Trump Administration Seeks Pakistan's Help For Promoting “Durable Peace Between Israel and Iran”

[Riaz Haq]

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to discuss promoting “a durable peace between Israel and Iran,” the State Department said in a statement, according to Reuters.  Both leaders "agreed to continue working together to strengthen Pakistan-US relations, particularly to increase trade", said a statement released by the Pakistan government.

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio

The call came after Iran and Israel agreed to a ceasefire to end what President Donald Trump described as a "12-day war". It is yet another indication of Pakistan's close ties with both Tehran and Washington. Pakistan strongly condemned Israel's "unprovoked attack" and the US bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities. It also  shows Washington’s growing engagement with Islamabad at a time when the Trump administration is exploring a new diplomatic initiative with Tehran, possibly “as early as next week”. President Trump met Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House last week where they discussed Iran, which Trump said Pakistan knew about better than most other countries. 

Earlier in May this year, President Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Secretary Rubio arranged India-Pakistan ceasefire after 4 days of fighting between the two South Asian neighbors. Testifying before the US Congress earlier this month, the US Central Command Chief General Michael Kurilla described Pakistan as a “phenomenal partner in the counterterrorism world”. This statement coincided with the Washington visit of the Indian parliamentary delegation led by Shashi Tharoor. Tharoor's delegation's aim was to "isolate Pakistan" after the Pahalgam militant attack in Kashmir which India blamed on Pakistan without presenting any evidence. 

Pakistan also enjoys close ties with China and Russia. China-Pakistan friendship has meant significant diplomatic support and massive investment in infrastructure, as well as the state-of-the-art military hardware for the country's armed forces. Russia, too, has drawn closer to Pakistan. It has recently agreed to invest in a modern steel plant in Karachi where an abandoned Soviet-era steel mill stands today. 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defense Ministers

At a recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defense Ministers meeting in China, nine member countries(China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus)  rejected India's attempt to insert a reference to Pahalgam in the joint statement.  Earlier, India distanced itself from SCO's joint condemnation of Israel’s attacks on Iran. India also abstained from voting on a UN resolution regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict, specifically related to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. This decision continues India's pattern of abstaining on resolutions criticizing Israel. 

While India claims the mantle of the "Global South" leadership, its actions do not align with its ambition. On the other hand, Pakistan's policies and actions are much more aligned with those of the BRICS nations. Pakistan is not currently a member of the BRICS yet, but both China and Russia have publicly expressed support for its inclusion as a full member. 

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[Riaz Haq]

OPINION - Türkiye’s Asia Anew initiative: Strengthening ties with Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan
Türkiye is positioning itself in three crucial geographical, geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic hubs, where these countries act as 'key allies' in the Southeast and South Asia region
Md. Nazmul Islam |

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/opinion/opinion-turkiye-s-asia-anew-initia...

Nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan perceive Türkiye as a reliable ally, believing that if they were to face external challenges, Türkiye would be among the first or possibly the only country to offer support

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What makes Asia a priority, and why were Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan chosen?

In recent times, global politics has been shifting significantly, largely due to China’s rise and its strategic influence, particularly in Asia. The USA's response to China’s expansion further underscores the region’s growing geopolitical importance. Additionally, initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or BRICS, alongside the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), or AUKUS, highlight why Asia remains a focal point for international politics, especially for nations aspiring to attain great power status.

Given this perspective, it is obvious that Türkiye, following its crucial role, advocacy, and support, if needed for Syria, Azerbaijan, Somalia, or Qatar, is on the path to becoming an emerging great power. However, to achieve this goal, Türkiye needs more reliable partners and strong allies. In this context, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan stand out as strategic choices, offering Türkiye the necessary support and opportunities to establish a stronger presence in the region.

Strategically, the geopolitical significance of these three countries explains why Türkiye has chosen to strengthen its cooperation with them. Türkiye is positioning itself in three crucial geographical, geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic hubs, where these countries act as "key allies" in the Southeast and South Asia region. The entire partnership is founded on a mutually beneficial ‘win-win’ cooperation.

Türkiye aims to prioritize expanding trade and economic ties, followed by enhancing defense cooperation through this partnership. Malaysia and Indonesia are particularly strategic choices for Türkiye due to their significant geoeconomic and geostrategic positions, as both hold strong economic influence globally and regionally. While the partnership initially focused on economic collaboration, both Malaysia and Indonesia have shown a keen interest in deepening defense relations. Türkiye already has a strong defense presence in these countries, with ASELSAN operating a branch in Malaysia and BAYKAR recently signing a major defense partnership with Indonesia during the latest visit. This demonstrates a shared commitment to expanding collaboration beyond trade to include cultural, educational, and broader economic cooperation.

Pakistan’s inclusion is also crucial due to its significant geopolitical role for Türkiye, particularly in shaping its future role in international politics. As highlighted by President Erdogan’s recent visit, Türkiye is seeking not only to expand trade with Pakistan but also to establish a stronger geostrategic and geo-security presence in Central and West Asia. Looking ahead, Türkiye’s growing engagement in Central Asia will be more effective with a solid foothold in Pakistan. To achieve this, Türkiye should prioritize forging a robust defense pact with Pakistan, which could later be expanded to include countries like Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Such a strategic alliance would bolster Türkiye’s regional leadership while allowing it to maintain an independent stance without being drawn into the power struggle between the USA and China.

[Riaz Haq]

Rabia Akhtar
@Rabs_AA
When a leading analyst like Ashley Tellis argues that India’s Pakistan obsession is self-defeating and strategically incoherent, it’s worth paying attention. His Foreign Affairs piece lays bare how New Delhi’s fixation on outmaneuvering Pakistan continues to undercut India’s ability to confront its real challenge: China.

Modi’s government is only the latest in a line of Indian leaderships that have struggled with this. As Tellis points out, India’s strategic autonomy mantra and its reluctance to align squarely with the United States has long been framed as a multipolar ideal. Yet this posture has delivered neither security nor the great-power status India seeks.

If India has not managed a fundamental shift despite two decades of deepening U.S. ties, what exactly would it take for such a redirection to happen? Until then, India remains caught in a cycle of balancing illusions, unable to transcend its own Pakistan complex and unwilling to fully anchor its future in a coherent grand strategy.

https://x.com/Rabs_AA/status/1939684438503264528

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Will the Modi government’s policies and beliefs thwart India’s international ambitions?

https://www.youtube.com/live/pnev9iJ3LZI

India believes it could be a rival of China in 25 year’s time. But is that likely? India wants to be a superpower by 2050. But is that a realistic ambition? In other words, is Viksit Bharat achievable? Ashley Tellis, The Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, believes India’s economic performance, its foreign affairs strategies and the authoritarian and illiberal practices of the Modi government could thwart India’s proud ambitions. That’s the message of his recent essay in Foreign Affairs magazine. But what are his reasons for coming to this conclusion?

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India’s Great-Power Delusions
How New Delhi’s Grand Strategy Thwarts Its Grand Ambitions
Ashley J. Tellis

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/indias-great-power-delusions

Since the turn of the century, the United States has sought to help India rise as a great power.


In military terms, it is the most significant conventional power in South Asia, but here, too, its advantages over its local rival are not enormous: in fighting in May, Pakistan used Chinese-supplied defense systems to shoot down Indian aircraft. With China on one side and an adversarial Pakistan on the other, India must always fear the prospect of an unpalatable two-front war. Meanwhile, at home, the country is shedding one of its main sources of strength—its liberal democracy—by embracing Hindu nationalism. This evolution could undermine India’s rise by intensifying communal tensions and exacerbating problems with its neighbors, forcing it to redirect security resources inward to the detriment of outward power projection. The country’s illiberal pivot further undermines the rules-based international order that has served it so well.

[Riaz Haq]

Post

See new posts
Conversation
Harmeet KKaur
@HarmeetKKaur
"The emperor is naked!"
Modi 3.0
Modi’s Hollow Vishwaguru persona,
Diminished at Home, Diminished abroad .

Hartosh Singh Bal and Sushant Singh, discuss how Narendra Modi’s projected image as a “vishwaguru” is visionless and merely a spectacle aimed at his nationalist fanbase in India.
The Reflection of Modi’s diminished status in his third term, both in the BJP and vis-à-vis the RSS.

Modi’s role, from State Elections to Operation Sindoor, is now far smaller than the Prime Minister once insisted on.

Objective analysis by Hartosh Singh Bal and Sushant Singh, Calm and collected demeanour .
https://youtu.be/VYcQBSEtJdA?si=HP2Nzgdh-MMqm2_o

[Riaz Haq]

Rabia Akhtar
@Rabs_AA
If it still takes an official statement by India’s Foreign Minister to convince Quad partners about India’s counterterrorism compulsions, then Ashley Tellis was right, India’s Pakistan obsession is a domestic compulsion, not a shared global concern. May 2025 should have clarified who provoked whom. That it didn’t, says more about how unconvinced India’s partners remain of its actions than about any imagined consensus on Pakistan.

https://x.com/Rabs_AA/status/1940114049657614515

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Sadanand Dhume
@dhume
Pretty unambiguous statement here from Jaishankar in Washington. Bottomline: For the Quad to work for India the grouping will have to take on board Indian concerns about Pakistan-backed terrorist groups.

https://x.com/dhume/status/1940083684025028766

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Dr. S. Jaishankar
@DrSJaishankar
My remarks to the press before Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Washington DC.

https://x.com/DrSJaishankar/status/1940050732662845466

[Riaz Haq]

Going Underground
@GUnderground_TV
🚨IS INDIA🇮🇳 A TROJAN HORSE WITHIN BRICS?

‘I think that India has been a problem for the BRICS. I think perhaps the major problem for the BRICS is India. India is an outlier. I don’t want to exaggerate, but some people even say that India’s a sort of Trojan horse inside BRICS.

I wouldn’t go that far, but I do think that Modi has shown some strange things from my perspective. How can he support Israel? How can he have a good relationship with Netanyahu when Netanyahu and Israel are doing what they’re doing?

What does that say about India? How do the Indian people feel when they see their government supporting a genocide in Gaza and silent on unilateral attacks against Iran by the US and Israel?

I understand what the motivations of India are. You know, also India fears China and feels the need to maintain a certain proximity with the US.

But that has become a major factor of weakness inside the BRICS grouping, in my opinion.’

-Prof. Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., former Vice President of the New Development Bank, on the latest episode of Going Underground ahead of the BRICS+ Summit in Rio

FULL INTERVIEW BELOW IN THE REPLIES👇


https://x.com/GUnderground_TV/status/1941419967640928505

[Riaz Haq]

‘Now there is a threat from three fronts’: The emerging alliance of China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and the concerns of General Anil Chauhan

https://fukatsoft.com/b/public/BlogView/now-there-is-a-threat-from-...

Where is India Failing?


Manoj Joshi believes that “India should stop using issues like terrorism for domestic politics.” He adds, “The Modi government needs to separate foreign policy from domestic political agendas. For example, the G-20 summit was portrayed as a huge achievement, but we need less showmanship and more concrete actions on the ground. Even Bhutan did not support Operation Sand Dune.” Defense analyst Uday Bhaskar thinks that CDS General Anil Chauhan has presented a significant assessment of India's complex security challenges. He says, “Indian strategic planners had so far been focusing on two-front threats, but now they may be dealing with a three-front challenge. China seems to be successfully drawing Bangladesh into its camp alongside Pakistan. This possibility wasn’t seriously considered before the likely departure of Sheikh Hasina.” Rahul Bedi adds, “Trump’s stance has boosted Pakistan’s credibility. The U.S. invited Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir for lunch at the White House. Ten days later, Pakistan’s Air Chief also visited the U.S. It is being speculated that America might even resume arms supplies to Pakistan.”


How did Pakistan suddenly become so important for America?


Rahul Bedi says, “Pakistan’s geographical location is considered highly strategic. It shares borders with China, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Central Asian countries. This makes it a critical location. Moreover, Balochistan has rare earth minerals, which are in global demand. After Operation Sand Dune, it became clear that aside from Israel, no one supported India. International organizations condemned terrorism, but not Pakistan.” When asked whether India has made any mistakes in this situation, Bedi replied, “A prominent Indian diplomat told me that India talks a lot but does very little in practice.” “India has a strong army and navy, but when officials from countries like Japan and the U.S. come and observe things on the ground, the reality looks very different,” he added. Professor Sreeradha Datta Pathak, who teaches China Studies at O.P. Jindal University, also believes that Bangladesh joining China and Pakistan raises the security threat for India. She says, “China is working to make the Lalmonirhat air base in Bangladesh operational again, which would be a serious threat to Indian security. Naturally, India is preparing for this.” “We can’t just wait for a change of government in Bangladesh. China is trying to keep India entangled with its neighboring countries to avoid facing any direct challenge,” she emphasized. However, Professor Pathak does not believe that Pakistan’s global reputation has improved. She states, “We can't expect too much from the U.S. The West’s stance on terrorism has always been like this. Israel was the only country that said India had the right to defend itself. Unfortunately, we were part of a BRICS resolution that condemned Israel.”

[Riaz Haq]

Trump's renewed interest in Pakistan has India recalibrating China ties | Reuters

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trumps-renewed-interest-pakista...

NEW DELHI, July 21 (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump's lunch meeting with Pakistan's military chief prompted a private diplomatic protest from India in a warning to Washington about risks to their bilateral ties while New Delhi is recalibrating relations with China as a hedge, officials and analysts said.
The meeting and other tensions in the U.S.-India relationship, after decades of flourishing ties, have cast a shadow in trade negotiations, they said, as Trump's administration weighs tariffs against one of its major partners in the Indo-Pacific.
India blames Pakistan, especially its military establishment, for supporting what it calls cross-border terrorism and has told the U.S. it is sending the wrong signals by wooing Field Marshal Asim Munir, three senior Indian government officials directly aware of the matter told Reuters.
It has created a sore spot that will hamper relations going forward, they said.
Pakistan denies accusations that it supports militants who attack Indian targets and that New Delhi has provided no evidence that it is involved.
U.S.-India ties have strengthened in the past two decades despite minor hiccups, at least partly because both countries seek to counter China.
The current problems are different, said Michael Kugelman, a Washington-based senior fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation think tank.
"The frequency and intensity with which the U.S. is engaging with Pakistan, and seemingly not taking Indian concerns into account, especially after India's recent conflict with Pakistan, has contributed to a bit of a bilateral malaise."
"The concern this time around is that one of the triggers for broader tensions, that being Trump's unpredictability, is extending into the trade realm with his approach to tariffs," he said.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi's office and India's foreign ministry did not respond to a request for comment. The foreign ministry has previously said that it had "taken note" of the Trump-Munir meeting.
A U.S. official said they do not comment on private diplomatic communications and that the United States enjoys strong relationships with both India and Pakistan.
"These relationships stand on their own merits, and we do not compare our bilateral relationships with one another," the U.S. official said.
LUNCH AT THE WHITE HOUSE
The U.S. seems to have taken a different tack on Pakistan after a brief conflict broke out between the nuclear-armed rivals in May when India launched strikes on what it called terrorist targets across the border in response to a deadly attack on tourists from the majority Hindu community in Indian Kashmir the previous month.
After four days of aerial dogfights, missile and drone attacks, the two sides agreed to a cease-fire.
Hindu-majority India and Islamic Pakistan have skirmished regularly and fought three full-scale wars since independence in 1947, two of them over the disputed Kashmir region.
A few weeks after the May fighting, Trump hosted Munir for lunch at the White House, a major boost in ties with the country, which had largely languished under Trump's first term and Joe Biden. It was the first time a U.S. president had hosted the head of Pakistan's army, considered the most powerful man in the country, at the White House unaccompanied by senior Pakistani civilian officials.
Indian leaders have said Munir's view of India and Pakistan is steeped in religion. "Tourists were murdered in front of their families after ascertaining their faith," Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said in May, referring to the Kashmir attack.

[Riaz Haq]

Trump's renewed interest in Pakistan has India recalibrating China ties | Reuters

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trumps-renewed-interest-pakista...

"To understand that, you've got to also see...you have a Pakistani leadership, especially their army chief, who is driven by an extreme religious outlook".
Pakistan says it is Modi who is driven by religious extremism, and that his brand of Hindu nationalism has trampled on the rights of India's large Muslim minority. Modi and the Indian government say they do not discriminate against minorities.
Munir's meeting in the White House added to India's chagrin over Trump's repeated insistence that he averted nuclear war between the two nations by threatening to stop trade negotiations with them. The comment drew a sharp response from Modi, who told Trump that the ceasefire was achieved through talks between army commanders of the two nations, and not U.S. mediation.
In the days following his June 18 meeting with Munir, people from Modi's office and India's national security adviser's office made separate calls to their U.S. counterparts to register a protest, two of the officials said. The protest has not been previously reported.
"We have communicated to the U.S. our position on cross-border terrorism, which is a red line for us," said a senior Indian official. "These are difficult times ... Trump's inability to understand our concerns does create some wrinkle in ties," he added, seeking anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.
Trump and Munir discussed continuation of a counter-terrorism collaboration, under which the U.S. has previously provided weapons to Pakistan, a non-NATO U.S. ally, and talked about ways to further strengthen ties, a Pakistani readout of the meeting said.
That raised concern in New Delhi that any arms Pakistan receives from the U.S. could be turned on India if the neighbours end up in conflict again, two of the officials said.
HARDER STANCE
Despite what used to be public displays of bonhomie between Trump and Modi, India has been taking a slightly harder stance against the U.S. in recent weeks, while trade discussions have also slowed, the Indian officials and an Indian industry lobbyist said.
Modi declined an invitation from Trump to visit Washington after the G7 meeting in Canada in June.
Earlier this month, New Delhi proposed retaliatory duties against the U.S. at the World Trade Organization, showing trade talks were not going as smoothly as they were before the India-Pakistan clashes.
India, like other nations, is trying to figure out a way to deal with Trump and is recalibrating ties with China as a hedge, said Harsh Pant, foreign policy head at India's Observer Research Foundation think tank.
"Certainly there is an outreach to China," he said. "And I think it is mutual...China is also reaching out".
Last week, India's Jaishankar made his first visit to Beijing since a deadly 2020 border clash between Indian and Chinese troops.
India is also making moves to ease restrictions on investments from China that were imposed following the 2020 clash.
The thaw comes despite India's prickly relations with China and Beijing's close ties and military support to Pakistan.
But New Delhi's concern about Trump's own engagement with China, which has ranged from conciliatory to confrontational, appears to have contributed to its shift in stance on Beijing.
"With an unpredictable dealmaker in the White House, New Delhi cannot rule out Sino-U.S. rapprochement," said Christopher Clary, an associate professor of political science at the University at Albany, New York.
"India is troubled by Chinese help to Pakistan and growing Chinese influence elsewhere in India's near abroad, such as Bangladesh. Yet New Delhi has largely concluded that it should respond to creeping Chinese influence by focusing its pressures on its nearest neighbours and not on China."

[Riaz Haq]

Christopher Clary
@clary_co
“Trump has thus ended—or at least paused—the U.S. policy of strategic altruism. If successive U.S. leaders refrained from asking, ‘What can India do for us?’ the current administration is shouting this question from the rooftops.”

https://x.com/clary_co/status/1947341177919050202

-------------------

Milan Vaishnav
@MilanV
In a new
@ForeignAffairs
essay, I argue that Washington’s era of “strategic altruism” toward India is over. Now, in a more uncertain world, it is India that must take the long view—and extend strategic altruism toward the United States

https://x.com/MilanV/status/1945525287489265753

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How India Can Placate America
In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-asia/how-india-can-placate-ame...

Over the past quarter century, few countries have commanded as much sustained attention from U.S. foreign policy officials as has India. Since the George W. Bush administration, the United States has placed India not just at the heart of its approach to Asia but at the center of its global strategy.

This enduring partnership rested on an unspoken doctrine of strategic altruism. U.S. policymakers believed that supporting India’s rise—economically, militarily, and diplomatically—would pay dividends for the United States in the long term. A stronger, more prosperous India would open markets for American companies, bolster regional deterrence against China, and serve as a democratic counterweight to authoritarianism in Asia. India’s ascent was perceived not as a threat but as an opportunity. Because India’s rise aligned with American goals, Washington made substantial investments in India without demanding immediate returns. That long-term bet endured across both Democratic and Republican administrations—including President Donald Trump’s first term.

But Trump’s return to office could mark the end of this approach. The second Trump administration is driven not so much by transactionalism as it is by an insatiable desire to burnish its dominance in virtually all its foreign relationships. Its dealings with India have been no exception.

To preserve the relationship, it now falls to India—not the United States—to practice strategic altruism: making concessions to, generating deliverables for, and limiting what it asks of a U.S. administration primarily concerned with maintaining the upper hand. For a country committed to strategic autonomy and “multialignment,” this is an uncomfortable proposition. Nevertheless, it may be India’s best bet for weathering Trump’s second term and positioning itself for a more favorable future.


IN A GIVING MOOD
The United States’ policy of strategic altruism toward India was most clearly articulated in Foreign Affairs in 2019 by former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill and the South Asia scholar and former National Security Council member Ashley Tellis. Blackwill and Tellis argued that, beginning at the turn of the century, U.S. foreign policy officials realized it would be inherently beneficial for the United States if India emerged as a fast-growing, democratic, and militarily capable power in Asia. With Beijing emerging as a strategic competitor, Washington came to see New Delhi not only as a natural partner but as an Asian power with a shared interest in preventing China from dominating the region and undermining the rules-based international order. A stronger, more prosperous India could serve as a counterweight to an assertive, authoritarian China.

[Riaz Haq]

How India Can Placate America
In a Reversal, It’s Time for New Delhi to Be Generous With Washington

Milan Vaishnav

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-asia/how-india-can-placate-ame...

U.S. foreign-policy makers believed that the long-term strategic convergence with India outweighed the inevitable frictions the two countries might experience on other issues, such as climate change, trade, or reform of the multilateral system. As the authors wrote: “Generous U.S. policies were not merely a favor to New Delhi; they were a conscious exercise of strategic altruism. When contemplating various forms of political support for India, U.S. leaders did not ask, ‘What can India do for us?’ They hoped that India’s upward trajectory would shift the Asian balance of power in ways favorable to the United States.”

To preserve the relationship, India must now be generous to the United States.
Although strategic altruism was never enshrined in official doctrine, it underpinned U.S. policy toward India for two decades. To be sure, successive U.S. administrations placed their own stamp on the budding partnership. The George W. Bush administration prioritized a landmark civil nuclear deal in 2005 that was approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2008, eventually removing India from the ranks of nuclear pariahs. The Obama administration perceived India as a linchpin in its “pivot to Asia” and a crucial protagonist in its vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Trump’s first term, despite its volatility, maintained continuity. Following China’s reckless incursions in 2020 along the disputed border in the rugged Himalayan region separating the two countries, India began to shed long-standing caution about antagonizing Beijing. This paved the way for the rejuvenation of the Indo-Pacific partnership known as the Quad (bringing together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and expanded bilateral defense and diplomatic collaboration between India and the United States. The Biden administration strengthened these partnerships and added a new element—an ambitious new framework for collaborating with India on critical and emerging technologies that resulted in joint initiatives on semiconductor manufacturing, codevelopment and coproduction of sensitive defense systems, and increased collaboration on space exploration and research.

Strategic altruism encountered speed bumps in the first Trump administration, when the president’s “America first” rhetoric left little room for magnanimity. But Trump’s penchant for transactionalism was tempered by several factors. First, several cabinet officials in the first Trump term were members of the traditional Republican foreign policy elite for whom the challenge posed by China, and India’s intrinsic utility to the United States in helping deal with that challenge, were hugely important. Their presence insulated India from the full brunt of Trump’s mercurial tendencies.

Second, the COVID-19 pandemic suspended normal diplomatic activity, drawing attention away from points of friction in the bilateral relationship that might have received more attention in the Trump White House. Instead, India’s generic pharmaceutical industry emerged as a critical asset during the pandemic and made New Delhi a more sympathetic partner for Washington, especially given that India also experienced significant pandemic-related deaths and dislocation.

Third, China’s risky 2020 border gambit offered a pretext for India and the United States to deepen cooperation in the sensitive areas of intelligence sharing, defense coproduction, and space collaboration. After years spent nudging India to align its cautious public messaging about China with its more strident private rhetoric, the United States found it was pushing on an open door. U.S.-Indian relations emerged from Trump’s first term in better shape than U.S. ties with many (if not most) other countries—reinforcing the notion that Democrats and Republicans agreed on India even when they agreed on little else.