Arabia. Apart from that, the GCC remains the largest source of foreign exchange for Pakistan. In addition, Saudi Arabia remains Pakistan’s biggest strategic ally and helps meet our energy needs. Instability within the GCC and Saudi Arabia would mean millions of Pakistanis coming back jobless, hurting us economically. We have seen what happened to Pakistanis living in Kuwait after Iraq invaded that country.

The question remains: will Pakistan’s participation in the operation in Yemen hurt Pakistan’s own war? No. Our military and air force deployment inside Saudi Arabia will be limited in numbers and the decision regarding this should be left to the military command. We regularly send troops on UN missions. Does our participation in these missions affect us? No. Secondly, the perception that the Yemen conflict is sectarian in nature is only because of Iran’s support to the Houthi rebels. In reality, this is more of an ethnic conflict with there being a quest for political power. Pakistan’s foreign policy with regards to Iran traditionally has been to defend Iran too. Hence, a serious diplomatic effort from our foreign office should be made to convince Iran that its stability as well as that of Saudi Arabia is vital for Pakistan. We cannot ignore either country.

We must also understand that there are more than 10 Muslim countries, including Turkey, backing the strikes in Yemen against the Houthis and Pakistan will eventually have to choose sides or lose support from our biggest strategic partners and energy providers. It is now up to the prime minister and his government to cash in on the opportunity and get a good economic deal for Pakistan in exchange for providing security for the GCC countries.

Pakistan could gain economically if a sound deal is negotiated for providing jobs to Pakistanis in the GCC countries, as well as negotiating a better energy deal. A good economic package negotiated at an appropriate time to benefit all Pakistanis will help the case for a greater military role in the GCC countries.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/861927/why-pakistan-needs-to-support-th...

[Riaz Haq]

Stratfor's George Friedman on US role in current Middle East regional conflict: 


There are two varieties of indirect warfare. The first is supporting native forces whose interests are parallel. This was done in the early stages of Afghanistan. The second is maintaining the balance of power among nations. We are seeing this form in the Middle East as the United States moves between the four major regional powers — Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey — supporting one then another in a perpetual balancing act. In Iraq, U.S. fighters carry out air strikes in parallel with Iranian ground forces. In Yemen, the United States supports Saudi air strikes against the Houthis, who have received Iranian training.

This is the essence of empire. The British saying is that it has no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests. That old cliche is, like most cliches, true. The United States is in the process of learning that lesson. In many ways the United States was more charming when it had clearly identified friends and enemies. But that is a luxury that empires cannot afford.

We are now seeing the United States rebalance its strategy by learning to balance. A global power cannot afford to be directly involved in the number of conflicts that it will encounter around the world. It would be exhausted rapidly. Using various tools, it must create regional and global balances without usurping internal sovereignty. The trick is to create situations where other countries want to do what is in the U.S. interest.

This endeavor is difficult. The first step is to use economic incentives to shape other countries' behavior. It isn't the U.S. Department of Commerce but businesses that do this. The second is to provide economic aid to wavering countries. The third is to provide military aid. The fourth is to send advisers. The fifth is to send overwhelming force. The leap from the fourth level to the fifth is the hardest to master. Overwhelming force should almost never be used. But when advisers and aid do not solve a problem that must urgently be solved, then the only type of force that can be used is overwhelming force. Roman legions were used sparingly, but when they were used, they brought overwhelming power to bear.

I have been deliberately speaking of the United States as an empire, knowing that this term is jarring. Those who call the United States an empire usually mean that it is in some sense evil. Others will call it anything else if they can. But it is helpful to face the reality the United States is in. It is always useful to be honest, particularly with yourself. But more important, if the United States thinks of itself as an empire, then it will begin to learn the lessons of imperial power. Nothing is more harmful than an empire using its power carelessly.

---

The current balancing act in the Middle East represents a fundamental rebalancing of American strategy. It is still clumsy and poorly thought out, but it is happening. And for the rest of the world, the idea that the Americans are coming will become more and more rare. The United States will not intervene. It will manage the situation, sometimes to the benefit of one country and sometimes to another.

https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/coming-terms-american-empire

[Riaz Haq]

#Pakistan and #SaudiArabia reconcile after rift over #Yemen. Gen Raheel Sharif visits King. #Pakistan can mediate. http://brook.gs/1QcVRo2 

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are resetting their relationship, which was dealt a major setback earlier this year when Islamabad refused to join the Saudi war in Yemen. 

Pakistan's chief of army staff, General Raheel Sharif, visited Riyadh last week and held talks with King Salman, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, and Defense Minister Prince Muhammad bin Salman. A joint Saudi-Pakistani military exercise was also concluded. The Saudi media hailed the visit as an end to the "somewhat cool" period that followed the unanimous vote in the Pakistani parliament last April against sending any troops to join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. 

The vote was followed by a wave of editorials in the Pakistani press harshly critical of the Kingdom. This criticism was highly unusual given the long history of close relations between the two states. Pakistan deployed thousands of soldiers in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s to deter any aggression by Iran against the Kingdom, for example, and Saudi Arabian money has helped bankroll Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. There are also 1.5 million Pakistanis working in Saudi Arabia. 

The chief of army staff's visit will help repair the rift over Yemen, but doubts about Pakistan's reliability will persist in the Gulf. Promises to come to the defense of the Kingdom and especially the two holy cities are taken with some question marks by the Gulf's royal families, especially in Abu Dhabi. 

For their part, senior Pakistanis have doubts about the stability of the succession process in Saudi Arabia. They are monitoring carefully the king's son, Prince Muhammad bin Salman, who is also deputy crown prince as well as defense minister, and who is very ambitious. The king has already deposed one crown prince this year, his brother Prince Muqrin, with no explanation. Many Pakistanis are also unhappy with the Saudi response to the tragic stampede at the Hajj this year, in which dozens of Pakistanis were killed. 

Given its neutral stand in the Yemen conflict, Pakistan could play a critical role in any peace agreement there by providing the core of a peace keeping force to oversee a cease-fire. Pakistan has a long history of providing excellent forces to United Nations peacekeeping missions. It is also experienced in managing Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions, which will be crucial to any peace process in Yemen. General Sharif will be in Washington later this month and should be quietly encouraged to lean forward to assist ending the war that Islamabad wisely stayed out of.

[Riaz Haq]

The #Obama Doctrine: "#Saudis need to “share” the Middle East with their #Iranian foes" #SaudiArabia #Iran #MidEast http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctr... …

“Aren’t the Saudis your friends?,” Turnbull asked.

Obama smiled. “It’s complicated,” he said.

Obama’s patience with Saudi Arabia has always been limited. In his first foreign-policy commentary of note, that 2002 speech at the antiwar rally in Chicago, he said, “You want a fight, President Bush? Let’s fight to make sure our so-called allies in the Middle East—the Saudis and the Egyptians—stop oppressing their own people, and suppressing dissent, and tolerating corruption and inequality.” In the White House these days, one occasionally hears Obama’s National Security Council officials pointedly reminding visitors that the large majority of 9/11 hijackers were not Iranian, but Saudi—and Obama himself rails against Saudi Arabia’s state-sanctioned misogyny, arguing in private that “a country cannot function in the modern world when it is repressing half of its population.” In meetings with foreign leaders, Obama has said, “You can gauge the success of a society by how it treats its women.”

His frustration with the Saudis informs his analysis of Middle Eastern power politics. At one point I observed to him that he is less likely than previous presidents to axiomatically side with Saudi Arabia in its dispute with its archrival, Iran. He didn’t disagree.

“Iran, since 1979, has been an enemy of the United States, and has engaged in state-sponsored terrorism, is a genuine threat to Israel and many of our allies, and engages in all kinds of destructive behavior,” the president said. “And my view has never been that we should throw our traditional allies”—the Saudis—“overboard in favor of Iran.”

But he went on to say that the Saudis need to “share” the Middle East with their Iranian foes. “The competition between the Saudis and the Iranians—which has helped to feed proxy wars and chaos in Syria and Iraq and Yemen—requires us to say to our friends as well as to the Iranians that they need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace,” he said. “An approach that said to our friends ‘You are right, Iran is the source of all problems, and we will support you in dealing with Iran’ would essentially mean that as these sectarian conflicts continue to rage and our Gulf partners, our traditional friends, do not have the ability to put out the flames on their own or decisively win on their own, and would mean that we have to start coming in and using our military power to settle scores. And that would be in the interest neither of the United States nor of the Middle East.”

One of the most destructive forces in the Middle East, Obama believes, is tribalism—a force no president can neutralize. Tribalism, made manifest in the reversion to sect, creed, clan, and village by the desperate citizens of failing states, is the source of much of the Muslim Middle East’s problems, and it is another source of his fatalism. Obama has deep respect for the destructive resilience of tribalism—part of his memoir, Dreams From My Father, concerns the way in which tribalism in post-colonial Kenya helped ruin his father’s life—which goes some distance in explaining why he is so fastidious about avoiding entanglements in tribal conflicts.

“It is literally in my DNA to be suspicious of tribalism,” he told me. “I understand the tribal impulse, and acknowledge the power of tribal division. I’ve been navigating tribal divisions my whole life. In the end, it’s the source of a lot of destructive acts.”