Trump Administration Seeks Pakistan's Help For Promoting “Durable Peace Between Israel and Iran”

[Riaz Haq]

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to discuss promoting “a durable peace between Israel and Iran,” the State Department said in a statement, according to Reuters.  Both leaders "agreed to continue working together to strengthen Pakistan-US relations, particularly to increase trade", said a statement released by the Pakistan government.

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio

The call came after Iran and Israel agreed to a ceasefire to end what President Donald Trump described as a "12-day war". It is yet another indication of Pakistan's close ties with both Tehran and Washington. Pakistan strongly condemned Israel's "unprovoked attack" and the US bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities. It also  shows Washington’s growing engagement with Islamabad at a time when the Trump administration is exploring a new diplomatic initiative with Tehran, possibly “as early as next week”. President Trump met Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House last week where they discussed Iran, which Trump said Pakistan knew about better than most other countries. 

Earlier in May this year, President Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Secretary Rubio arranged India-Pakistan ceasefire after 4 days of fighting between the two South Asian neighbors. Testifying before the US Congress earlier this month, the US Central Command Chief General Michael Kurilla described Pakistan as a “phenomenal partner in the counterterrorism world”. This statement coincided with the Washington visit of the Indian parliamentary delegation led by Shashi Tharoor. Tharoor's delegation's aim was to "isolate Pakistan" after the Pahalgam militant attack in Kashmir which India blamed on Pakistan without presenting any evidence. 

Pakistan also enjoys close ties with China and Russia. China-Pakistan friendship has meant significant diplomatic support and massive investment in infrastructure, as well as the state-of-the-art military hardware for the country's armed forces. Russia, too, has drawn closer to Pakistan. It has recently agreed to invest in a modern steel plant in Karachi where an abandoned Soviet-era steel mill stands today. 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defense Ministers

At a recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defense Ministers meeting in China, nine member countries(China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus)  rejected India's attempt to insert a reference to Pahalgam in the joint statement.  Earlier, India distanced itself from SCO's joint condemnation of Israel’s attacks on Iran. India also abstained from voting on a UN resolution regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict, specifically related to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. This decision continues India's pattern of abstaining on resolutions criticizing Israel. 

While India claims the mantle of the "Global South" leadership, its actions do not align with its ambition. On the other hand, Pakistan's policies and actions are much more aligned with those of the BRICS nations. Pakistan is not currently a member of the BRICS yet, but both China and Russia have publicly expressed support for its inclusion as a full member. 

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[Riaz Haq]

How India Can Placate America
In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-asia/how-india-can-placate-ame...

WHAT’S IN IT FOR ME?
With Trump’s victory in the November 2024 presidential election, many in India believed the country was well positioned to manage his return, given the experience of his first term. It has slowly become clear to Indian policymakers, however, that while Trump 1.0 was unpredictable, Trump 2.0 is unbound.

The second Trump administration is driven by an unyielding conviction that the United States has been badly taken advantage of, especially by its so-called allies and partners. Trump and his lieutenants claim that the United States has borne a disproportionate share of the burden in its myriad partnerships with little reciprocal benefit. Unlike its first iteration, this administration has fewer foreign policy veterans who believe in India’s intrinsic value as a bulwark against China.

In addition to skepticism about partnerships, the current administration’s incoherence about China has left India on uncertain ground. Although it is still early days, this Trump administration’s China policy is strikingly muddled. In Washington, it is an open secret that the administration has not one China strategy but many. Competing factions and schools of thought vie for influence. Trump’s team includes skeptics who downplay the China threat, hard-liners who champion Biden-era curbs on investment and technology, and dealmakers (possibly including Trump himself) who dream of a personal détente with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. In New Delhi, Indian officials struggle to parse the mixed signals.

In this Trump administration, few officials believe in India’s intrinsic value.
Trump has thus ended—or at least paused—the U.S. policy of strategic altruism. If successive U.S. leaders refrained from asking, “What can India do for us?” the current administration is shouting this question from the rooftops. Indeed, it is instructive that the administration has conditioned a broader dialogue with New Delhi on India acceding to several key demands.

First, as part of its policy of “reciprocal tariffs,” the Trump administration has threatened India with an across-the-board 26 percent tariff unless it delivers generous trade and market access concessions. India has emerged as one of the most enthusiastic suitors of a trade pact with the United States, with a tentative deal expected to be reached before the president’s new, arbitrary August 1 deadline. Although this “early harvest” deal may outline only basic terms, officials on both sides hope for a formal pact by this fall’s Quad summit in New Delhi.

Second, the administration has publicly pressed India to increase purchases of U.S.-made defense equipment. Although India has long relied on Russian arms imports, it has meaningfully diversified its portfolio of new purchases over the last decade, increasing the military equipment it buys from the West—notably from France, Israel, and the United States. In a February meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Trump floated the possibility of granting India access to buy cutting-edge F-35 stealth fighter jets, an offer normally restricted to the closest U.S. allies. India currently buys more arms from Russia and France than from the United States. Although it is unlikely that the United States could become India’s preferred military supplier even if New Delhi were so inclined—cost considerations alone would rule this out—Trump’s team believes India has been slow to accelerate the purchase of U.S. weapons.

[Riaz Haq]

How India Can Placate America
In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-asia/how-india-can-placate-ame...

Finally, the administration has also implored India to do more on energy. It wants India to buy more U.S. liquid natural gas and oil, and India seems to be complying. In 2025 alone, India has more than doubled its oil imports from the United States. Washington is also lobbying New Delhi to amend its liability laws to allow for foreign firms to invest in the country’s civilian nuclear sector—the prime reason why the celebrated U.S.-Indian civil nuclear deal has never been consummated. Although the ink on the bilateral accord has long dried, India’s onerous regulations regarding liability issues continue to stymie American investment in Indian nuclear reactors.

RETURNING THE FAVOR
With strategic altruism in Washington on ice, India faces a new reality: New Delhi may have to swallow the bitter pill of making sacrifices today for the promise of security and prosperity tomorrow. In this reversal, it is India—not the United States—that must embrace delayed reciprocity, delivering tangible benefits without expecting short-term returns. For a country that has long prized strategic autonomy, this posture is an uncomfortable departure, although perhaps a necessary one. In the short term, it allows India to withstand the Trump storm in the hopes that either the current administration tempers its transactionalism or that it is eventually followed by a more traditional, strategically minded administration. Over the long run, India’s need for a strategic partnership with the United States remains as vital as it has been for the past quarter century.

That is because India requires significant foreign capital to help finance its ambitious domestic transformation. Although India’s trend growth of roughly 6.5 percent is robust by global standards, it is inadequate given the country’s development goals and the urgent needs of its burgeoning, young, and rapidly urbanizing workforce. To realize the Modi government’s vision of attaining developed-country status by 2047—an aspiration that implies a $30 trillion economy—India will require a massive influx of investment. At present, foreign direct investment inflows into India are muted; last fiscal year, India recorded its lowest level of net FDI inflows in at least two decades. For India to return to double-digit growth rates, renewed investment from the United States will be paramount.

India also needs American support in matters of security. The conflict with Pakistan in May underscored that India was fighting not one neighboring adversary but two; Pakistan used Chinese weapons systems to repel Indian attacks, relied on Chinese satellite imagery of Indian assets, and received real-time intelligence from Beijing on battlefield movements. India’s strategic vulnerability to China has only grown in recent years. Both countries remain locked in an unresolved standoff in the mountains of Ladakh, China has expanded its military infrastructure in the border region, and Beijing continues to encircle India through economic and military advances across South Asia. Despite its rhetoric of strategic autonomy, India cannot deter China alone; its defense posture and economic resilience hinge on American partnership to varying degrees.

[Riaz Haq]

How India Can Placate America
In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-asia/how-india-can-placate-ame...

So, too, do India’s technological ambitions. India boasts world-class engineering talent, but it lacks the necessary resources and infrastructure to be an industry leader in the rapidly expanding field of artificial intelligence. In February 2026, India will host the next global AI summit. U.S. officials have privately suggested that this gathering could be an opportunity for large U.S.-based tech giants to unveil major investments in state-of-the-art AI infrastructure across India. Indeed, much of India’s tech talent has found a home not in India but in the United States. Often dismissed as a source of “brain drain,” the migration corridor between the two countries—the sixth largest globally—also brings substantial gains. In the last fiscal year alone, India received over $135 billion in remittances from around the world, nearly 30 percent of which originated in the United States.

DOMESTIC PRESSURES, GLOBAL IMPERATIVES
Within India, adopting a policy of strategic altruism toward the United States does carry risks. Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has long cultivated a muscular, nationalist image in contrast to the dovish, secular Indian National Congress. Concessions to Trump risk undercutting that image, especially given recent accusations that Modi yielded to White House pressure to finalize a cease-fire with Pakistan in May.

On the substance of its concessions, here, too, India will have to tread carefully. Energy and defense purchases may not be the stuff of mass political campaigns, but issues related to farmers and agriculture are. If India makes significant market access concessions to cater to American agricultural interests, Modi’s government will come dangerously close to touching the third rail of Indian politics. This is why India is more likely to offer the United States tariff relief on products such as ethanol, almonds, wine, and spirits rather than on staples such as rice, wheat, or dairy products.

With India’s economy punching below its weight, however, Modi’s inner circle realizes the status quo is no longer tenable. In recent years, India has raised tariffs, steadfastly remained outside mega-regional trade pacts, and subsidized domestic industry to stimulate investment. Collectively, these protectionist measures have failed to trigger an economic takeoff. If Modi can deftly use Trump as a foil—framing domestic tariff cuts as a tactical move to placate a capricious U.S. president—he can unlock trade reforms that better integrate India into global supply chains and yield long-term economic gains.

If anybody has the latitude to make such concessions to a bullying Washington, Modi does. Although the Modi-led BJP suffered a temporary setback in last year’s general elections, it remains dominant. In regional elections held over the past year, the ruling party decisively defeated opponents in key states, defying predictions of “peak Modi.” Few elected leaders enjoy Modi’s political space to take the high road with Trump. If he does so, he might succeed in insulating the U.S.-Indian relationship from the tumultuous present to reap the benefits of a more congenial future.

Some Indian strategists rightly worry that it takes a dangerous leap of faith to bet on the United States returning to moderation in 2028. But the alternative—strategic estrangement—could come at an even greater cost. In an era of global uncertainty, strategic altruism may be the highest form of self-interest India can exercise.