History of US-India Ties

[Riaz Haq]

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's decision to skip the upcoming Non-Aligned Summit in Venezuela sends a powerful signal of his Hindu Nationalist government's growing commitment to India's partnership with the United States.

The latest logistics deal allowing the US forces to use Indian military bases is an indication of how the Americans intend to play the India card against China after the Cold War,  just as they played the China card against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The US-India deal is part of the  US “pivot” to Asia designed to check rising China. The U.S. Navy plans to deploy 60 percent of its surface ships in Asia in the near future. Instead of having to build facilities virtually from the ground up, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. has the benefit of simple arrangements for the tremendous Indian facilities, according to Forbes magazine. This deal will accelerate the unfolding post Col-War realignment taking place in South Asia.

Massive Western Aid to India:

US-India ties are not new. India has been the number one recipient of US aid since 1947, according to the US government data.   The country India's first Prime Minister turned to for help during the 1962 China-India war was also the United States.

India has received $65.1 billion in US aid since its independence, making it the top recipient of American economic assistance. Pakistan, with its $44.4 billion, is at number 5 on the list.  US data also shows that Pakistan is not among top 10 for military or total economic and military aid.

More recently, the US aid to India has been replaced by massive US investment in the country that keeps its economy afloat. Massive western money inflows help India, with its huge trade deficits, pay for its imports and help maintain significant foreign exchange reserves. U.S. investment in India has jumped 500% in the past two years, according to the Wall Street Journal.

US Help in 1962 Indo-China War:

Indian Prime Minister Nehru sought significant US material aid and diplomatic help as the Indian troops were in full retreat in the 1962 China-India war.  A former US intelligence official Bruce Riedel in his book "JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA and the Sino-Indian War" notes that President John F. Kennedy played a “decisive role” in “forestalling a Pakistani attack” on India, even as
Islamabad then was fully capable of going to war with India to wrest the disputed territory of Kashmir.

India's Pakistan Obsession:

The US efforts to partner with India are clearly aimed to check China's rise. However, India's actions and statements suggest that it expects to use this partnership to against Pakistan.

Anticipating questions about US-Pakistan ties during his India visit, here's what Carter told Council of Foreign Relation in Washington D.C. before leaving for New Delhi:

“I’m sure I’ll be asked about it in India, but I think the first thing one needs to say from an American policy point of view, these (India and Pakistan) are both respected partners and friends.”

"Pakistan is an important security partner", Carter added.

Pakistan-China Ties: 

While US is courting India to check China's rise, the China-Pakistan ties have now moved well beyond “higher than Himalayas and sweeter than honey,” as officials on both sides say. Chinese strategists openly talk of Pakistan as their nation’s only real ally. And China is investing heavily in Pakistan to build the Gwadar deep sea port as part of a much more ambitious and strategic China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that India is attempting sabotage.

The result is that Pakistan is drawing closer to China, a rising superpower, while its rival India is partnering with the United States, a superpower in relative decline on the world stage.

Let me conclude with a quote from from Brookings' Stephen Cohen on India-Pakistan power equation:

“One of the most important puzzles of India-Pakistan relations is not why the smaller Pakistan feels encircled and threatened, but why the larger India does. It would seem that India, seven times more populous than Pakistan and five times its size, and which defeated Pakistan in 1971, would feel more secure. This has not been the case and Pakistan remains deeply embedded in Indian thinking. There are historical, strategic, ideological, and domestic reasons why Pakistan remains the central obsession of much of the Indian strategic community, just as India remains Pakistan’s.”


Here's a video discussion on the subject:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6sfliv7KJVM




http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x45590s_pak-leaders-in-london-us-i...



Pak Leaders in London; US-India Defense Deals... by ViewpointFromOverseas

https://vimeo.com/163190180



Pak Leaders in London; US-India Defense Deals; Trump vs GOP from Ikolachi on Vimeo.



Related Links:

Haq's Musings

India's Pakistan Obsession

Can India Survive Without Wester Money?

India's Superpower Delusion: Modi's Policy Blunders

Does Pakistan Really Need F-16s to Fight Terror? 

Pakistan-Russia-China vs India-Japan-US?

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Gwadar: Hong Kong West for China?

Indian Agent Kulbhushan Yadav's Confession

[Riaz Haq]

#India’s foreign policy is up a creek without a paddle, especially in its #SouthAsia neighborhood due to reckless adventurism. #Modi has abandoned non-aligned movement and antagonized #China and #Russia in its pursuit of alliance with #America, #Trump.

https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/is-indias-foreign-policy-adr...

The BJP government’s denseness has ended up antagonising both Russia and China. Nothing typified this more than Russia holding antiterror exercises with Pakistan in DRUZBA-2017. Similarly, rather than taking a nuanced position, the ill-conceived boycott of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in 2017 invited the wrath of China via the Doklam standoff. Notwithstanding government claims, the withdrawal from Doklam was sequential — India first, then China — rather than simultaneous. The sequel was that the Prime Minister had to travel to Wuhan and Sochi to effectively pay ‘court’ to Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively.

The worst casualty has, however, been India’s neighbourhood. In the past four years, the BJP government has swung from the sublime to the ridiculous on Pakistan, blockaded Nepal for not declaring itself as a Hindu Rashtra, lost Sri Lanka to the Chinese, been belittled by the Maldives and even Seychelles. Europe, Africa, Latin and South America have fallen off the map.

The list is interminable. The BJP government’s denseness has ended up antagonising both Russia and China. Nothing typified this more than Russia holding antiterror exercises with Pakistan in DRUZBA-2017. Similarly, rather than taking a nuanced position, the ill-conceived boycott of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in 2017 invited the wrath of China via the Doklam standoff. Notwithstanding government claims, the withdrawal from Doklam was sequential — India first, then China — rather than simultaneous. The sequel was that the Prime Minister had to travel to Wuhan and Sochi to effectively pay ‘court’ to Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively.

The worst casualty has, however, been India’s neighbourhood. In the past four years, the BJP government has swung from the sublime to the ridiculous on Pakistan, blockaded Nepal for not declaring itself as a Hindu Rashtra, lost Sri Lanka to the Chinese, been belittled by the Maldives and even Seychelles. Europe, Africa, Latin and South America have fallen off the map.

The list is interminable. India’s foreign policy is up a creek without a paddle.

[Riaz Haq]

#Pompeo in #Delhi: #Trade, #Russia #S400 anti-missile deal, #Huawei #China #5G, #USICRF #US #ReligiousFreedom report other sticky issues on plate during Pompeo-Jaishankar in #India talks. #Trump #Modi https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/trade-s-400-iran-oil-to-top-...

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-hindu-explains-the-state...

U.S. Secretary of State will meet Modi before the latter leaves for Osaka
India will once again press its case for a waiver of United States’ sanctions on the $5.4 billion Russian S-400 Triumf anti-missile deal, but will discuss Washington’s concerns over the issue during talks with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Wednesday.

On a visit to Delhi to prepare for the Trump-Modi meeting this weekend, Mr. Pompeo landed on Tuesday evening ahead of a full day of meetings with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval on Wednesday, where he will also call on Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Mr. Pompeo will start his day with full-delegation meetings with Mr. Jaishankar followed by a press briefing. No MoUs or agreements are expected to be announced, although negotiations on two important agreements, the Industrial Security Annexe and the Geo-spatial cooperation agreement BECA have made considerable progress. Mr. Pompeo will hold a closed-door interaction with Indian and American businesses to speak about the impasse over a trade deal and the U.S. withdrawal of India’s GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) status.

In the evening, he will meet Mr. Modi before the latter leaves for Osaka, and also give a public address aimed at India’s youth. Mr. Pompeo will leave for Osaka early Thursday morning.

While strategic relations and people-to-people ties are on the agenda during the main talks, trade issues between the two countries are expected to take centre stage, diplomatic sources said. In addition, the U.S.’s objections to the purchase of the S-400, its sanctions on Indian imports of oil from Iran and Venezuela as well as its new demand that India must not allow Chinese telecom major Huawei to participate in 5G network trials are likely to come up for discussion.

The sources acknowledged that the U.S. had made known its concerns over the S-400 deal and other issues quite openly, and India fears becoming “collateral damage” of the U.S.’ relationships with other countries. In the past few weeks, a number of senior U.S. diplomats and officials have suggested that if India goes through with buying the S-400, the U.S. will not offer India certain hi-technology platforms or may hold back on F-21/F-35 sales, as it had done with Turkey which has also bought the S-400.

“[The U.S.] must realise that we have a long-standing defence relationship with Russia which we cannot wish away,” a government official said on Tuesday, adding that the S-400 deal had been discussed with the Putin government for a long time before it was signed in October last. “If you look at it purely from a legal point of view, India fulfils the requirements for a CAATSA waiver,” the official said, referring to the U.S. law that bans military purchases from Russia, Iran and North Korea.

[Riaz Haq]

Excerpts of Bruce Riedel's "JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War"


https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/books/story/20151102-jfk-to-the-...


https://twitter.com/clary_co/status/1259164657442525186?s=20

For (then US ambassador to India J.K.) Galbraith "the nightmare of a combined attack by Pakistan and China, with the possibility of defeat, collapse and even anarchy in India, was much on my mind. My concern was about equally divided between helping the Indians against the Chinese and keeping peace between the Indians and the Pakistanis". The ambassador was right to be concerned. From the beginning of hostilities (Pakistan's President) Ayub Khan began pressing for some kind of Indian "compensation" in Kashmir in exchange for Pakistani neutrality. As the United States began to back India publicly on the McMahon Line and then to send it arms, Ayub Khan felt betrayed by Kennedy. The promise he had gotten in July 1961 that Washington would not arm India, even if China attacked, without Pakistan's agreement seemed to be a dead letter: The "most allied ally" was being forsaken to help its bigger neighbor.

Washington sided immediately with Galbraith on Kashmir, but thought it would be useful for (US Ambassador to Pakistan Walter P.) McConaughy to be able to tell Ayub Khan that Nehru would welcome reassurances of Pakistani neutrality. Galbraith that evening saw the prime minister and wrote later in his diary, "Nehru was frail, brittle, and seemed small and old. He was obviously desperately tired". When asked if the United States could tell Ayub Khan that Nehru would welcome a Pakistani assurance of neutrality, the prime minister said he would not object. Galbraith then "moved in very hard saying this would not be sufficient, that we must be able to say that Nehru would warmly accept such assurances. He looked a little stunned". Nehru relented and agreed that such a letter would be helpful. Galbraith pressed further and asked Nehru to promise that he would positively respond to a Pakistani assurance. Nehru said "on some appropriate occasion he would". Galbraith pressed hard again and said, "This was a time for generosity and he should be immediately forthcoming. Again Nehru agreed." Thus Galbraith was increasingly becoming a key policy counselor to the Indian prime minister behind the scenes.

The next day, on October 29, Nehru formally asked Kennedy via Galbraith to supply arms to India. Kennedy had just sent a letter to Ayub Khan describing the Chinese attack on India as an act of aggression and informing him that the United States would provide support to India. Kennedy asked for Pakistan to reassure India that it would not take advantage of the Chinese attack to pressure India. Kennedy's message was, in essence, that the Chinese communists were now threatening a neighbor and that Pakistan, as a member of two alliances built to fight communism, needed to be on the right side. This was why the Pakistanis and Americans were treaty allies: to fight communism.

Nehru did write to Ayub Khan on October 29 to explain the situation as Galbraith had suggested and Ayub wrote back. Nonetheless, throughout late October and November Ayub Khan and his aides publicly criticised U.S. and British military aid to India. After all, Pakistan was an ally of the United States, whereas India was a neutral nonaligned state.

The U.S. State Department assured the ambassador that the rules for this equipment's use would be same as those for the U.S. weapons received by Pakistan: The military equipment was to be used against communist aggression, not India's neighbor.

[Riaz Haq]

Excerpts of Bruce Riedel's "JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War"


https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/books/story/20151102-jfk-to-the-...


India's ambassador in Washington, Braj Kumar Nehru, delivered the second letter late in the evening of November 19. It began with a dire assessment of the situation facing India: "Within a few hours of dispatching my earlier message of today, the situation in the NEFA command has deteriorated still further." Nehru wrote that "the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands". Even worse, Nehru warned that the Chinese had "massive forces" north of Sikkim and Bhutan, and "another invasion from that direction appears imminent". He repeated his concerns about Kashmir and feared "increasing air activity by the Chinese air force in Tibet". The letter's assessment of the crisis concluded, "The situation is really desperate. We have to have more comprehensive assistance if the Chinese are to be prevented from taking over the whole of Eastern India." Without American airpower Nehru believed India faced "a catastrophe for our country". India's only hope was to counter China's gains on the ground with the use of airpower, but India lacked "air and radar equipment to defend against retaliatory action by the Chinese". Nehru made his request specific: "A minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic all weather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained." The Indian prime minister spelled out the implications of his request, writing that "U.S. fighters and transport planes manned by U.S. personnel will be used for the present to protect our cities and installations" from the Chinese. Moreover, American pilots and fighters would "assist the Indian Air Force in air battles with the Chinese air force over Indian areas", while Indian aircraft attacked Chinese PLA troops and supply lines on the ground. Air attacks inside Tibet would be undertaken by the Indian Air Force alone.

In addition to the fighters and radar installations manned by Americans, Nehru also requested "two squadrons of B-47 Bombers" to strike in Tibet. India would "like to send immediately our pilots and technicians for training in the United States" to operate these sophisticated long-range jet bombers. The prime minister assured JFK that the equipment would not be used against Pakistan, but only for "resistance against the Chinese." The stakes were "not merely the survival of India," Nehru told Kennedy, "but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this subcontinent or in Asia." India was ready to "spare no effort until the threat posed by Chinese expansionist and aggressive militarism to freedom and independence is completely eliminated."

In this second letter Nehru was, in fact, asking Kennedy for some 350 combat aircraft and crews: twelve squadrons of fighter aircraft with twenty-four jets in each and two bomber squadrons. At least 10,000 personnel would be needed to staff and operate the jets, provide radar support, and conduct logistical support for the operation. If the RAF shared the task the American numbers would be lower, but it still would be a substantial force, large enough to make it a numbered air force in the American order of battle.

[Riaz Haq]

The China-India Border War
CSC 1984
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
ABSTRACT
Author: CALVIN, James Barnard, Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. Navy

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm

The object of this paper is to present an overview of
the 1962 China-India Border War. The paper chronologically
examines the 19th and 20th Century roots of disputed border
areas between China and Indian the increase in tensions and
conflicts in the late 1950s, the skirmishes along the China-
India border, the October-November 1962 hostilities, and the
ceasefire.
The roots of the Border War extend back into the 19th
Century, when both China and British India asserted claims
to desolate, remote mountain areas between China and India.
Military expeditions, intrigue and unproductive diplomatic
exchanges marked decades of relations between the two coun-
tries. Rather than resolving the border issue, Chinese and
British Indian actions only set the stage for conflict.
Major changes in the governments of both China and
India in the late 1940s had brought the two countries to
friendly relations in the early 1950s. The paper examines
how "intrusions"--strategic military projections into each
others claimed territory--again created conflict over the
disputed border areas. The key issue was the 1956-57
construction of a Chinese military highway in the disputed
territory of Aksai China just west of Tibet. India protested
the Chinese "incursion"; diplomatic exchanges continued for
three years without progress or compromise. Each side firmly
asserted its claim to the Aksai Chin area. Large sections of
the North East Frontier Agency, east of Tibet, were also in
dispute. In 1959, India initiated a forward policy of sending
Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas. This
program created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations
between India and China. The 1961 Indian invasion of Portu-
gese Goa further alarmed Chinese officials in Peking.
The paper examines the state of the Chinese and Indian
armies. In 1962, China was strong and well-prepared for
alpine warfare; India was logistically weak and unprepared.
The paper next examines the conduct of the Border War.
The war began with skirmishes in the summer of 1962. The
significant fighting occurred in October and November, 1962,
along three widely separated fronts. In virtually every
battled the Chinese forces either outmaneuvered or overpowered
the unprepared Indians. In less than six weeks of bloody
fighting, the Chinese completely drove Indian forces back
behind Chinese claim lines.
The paper outlines the November 21, 1962 ceasefire, which
the Chinese dramatically declared after achieving her limited
strategic objectives. Following the ceasefire, China kept
most of her claim in Aksai Chin but gave India virtually all
of India's claim in the North East Frontier Agency--about 70%
of the disputed land!
Finally, the paper evaluates the outcomes and lessons of
the China-India Border War. Significant lessons included:
(Prime Minister Nehru's) rigid adherence to assumptions,
(Nehru's) unwise practice of ignoring advice of senior army
officers, India's poor state of readiness both logistically
and for alpine warfare, and India's underestimation of intel-
ligence. Outcomes of the Border War included modernization
of the Indian army, the roots of the 1965 India-Pakistan Bor-
der War, and realization of China's limited strategic objec-
tives--the limited nature of which was again seen in the 1979
China-Viet Nam Border War.

[Riaz Haq]

Retired #Indian General: "#Ladakh is the only area where physical military collusion can take place between #Pakistan and #China...just to the East of Siachen glacier and is our (#India's) vulnerability" #LadakhStandoff #Kashmir #CPEC https://theprint.in/opinion/china-believes-india-wants-aksai-chin-b... via @ThePrintIndia

China is extremely suspicious of India. It believes that in the long term, India’s strategic aim is to restore the status quo ante 1950 by recovering Aksai Chin and other areas captured/secured by China. India’s alignment with the US, the presence of Tibetan government-in-exile in India, and the aggressive claims on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit Baltistan — through which the prestigious China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes — only strengthen China’s suspicion.

--------

In the absence of any government or military briefings, there are speculations galore about the details of the incidents on the LAC and the political/military aims of China. More so, after the two informal summits between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Xi — at Wuhan in 2018 and Mamallapuram in 2019 — wherein both leaders had committed to maintain peace and tranquility on the LAC and give strategic directions to their militaries on border management.

The starting point of any conflict between two nations is the political aim. Military actions are merely the means to achieve that aim. I will reverse the process and analyse the military situation and strategic importance of the areas of the India-China ‘face-offs’ to derive the political aims.

At the outset, let me be very categoric — just like in 1962, 1965, and 1999, we have once again been surprised both at the strategic and tactical levels. The manner in which we had to rush reinforcements from other sectors gives a clear indication that we were surprised. At the strategic level, it was the failure of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) to detect the build-up of the PLA formations from the rear bases to replace the border defence units. Our tactical surveillance with UAVs and patrols has been inadequate to detect this large-scale movement close to the LAC. The ITBP mans the border and ironically is not under the command of the army.

As per unconfirmed reports, the PLA has crossed the LAC and physically secured 3-4 km of our territory along Galwan River and the entire area between Finger 5 and Finger 8 along the north bank of Pangong Tso, a distance of nearly 8-10 km (the areas are marked in this Indian Express sketch in its 2017 report). There also seem to be minor incursions in the area of Hot Springs, in Ladakh’s Chang Chenmo River valley and at Demchok.

My assessment is that the PLA has deployed maximum one brigade each in Galwan River valley and along the north bank of Pangong Tso. Precautionary deployment would have been done at likely launch pads for offensive and other vulnerable areas along the LAC. Reserves would be on short notice to cater for Indian reaction/escalation. The airfield at Ngari has been upgraded and fighter aircraft have been positioned there. It is likely that additional troops have been deployed at Depsang plains, Hot Springs, Spanggur Gap, and Chumar.

It is pertinent to mention that the intrusion by regular troops is not linear like normal border patrols going to respective claim lines. If a brigade size force has secured 3-4 km in Galwan River, it implies that the heights to the north and south have been secured, thus securing a total area of 15 to 20 square km. Similarly, along Pangong Tso, the PLA brigade having secured 8-10 km on the north bank would have also secured the dominating heights to the north to physically control 35-40 square km. And if China subsequently realigns its claim line based on the areas secured, the net area secured would increase exponentially.

[Riaz Haq]

US President John F.Kennedy declared Nehru’s “the worst State visit” he had ever experienced and found infuriating Nehru’s focus on his wife and his inability to keep his hands from touching her.
(Wolpert, "Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny", p. 480)

https://twitter.com/_merajhasan/status/1281271898773618688?s=21

https://books.google.com/books?id=YGdiqF6V8wYC&pg=PA153&lpg...

--------------------

http://contrarianworld.blogspot.com/2016/03/jfk-nehru-tibet-cia-and...


Amidst all of this Nehru signed a treaty with China in 1954, called the Panch-Sheel (5 principles). Though Nehru gave it the sentimental flavor of HIndi-Chini bhai-bhai the agreement was grounded in pragmatism and the lopsided military superiority of China was a critical factor. The Dalai Lama sought refuge in India in 1959. The capture of a U2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, in 1961 by USSR plunged US-Soviet relationship to it's lowest. Further flights over USSR were stopped by US but flights over Tibet continued.

Ike departed office gifting incoming president JFK a world steeped in chaos. JFK's first year in office was rocked by the disastrous Bay of pigs invasion of Cuba. JFK retained Allen Dulles at the CIA. At a meeting held on Fenruary 14th 1961 JFK approved support for continued stoking of insurgency in Tibet. Now declassified CIA files show that by 1961 CIA had escalated the insurgency in tibet with more air drops, more arms and ammunition, use of larger C-130 planes instead of C-118 planes for air drops. Seidel says JFK persisted with this despite the objection of his ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith. "Galbraith thought the whole Tibet covert operation was too dangerous, recklessly provoking the Chinese".

Unhappy over Kennedy becoming friendly with India Ayub Khan rescinded permission for US access to air bases in East Pakistan but retaining access to those in West Pakistan. International diplomacy is an art in skulduggery.

Nehru visited US in 1961 and met with JFK. The visit was unmitigated disaster. The aging Indian leader and the charismatic young president did not get along. By all accounts Nehru was frosty, except when chatting with Jacqueline.

1961 was a watershed year that paved the year for the calamitous events next year. The Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco convinced Kruschev that he needed to supply Cuba with nuclear missiles. In India, alarmed by China constructing a road in Aksai Chin area, Nehru, in a meeting held on November 2nd 1961, initiated what came to be called 'Forward policy'. In 1959 China had proposed that India cede Aksai Chin in return for them agreeing to honor the McMohan line in the west. Nehru had rejected that.

The 'Forward Policy' was completely ill thought out. Indian intelligence bureau and CIA which were monitoring the Communist Party of India intercepted communications from China that had propaganda material meant to bolster China's case when war came.

Events moved on many fronts across the globe now. USSR had signed a treaty with India on August 17 1962 which included sale of MIGs. Alarmed Pakistan moved towards China. Pakistan had it's own border problem with Afghanistan for which Afghanistan turned to USSR for help. Pakistan was not backed up by US contrary to expectation. When the UN voted on allowing China to become part of UN for the first time Pakistan voted 'yes'.

[Riaz Haq]

#US sees opportunity in #India’s increasing focus on #China — a turnaround from the days when #Pakistan claimed most of India’s attention. Others fear #US support for #Modi worsens persecution of #Indian #Muslims. #Ladakh #Islamophobia —The New York Times


https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/world/asia/india-china-trump.html

India’s border dispute with China has accelerated its relations with the United States. Others worry that warming ties ignore India’s persecution of Muslims.
--------

“Both the U.S. and India have recognized the importance of the other,” said Nisha D. Biswal, President Barack Obama’s assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs. “It’s not a surprise that the Indians are looking for like-minded strategic and security partners, given concerns around a destabilizing environment in the Indo-Pacific.”

But social justice advocates worry that the Trump administration is turning a blind eye to India’s rights abuses against Muslims under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, prioritizing military and geopolitical alliances over all else.

“They are warming relations under the same authoritarian banner,” said Wasim Dar, who campaigns for rights of people in the disputed territory of Kashmir. “They’re prioritizing military, or hegemony, over any kind of human rights or political freedom.”

The United States and India have increasingly soured on China in recent years.

A looming presidential election in the United States — and President Trump’s eagerness to paint China as a rival — has caused Washington to sharply shift its policies toward Beijing. The Trump administration has taken a series of economic, political and diplomatic actions against China, citing its crackdown on democratic protests in Hong Kong, human rights abuses against the largely Muslim Uighur minority, unfair trade practices and aggressive expansion into the South China Sea.

At the same time, India and China have engaged in increasing aggression in recent months.
----------

Washington’s relationship with India has a rocky history. During the Cold War, the United States grew closer with Pakistan, India’s border rival, and Russia with India. U.S. relations with India started to warm in 2000, after President Bill Clinton became the first American president to visit the country since 1978. Since then, every American leader has made the trip to India and extolled the virtues of teaming with the world’s largest democracy.

Still, the United States and India have not signed a formal alliance. India, which for years has maintained a stance of nonalignment, has been reluctant to engage.

But the Himalayan crisis is helping change that.

India’s increasing focus on China — a turnaround from the days when Pakistan claimed most of its attention — is a welcome sign for American diplomats, who believe the shared anger can draw India into a strategic partnership that will help neutralize China’s growing influence in the region.

Of most interest, experts say, is whether the border dispute will move India closer into a regional partnership with the United States, Japan and Australia — known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad.”

The forum — proposed in 2007 by the Japanese prime minister at the time, Shinzo Abe — was billed as the Asian “arc of democracy.” China has seen it as a threat to its dominance in the region, saying the Quad is a U.S. attempt to create an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization directly aimed at counterbalancing its interests.

In the past, India was hesitant to fully engage in the partnership, spurned by Australia’s exit in 2008, and fearful of upsetting China and ruining its trade ties with the country. Australia has since rejoined.

[Riaz Haq]

Excerpts of "A Promised Land" by Obama:

“Expressing hostility toward Pakistan was still the quickest route to national unity (in India)”.

"(Manmohan) Singh had resisted calls to retaliate against Pakistan after the attacks, but his restraint had cost him politically. He feared that rising anti-Muslim sentiment had strengthened the influence of India’s main opposition party, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)"

"Across the country (India), millions continued to live in squalor, trapped in sunbaked villages or labyrinthine slums, even as the titans of Indian industry enjoyed lifestyles that the rajas and moguls of old would have envied".


"Violence, both public and private, remained an all-too-pervasive part of Indian life”.


“Joe (Biden) weighed in against the (Usama Bin Laden) raid (on compound in Pakistan)”

[Riaz Haq]

India Romances the West
In a deepening geopolitical shift, New Delhi is inching closer on many fronts.

By C. Raja Mohan


https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/19/india-modi-west-quad-china-bid...


In affirming that the “Quad has come of age” at the first-ever summit of the Quadrilateral Dialogue with the United States, Japan, and Australia last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sent an unmistakable signal that India is no longer reluctant to work with the West in the global arena, including in the security domain. The country’s new readiness to participate in Western forums marks a decisive turn in independent India’s world view. That view was long defined by the idea of nonalignment and its later avatar, strategic autonomy—both of which were about standing apart from, if not against, post-World-War-II Western alliances. But today—driven by shifting balance of power in Asia, India’s clear-eyed view of its national interest, and the successful efforts of consecutive U.S. presidents—India is taking increasingly significant steps toward the West.

The Quad is not the only Western institution with which India might soon be associated. New Delhi is set to engage with a wider range of Western forums in the days ahead, including the G-7 and the Five Eyes. Britain has invited India to participate in the G-7 meeting in London this summer, along with other non-members Australia and South Korea. Although India has been invited to G-7 outreach meetings—a level or two below the summits—for a number of years, the London meeting is widely expected to be a testing ground for the creation of a “Democracy Group of Ten,” or D-10.

In Washington today, there are multiple ideas for U.S.-led technology coalitions to reduce the current Western dependence on China. Two initiatives unveiled at the Quad summit—the working group on critical technologies, and the vaccine initiative to supply Southeast Asia—underline the prospects for an Indian role in the trusted technology supply chains of the United States and its partners.

Along with Japan, India also joined a meeting of the Five Eyes—the intelligence-sharing alliance between the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand— in October 2020 to discuss ways to give law enforcement agencies access to encrypted communications on platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram. Five Eyes is a tightly knit alliance, and it is unlikely India will be a member any time soon. But it is very much possible to imagine greater consultations between the Five Eyes and the Indian intelligence establishment.

To be sure, India’s engagement with Western institutions is not entirely new. India joined the British-led Commonwealth in 1947, but only after India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, made sure the forum was stripped of any security role in the postwar world. Refusing to join military alliances was a key plank of India’s policy of non-alignment.

Many concluded in the 1970s that anti-Americanism was part of India’s genetic code.

Nehru turned to the United States when his policy of befriending China and supporting its sensitivities collapsed by the end of the 1950s. Facing reverses in a military conflict with China on the long and contested border in 1962, Nehru sought massive defense assistance from U.S. President John Kennedy. With the deaths of both Kennedy and Nehru soon after, the prospects for strategic cooperation between New Delhi and Washington receded quickly.

The 1970s saw India drift away from the West on three levels. On the East-West axis, it drew closer to the Soviet Union. On the North-South axis, it became the champion of the Third World. This was reinforced by the sharply leftward turn of India’s domestic politics and a deliberate severing of commercial cooperation with the West.