Trump calls India-U.S. trade relationship 'a totally one sided disaster'

https://www.cnbc.com/2025/09/02/trump-india-us-china-tariffs-trade....

U.S. President Donald Trump on Monday called trade ties with India “a totally one sided disaster!”
“They [India] have now offered to cut their Tariffs to nothing, but it’s getting late. They should have done so years ago,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.
This comes against the backdrop of the U.S. imposing 50% tariffs on the country, including secondary duties of 25% last month for purchasing Russian oil.
U.S. President Donald Trump on Monday doubled down on his criticism of India, calling trade ties with the country “a totally one sided disaster!” after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.

Trump in a post on Truth Social also said that India had offered to cut its tariffs to zero, but it was “getting late,” and that the country should have done so “years ago,” without elaborating on when such an offer was made.

This comes against the backdrop of the U.S. imposing 50% tariffs on the country, including secondary duties of 25% last month for purchasing Russian oil, which India has called “unfair, unjustified and unreasonable.”

Trump reiterated that India was buying oil and arms from Russia, and accused New Delhi of selling the U.S. “massive amounts of goods,” but imposing high tariffs on U.S. exports to India.

“The reason is that India has charged us, until now, such high Tariffs, the most of any country, that our businesses are unable to sell into India. It has been a totally one sided disaster!” he wrote.

Data from the World Trade Organization shows that India imposed a 6.2% average tariff on U.S. imports into the country in 2024, on a trade-weighted basis, while U.S. levied 2.4% on Indian goods. The trade-weighted average is the average rate of duty per imported value unit.



The U.S.-India relations have soured over the past couple of months, upending more than two decades of improving ties, with several U.S. officials increasing their criticism of New Delhi over its Russian oil imports. India has called out the U.S. and European Union for their trade with Russia, while targeting New Delhi.

India’s foreign ministry last month said “it is revealing that the very nations criticizing India are themselves indulging in trade with Russia. Unlike our case, such trade is not even a vital national compulsion [for them].”

Back in May, India had reportedly offered a “zero-for-zero” tariff deal on steel, auto components and pharmaceuticals on a reciprocal basis, up to a certain quantity of imports. However, both New Delhi and Washington failed to come to a trade deal, leading Trump to impose 50% tariffs on Indian exports.

India’s Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping at the SCO summit in Tianjin held between between Aug. 31 and Sept. 1, with both sides affirming the importance of being partners, not rivals.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on Monday played down the idea that U.S. tariffs were bringing countries like China and India closer together, describing the SCO summit as “performative,” according to Reuters.

Experts have said that the improving relations between New Delhi and Beijing would benefit the two countries, but have cast doubt over them becoming close partners due to long-standing disputes.

“The improvement of relations with India is a big deal. It allows India to access highly critical intellectual property that it needs if it is to industrialize and boost manufacturing,” Marko Papic, chief strategist, GeoMacro Strategy BCA Access, said in an email.

“But, over the long term, the U.S. is losing the propaganda battle to paint China as the trouble-maker-in-chief. And that only further ossifies multipolarity,” he said.

Chinese, Russian, Indian Leaders Pledge Cooperation, in a Message to Trump - The Wall Street Journal.

https://www.wsj.com/world/chinese-russian-indian-leaders-pledge-coo...

These tariffs (on India) are higher than those enacted against China, America’s strategic rival, and have been accompanied by many statements by Trump administration officials that amplify Indian anger. Trump’s trade adviser, Peter Navarro, caused particular outcry in recent days by using caste terminology as he said that Indian “Brahmins are profiteering at the expense of the Indian people” with the Russia oil trade. The Trump administration so far hasn’t enacted any additional sanctions on Russia itself, despite repeated threats to do so.

---------------

Trump administration officials have explained their opening to Putin as part of a so-called “reverse Kissinger” strategy that would pry Moscow away from its growing dependence on Beijing, which has provided an economic lifeline to Russia after Western sanctions were imposed because of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

While the final statement of the Shanghai summit didn’t mention Ukraine, Putin dedicated much of the speech to the war, saying that the “crisis” didn’t begin with the Russian invasion but with what he described as a Western-backed coup in 2014. He added that, for the war to end, the supposed root causes must be addressed—a Kremlin shorthand for Ukrainian aspirations to pursue policies independent from Moscow.

“The ‘reverse Kissinger’ doesn’t work. India’s alignment with the Russia-China dynamic, even partially or pragmatically, would signify the strengthening of a new world order led by China, and a narrowing of the strategic room for maneuver available to the United States and its allies in Asia,” said Marko Mihkelson, chairman of the foreign-affairs committee of the Estonian parliament.

Sushant Singh
@SushantSin
Many myths of India’s ruling regime that have been busted by Trump’s tariffs. Two (three) of them here.

1. US-India ties enjoy bipartisan support in Washington.Not true under Trump. New Delhi should have anticipated this and recalibrated its approach.

2. Indian diaspora in the US is very powerful. Trump's overwhelming support from the right has blunted it.

3. Goals and ideologies of the right-wing in both countries align. Many in India prayed for Trump's victory and celebrated it.


https://x.com/SushantSin/status/1962842457143447833

George Friedman Unpacks Xi's Coalition of Anti-Western Powers

https://youtu.be/8Xa1iZGnLG0?si=ajieo3NxFWrRx5t3


Over the weekend, the leaders of countries like China, Russia, India and Pakistan arrived in Tianjin, China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Chinese President Xi Jinping was joined by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un for a victory parade celebrating the end of the Second World War in Tiananmen Square.

As Xi spoke of nothing less than creating a new global security and economic order while U.S. President Trump claimed that the trio were conspiring against America, what are the real takeaways from such high-profile events? Shifts away from the U.S. are nothing new, but in this rapidly changing world, could this be different? GPF Chairman George Friedman joined Talking Geopolitics host Christian Smith to discuss it all, as well as how India factors into the equation.

Visit http://www.geopoliticalfutures.com for world-class geopolitical analysis and discussion.

*Note: In reference to China GDP data mentioned in this episode, China's growth rate is a little below 4% whereas at its highest point it was 15%.

-------------

Transcript:

Both the Chinese and the Indians are
3:41
heavily dependent for their economies on the United States. The Chinese economic
3:46
miracle occurred because of access to being able to export to the United States
3:52
and as well as depending on American investment.

The same is true with India. You cannot develop radically without
4:05
access to one quarter of the world's economy. Especially that part of the economy which is not at maintenance
4:12
level but has the ability to ex in both invest and to buy.
4:20
So the idea that India and China which have fought border wars in the recent

past uh are going to come together in a coalition against the United States
4:31
means that the United States which is not suffering nearly as much from these terrorists as China and India would. Uh
4:39
that they're going to do this is simply not a possibility

Christopher Clary
@clary_co
"An analysis by The Hindu... shows that foreign private companies dropped projects worth ₹1.97 lakh crore (US$22.4 billion) in Q1 of 2025-26, the highest amount since at least 2010, the earliest date for which there is data, and 570% higher than the long-term quarterly average."

https://x.com/clary_co/status/1963550047259201678

-----------


Suhasini Haidar
@suhasinih
Foreign firms halted India projects worth ₹2 lakh crore in Q1, 1,200% more than last year -
@SharadRaghavan
on the US tariff impact.
@the_hindu

https://x.com/suhasinih/status/1963443406472167810

Ilhan Niaz
@IlhanNiaz
Uzair Younus cuts through the fog:

“The real story in South Asia today is not tariffs or 🇷🇺 oil, but Washington’s quiet reassessment of 🇵🇰 , & its implications for both the India-U.S. relationship and China’s role in South & West Asia.”

https://x.com/IlhanNiaz/status/1963536865954337054

-----------

The US Is Rethinking the India-Pakistan Dynamic
Washington’s South Asia strategy is shifting, and it is this recalibration – rather than tariffs – that threatens to inject lasting volatility into ties with New Delhi.

By Uzair Younus

https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/the-us-is-rethinking-the-india-paki...



The real story in South Asia today is not tariffs or Russian oil, but Washington’s quiet reassessment of Pakistan, and its implications for both the India-U.S. relationship and China’s role in South and West Asia. While critics of President Donald Trump focus on his personality and unpredictable diplomacy, they miss a deeper truth: U.S. strategy is shifting, and it is this recalibration – rather than short-term irritants – that threatens to inject lasting volatility into ties with New Delhi.

This ongoing shift is a major departure from existing policy, where successive administrations in Washington have sought to deepen relations with India while simultaneously limiting their relationship with Pakistan. Two trends drove this policy direction: growing U.S. frustration over Pakistan’s conduct during the war in Afghanistan, and a greater focus on the strategic competition with China, which increased the centrality of India as a potential net security provider in the Indo-Pacific region. These trends granted policymakers the space to limit the relationship with Pakistan, and by extension be seen as being respectful of New Delhi’s sensitivities with regards to U.S. security and economic engagement with Pakistan.

The Trump administration, however, has apparently reconsidered this approach. Many have argued that the ongoing shift is simply a function of Trump’s own unique personality. And while this may be true to some extent, much of the change in strategy is informed by a reassessment of the United States’ global geostrategy and the ways in which the competition with China is being approached.

As far as the region is concerned, the Trump administration seems to have concluded that Pakistan offers things that are of importance to the United States, especially as it relates to the country’s role in West Asia and the Middle East. Furthermore, Pakistan is home to some of the world’s largest undeveloped copper and gold reserves, which are currently being developed by a Canadian mining company that is seeking a “G-7 financing package.” Washington does not want a Chinese flag to fly over Pakistan’s critical mineral assets, and policymakers also see U.S. investments as a means to guard against a potential Chinese military footprint in Gwadar. As such, engagement with Pakistan is being seen through a different lens, where the alignment of interests is sharper than it has been in decades.

On the China front, Washington is waking up to the reality that Beijing is now a peer competitor, with economic and technological capabilities rivaling – and in some areas surpassing – the United States. At the same time, policymakers know the deep interconnectedness of the two economies cannot be unwound anytime soon, making it imperative for Washington and Beijing to find terms of coexistence. This recalibration, in turn, reduces India’s relative salience as a partner to offset U.S. dependency on China.

Finally, the recent conflict between India and Pakistan also seems to have changed Washington’s net assessment of each country’s military capabilities. More specifically, there is a belief that India is likely to be tied up in the Himalayas for the foreseeable future. As a result, it will be much more difficult for India to commit the expected level of resources into building maritime capabilities that can position it as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific.

By Uzair Younus

https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/the-us-is-rethinking-the-india-paki...

Washington’s Shifting Stance

This shift in thinking comes after a prolonged period of time where Islamabad has shown a willingness to engage with New Delhi and reduce tensions. In February 2021, while tensions were riding high along the disputed border between India and China, Pakistan’s then-Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa called for India and Pakistan to “bury the past and move forward.” This overture coincided with a renewed Line of Control ceasefire, a gesture meant to ease pressure on India’s northern front.


While this ceasefire holds to this day, from Islamabad’s perspective, these openings were met not with reciprocity but escalation by New Delhi. Pakistan alleges that India expanded its covert footprint in Balochistan and pursued assassination campaigns on its soil. New Delhi, for its part, resists dialogue, categorically rejects third-party involvement, and continues to accuse Pakistan of sponsoring cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.

These tensions resulted in yet another India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, when missile and drone exchanges raised fears of nuclear escalation. Washington, which has historically played a role in de-escalating tensions, stepped in once more. This led to a ceasefire, which the U.S. president claimed to have brokered. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio praised Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shehbaz Sharif, tweeting that both countries had agreed “to start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.” This episode underscored a hard truth: when South Asia flirts with nuclear war, the United States cannot afford to stand aside.

Yet prevailing wisdom in Washington has long counseled against mediation, arguing that U.S. involvement only irritates India while yielding little progress. That advice might have made sense over the last few decades, but as Washington recalibrates its global posture and confronts China’s growing presence, sitting out the India-Pakistan equation is no longer feasible.

This shift under the Trump administration has become a major source of irritation for India, which views dialogue – let alone U.S. mediation – as undermining its strategic autonomy. This reluctance is not new, but its consequences are becoming more severe.

For years, India became used to a U.S. posture that privileges Indian regional interests above U.S. strategic ones. This approach left smaller South Asian states looking elsewhere – primarily to Beijing – to balance what they perceive as Indian hegemony. With greater economic and technological resources at its disposal, China steadily expanded its footprint, undermining both India’s neighborhood policy and the United States’ strategic vision.


Policymakers in the Trump administration’s inner circle want to change this trajectory.

A Tough Choice for India

When viewed through shifting strategic realities, it becomes clear that U.S. and Indian interests regarding Pakistan are diverging. For Washington, a more normal relationship between India and Pakistan is now essential to advancing its regional objectives.

Without normalization, India will remain consumed by its Himalayan front, unable to build the maritime capabilities that the U.S. envisions as central to countering Chinese naval expansion. The rivalry also fuels proxy conflicts, destabilizing the region and complicating U.S. ambitions in places like Balochistan, where Washington seeks access to critical mineral resources as a hedge against Chinese influence.

By Uzair Younus

https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/the-us-is-rethinking-the-india-paki...

Put simply, continued hostility between India and Pakistan leaves U.S. interests exposed on both land and sea. Unless India recalibrates, Washington will face a region where New Delhi is too tied down to serve as a counterweight to Beijing, while Pakistan tilts further into China’s orbit, at the expense of U.S. influence and interests.


For years, New Delhi grew comfortable with a U.S. posture that deferred to Indian preferences. That era is over. As far as Washington is concerned, the path to a free and open Indo-Pacific and a stable West Asia runs through both New Delhi and Islamabad. If the United States clings to the old orthodoxy of avoiding the India-Pakistan question, it will undermine its own strategic interests. And if India refuses engagement, it risks a future of sustained volatility and divergence in its relationship with Washington.

What happened to Palki a.k.a India’s No. 1 China hater? | TV Newsance 313

https://youtu.be/Ogp16ivYmis?si=PTTQvAwLaj0I7rHu

--------

Friendship over with Dolan Trump. TV
0:10
media new best friend is sheing.
0:14
Millions of Chinese.
0:23
Okay, I guess this guy was not invited
0:25
to any of the panels this week, but
0:30
[Music]
0:35
That's an actual visual that news 18
0:37
network 18 used this week. Indian TV
0:41
news has become so predictable now that
0:43
honestly their only use is for Instagram
0:45
memes and reals from China India number
0:48
one enemy to chain
1:04
China America

---------


Anyway, we don't expect much from these
1:56
guys, but there is one China hater
1:59
though that we had our hopes pinned on.
2:02
It is a completely new lineage of the
2:05
Wuhan virus. The WHO probe team finally
2:08
got access to the infamous Wuhan lab.
2:10
The Wuhan virus. The Wuhan virus. The
2:11
Wuhan virus. This is how Pali Sharma
2:15
rose to fame. During the pandemic, her
2:18
big USP was that she was exposing China
2:20
by making sure it's called the Wuhan
2:23
virus every night, not the Corona virus.
2:26
Since then she pretty much established
2:28
herself as the credible China basher
2:30
foreign policy voice of India. You see
2:33
Pakistani
2:36
vers how do you stand apart from the
2:38
rest while still doing shashtang praam
2:40
to power? You choose a new enemy. You
2:43
speak English with a serious tone and
2:45
look and the right pauses. You don't
2:48
shout like arnab. You just snigger.
2:50
China keeps exporting disease after
2:52
disease. China the disease incubator of
2:55
the world global disease incubator
2:57
vanadia this was an average show that
2:59
pali would do on China and it's not
3:01
changed much from a von to first post
3:04
children were considered to be carriers
3:06
not victims of the Wuhan virus
3:08
another virus outbreak it is called HMPV
3:10
it's not as dangerous as a Wuhan virus
3:12
is China cooking another pandemic I
3:14
don't want to be sensational but one
3:16
cannot help feeling worked up when China
3:18
reports that another virus has jumped to
3:20
humans this one is bird proof Chicken
3:23
gonia outbreak. This is a mosquito-b
3:25
born disease. It is rarely fatal, but it
3:27
has put Beijing on edge.
-----
tell you about that or not? China's
4:14
collapsing real estate, China's
4:15
collapsing economy, SEO summit. Is it
4:18
even relevant? We were ready for Balky
4:21
to take on China. In China,
4:24
at the center of it all stands an


For India, it's a diplomatic win.
7:43
Okay. So many countries have condemned
7:45
Pelgam. It's the easiest thing to do and
7:48
many have done it. The tough thing is to
7:50
get countries to condemn Pakistan as a
7:53
sponsor for terrorism in India. No
7:56
country has done it. But still the likes
7:57
of Pali will push the SEO statement as
8:00
some big diplomatic win for India when
8:03
it's really the bare minimum. And here's
8:05
what Pali didn't really emphasize on the
8:08
joint SEO statement condemned both the
8:10
Pulwama attack and the Jaffer Express in
8:13
Baluchasthan equating the two countries.
8:16
SEO summit had a uh there was this uh
8:20
statement coming out of the Shangai
8:22
Corporation Organization summit just
8:24
this morning where they did say uh the
8:27
Pelgam incident was I mean they
8:29
condemned that incident but they also uh
8:33
condemned the simultaneously the Jaffur
8:37
Express attack in Baloasan the terrorist
8:40
attack in in Balojasthan.
8:42
Exactly. Before calling the statement a
8:45
diplomatic win, we need to think that
8:47
one of our oldest allies for whom we
8:49
suffered 50% tariff. Our bestie Putin
8:53
Modi Karpool, that guy sat in front of
8:56
Pakistani prime minister and said we
8:58
want deeper ties with Pakistan. China
9:01
and Pakistan's friendship is no secret.
9:03
I mean, have we forgotten how we were
9:05
essentially fighting China during the
9:07
operation sindur? What does all of that
9:09
mean for India? You'd expect some
...

‘We’re scared of losing our jobs’: industries in India fear impact of Trump’s 50% tariffs

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/05/scared-losing-jobs-in...

Textiles, footwear, jewellery, gems and seafood are sectors most affected in trade with US, India’s biggest market

India has long been one of the world’s great garment houses, turning out everything from cheap T-shirts to intricate embroidery. Last year, textile and garment exports to the US alone fetched £21bn, riding a wave of strong consumer demand.

Now the trade is in jeopardy. With the stroke of a pen, the US president, Donald Trump, last week slapped a 50% tariff on more than half of India’s £65bn worth of merchandise exports to the country’s largest market. A supply chain once prized for being cheap suddenly became among the priciest.

The scale of the hit is sobering. Christopher Wood, the global head of equity strategy at the investment bank Jefferies, puts the economic blow at £41bn-£45bn, singling out textiles, footwear, jewellery and gems, all of which are highly labour-intensive, as “the most negatively impacted”.

The pain is visible in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu’s booming textile hub. “We’re scared of losing our jobs. Many of us borrowed money to come here. If the factories cut workers, we will have nothing,” Harihar Pradhan, a 32-year-old migrant worker from Odisha told the Times of India.

Tirupur’s half a million workers churn out cotton T-shirts, tracksuits and undergarments. They are shipped worldwide, but Americans have always been the biggest customers. Factories in Tirupur, as well as Noida in Uttar Pradesh, near Delhi, and Gujarat, are already shuttering production lines, according to the Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO).

Alongside textiles, India’s gems, jewellery and seafood industries face the same tariffs: 50%, compared with 15-20% for competitors in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and South Korea.

Effective rates, once exemptions and existing duties are folded in, are even more punishing: 62% for ready-made garments, up from 12%, and 60% for shrimp, for example. “That’s a massive competitive disadvantage,” said Aurodeep Nandi, an economist at the Asian investment bank Nomura.

Margins in these industries were razor-thin to begin with. The new tariffs could push them into loss-making territory, threatening factory closures, mass job losses and the unravelling of supply chains built over decades.


Kirit Bhansali, the chair of the Gem and Jewellery Export Promotion Council, warned of “devastation”. The US “is our single largest market, accounting for over $10bn [£7.4bn] in exports – nearly 30% of our industry’s total global trade,” he said. “A blanket tariff of this magnitude will inflate costs, delay shipments, distort pricing and place immense pressure on every part of the value chain. We fear exports to the US could fall by over 75%, impacting polished diamonds, jewellery and coloured gemstones alike.”

Indian exporters rushed shipments to the US in August to beat the fall of the tariff hammer. “If the tariffs stick even for just three to six months, I fear India will lose a major share of this [apparel and garment] business,” said Pallab Banerjee, a senior executive at Pearl Global Industries, a leading garment manufacturing firm. A Jaipur exporter added: “Global buyers are highly price-sensitive. Even a 5% tariff difference can turn away buyers.”

Pearl Global can shift orders to factories abroad. But most Indian firms lack that luxury.

The stakes for India’s government are political as well as economic. The prime minister, Narendra Modi, has pitched manufacturing as a way to provide jobs to the millions of young Indians who join the labour force each year. These industries employ tens of millions, directly and indirectly.

Congress Kerala
@INCKerala
Our trade with China:

Exports: $14.25B
Imports: $113.5B
Deficit: $99.25B

Our trade with Russia:

Exports: $4.88B
Imports: $67.15B
Deficit: $62.27B

Our trade with US:

Exports: $86.50B
Imports: $38.99B
Surplus: $47.51B

What this news tells us that even after 11 years and Modi meeting Xi Jinping more than 20 times, we still don't have access to Chinese market. We are running nearly half of our deficit with China. The recent visit means that China will have more unbridled access to the Indian market.

And Modi-Trump ego clash is killing our US market access too. Where are we really headed? What will our farmers do? What will our industries do?

https://x.com/INCKerala/status/1964175320342528441

Rabia Akhtar
@Rabs_AA
Moeed Yusuf’s brilliant essay makes a clear case: it is time for Washington to rethink. Pakistan, despite decades of mistrust, continues to demonstrate its centrality to the region’s stability. The May 2025 crisis showed both its military resilience and its restraint, strength without recklessness, resolve without destabilization. Pakistan does not seek to choose between Washington and Beijing; it seeks balance. That balance, if supported, could transform South Asia from a theater of great-power rivalry into one of pragmatic coexistence.

Rightly so, the U.S. does not need to abandon India, but it must stop betting on India alone. To bet on Pakistan is to acknowledge reality: that no lasting architecture of peace, connectivity, or counter-terrorism in South Asia can be built without Islamabad at the table. Ignoring this truth risks perpetuating fault lines and pushing the region further toward instability.

https://x.com/Rabs_AA/status/1966131058044293547

------

Why America Should Bet on Pakistan | Foreign Affairs

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/why-america-should-bet-paki...

Washington’s South Asia policy is adrift. Since roughly the turn of the century, U.S. leaders have seen India as a democratic counterweight to China and sought to position New Delhi in a wider competition with Beijing. At the same time, U.S. officials have grown disillusioned with Pakistan, once an ally during the Cold War, and see Islamabad as an unreliable partner when it comes to combating terrorism in the region. They are also displeased with Pakistan’s growing closeness to China, which has become a key source of infrastructure investment and military equipment for Islamabad.

The United States bet on India, but that bet has not paid off. After two decades, India remains both unwilling and unable to align itself fully with U.S. preferences in the region and beyond. This year, the relationship between the two countries began to fray. New Delhi’s quixotic quest for multipolarity in the international system—that is, a world not structured around the hegemony of a single superpower or the competition of two great powers—has rankled Washington. And it has now earned India the ire of U.S. President Donald Trump. Citing ongoing Indian purchases of Russian oil, Trump raised tariffs on imports from India to 50 percent in August, the highest rate he has imposed on any country. To make matters worse, New Delhi reacted by signaling its intent to strengthen ties with Beijing, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China for very public and amicable meetings with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

At the same time, relations between the United States and India’s neighbor and adversary Pakistan have experienced a surprising thaw. Since returning to the White House in January, Trump has warmed to Pakistan’s military. In March, he praised Pakistan for its arrest of an Islamic State operative suspected of involvement in a 2021 bombing in Kabul that killed 13 U.S. soldiers. Then, in May, he claimed to have brought an end to a four-day military clash between India and Pakistan that had threatened to escalate dangerously. “We stopped a nuclear conflict,” Trump declared. “I think it could have been a bad nuclear war.” He has repeatedly claimed credit for preventing a catastrophe ever since; Pakistani officials even nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. India, which rejects outside attempts to mediate its disputes with Pakistan, has denied that any such intervention took place. According to reporting by The New York Times, Trump asked Modi in June to echo Pakistani leaders and nominate him for the Nobel prize. Modi refused, and the two have not spoken since.

Why America Should Bet on Pakistan | Foreign Affairs

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/why-america-should-bet-paki...

Over the summer, Trump courted Pakistan. He hosted Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, in the White House in June. And in July, he struck a deal with Islamabad that kept the tariff rate at a relatively low 19 percent in exchange for allowing U.S. companies exploration rights for untapped oil reserves in Pakistan. Pakistani and U.S. officials have also been discussing joint ventures in cryptocurrency and the mining of critical minerals.



More broadly, this thaw in U.S.-Pakistani relations under Trump augurs well for Washington’s South Asia policy. The United States’ myopic focus on and support for India has succeeded only in only driving many of India’s neighbors, including Pakistan, closer to China. It’s time for Washington to rebalance its commitments in the region. Without dispensing with its partnership with India, it could forge a closer relationship with Pakistan and find ways to productively work with China in South Asia, in particular by collaborating on improving regional connectivity. This would offer the United States a way to pragmatically coexist with China in the region rather than allowing South Asia to become a proxy battleground for great-power contestation. Tilted toward India, current U.S. policy will deepen fault lines in South Asia. It would not only make conflict between India and Pakistan more likely but also prevent the United States from working with Pakistan to achieve their common strategic objective of combating the transnational terrorism emanating from the region.

The Wrong Choice
Washington’s strategic bet on New Delhi had multiple goals, but none more important than helping put India in a position to counter China. Every U.S. administration since that of President Bill Clinton has viewed India through the prism of the larger geopolitical contest with Beijing. Washington has courted New Delhi with major economic, defense, and technology deals while insisting that it is in American national security interests to facilitate India’s emergence as what U.S. officials call a “net provider of security” in the wider Indian Ocean region. To buttress India, the United States secured an unprecedented civil nuclear deal with New Delhi in 2008 (even though India has never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) and more recently waived sanctions on India despite its investment in Iran’s Chabahar port, purchases of Iranian oil, and acquisition of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles. Washington has also been a keen supporter of India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.



Central to this approach was the American conviction that India would be committed to aligning with U.S. regional interests, specifically when it came to containing China. Driven by this belief, Washington gradually separated its relationship with India from its ties to other important countries in the region, including Pakistan. Senior U.S. officials met with counterparts from other South Asian countries less frequently as the number of forums for U.S. engagement with India grew. Washington also responded to Indian concerns about U.S. military support for Pakistan. In 2016, the U.S. Congress removed subsidies for Pakistan’s purchase of eight F-16 fighter jets, a move that effectively stalled the deal, even though the United States had initially agreed to the sale because the jets would help Pakistan support the U.S. counterterrorist campaign in Afghanistan.

Why America Should Bet on Pakistan | Foreign Affairs

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/why-america-should-bet-paki...

Despite all these efforts, U.S. policymakers should be alarmed by the results. In a recent Foreign Affairs essay, the scholar and former U.S. official Ashley Tellis aptly highlighted India’s fixation on global multipolarity, which drives foreign policy choices at odds with American preferences. For example, India took a roughly neutral position on Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and has participated in efforts by some non-Western countries to shift away from trade in U.S. dollars. These divergences are not accidental; they are derived from India’s long-standing commitment to what it considers strategic autonomy in foreign policy. This posture is unlikely to change, especially in view of India’s resistance to recent Trump administration attempts at coercion over New Delhi’s relations with Moscow. Yet this growing rift with the United States bodes ill for India’s long-term desire to fend off China. Despite India’s remarkable economic rise in recent decades, it remains and will remain far less powerful than China and unable to truly counter its northern neighbor on its own.

But India is not the only country in South Asia that can help advance U.S. interests in the region. To be sure, Pakistan and the United States have had a peculiar relationship in recent decades: Islamabad has swung periodically from being the most allied of allies to facing punitive U.S. sanctions. The incoherent nature of this partnership was most evident in the years after the 9/11 attacks. Pakistan acted as a frontline ally in the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan while the United States accused it of supporting the Taliban insurgency against the Afghan government in Kabul. Islamabad, for its part, saw the U.S. policy of propping up the unpopular Afghan government as impractical and unlikely to succeed. It also felt that supporting the United States in this endeavor would ultimately produce a government in Kabul aligned closely with India—and against Pakistan. The United States seemed to care about Pakistan only in terms of the situation in Afghanistan even as it helped India expand its influence in the region. The U.S.-Pakistani partnership in Afghanistan created immense mutual mistrust and made Pakistan extremely unpopular in Washington—especially after the discovery in 2011 that the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was sheltering in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad, leading to a U.S. raid that ended in his death. The difficult marriage finally ended with the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. After the fall of Kabul and despite Pakistan’s full assistance in evacuating U.S. and other Western military and civilian personnel from Afghanistan, U.S. President Joe Biden immediately pursued strategic disengagement with Pakistan, downgrading ties to midlevel engagement at the State Department and White House and snubbing his Pakistani counterpart, then Prime Minister Imran Khan.

But after four years of relative disinterest in Washington, the relationship between Pakistan and the United States has begun to swing in the other direction. Energized by his role in ending the clashes between India and Pakistan in May, Trump has presided over a series of engagements, the most significant of which was his unprecedented lunch meeting with Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, in June. At the same time, Trump has taken a tougher stance toward India, bullying a partner that the United States has long treated more generously.

Why America Should Bet on Pakistan | Foreign Affairs

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/why-america-should-bet-paki...

Faulty Assumptions
That shift suggests that under Trump, U.S. policymakers have begun thinking differently about the region. For much of the last 20 years, U.S. officials have been troubled by Islamabad’s dysfunctional relations with New Delhi, its proximity to Beijing, and its checkered counterterrorism commitments. U.S. officials perceived those positions as inimical to Washington’s own interests. Yet the United States misread developments in South Asia. First, American officials presumed that India would keep on rising as a major power able to compete with China no matter its relations with Pakistan. Second, they thought that Pakistan would inevitably become closely aligned with China. As a result, Washington would have to back New Delhi in its feuds with Islamabad in order to counter Beijing. And third, frustrated by Pakistani support for militancy in Afghanistan, U.S. officials believed that Pakistan could never be trusted as a dependable long-term ally again. Each of these assumptions has hindered U.S. policy aims in South Asia.



The United States’ decision to separate India from its dealings with Pakistan and other South Asian states satisfied New Delhi, which had long chafed at being yoked to Islamabad. India believed that its relations with Pakistan were bilateral and did not need the mediation of external powers or international bodies. The United States not only accepted India’s position and limited its own intervention to crisis moments to prevent nuclear war, as it did during a crisis in 2019 and again this year, but also pressured Pakistan on a number of fronts. This included blocking multiple Pakistani military purchases and slowing economic assistance to the country in recent years. Although many of these decisions were driven by Washington’s frustration with Pakistan’s actions in Afghanistan, they aligned neatly with India’s aim of keeping Pakistan weak and isolated. Washington’s inherent assumption, flawed as it turns out, was that India could continue marching ahead at the desired pace despite its disputes with Pakistan.

In reality, Washington’s support for India only emboldened India’s decision-makers, especially the present government under Modi, to pursue a more muscular policy toward Pakistan. That support encouraged India to take greater risks than it had in the past. During crises in 2019 and 2025, the Indian military struck targets deeper and deeper within Pakistan. Since 2020, according to various news reports, Indian operatives have assassinated 20 individuals inside Pakistan. India’s aggressive military actions have led Pakistan to seek even greater proximity to China, especially by acquiring Chinese military equipment and technology. The clashes between India and Pakistan in May laid bare the consequences of this policy. India was unable to outmaneuver Pakistan militarily, as Pakistani forces combined domestic, Chinese, and Western technology and managed to repulse the Indian air force by shooting down multiple jets. This is the same Pakistani military that was almost solely reliant on Western technology throughout the Cold War. Today, 80 percent of Pakistan’s new arms imports come from China—the result of Pakistan’s desperation over its growing power asymmetry with a U.S.-backed India and the imposition of restrictions on arms exports to Pakistan by Western countries in recent decades.

Why America Should Bet on Pakistan | Foreign Affairs

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/why-america-should-bet-paki...

Although the active crisis is over (Modi tellingly described the cease-fire as merely a “pause”), South Asia remains on the brink. Disturbingly, from a U.S. perspective, India will continue to expend significant attention and energy on its rivalry with Pakistan. Pakistan’s military performance in May will force a good deal of soul-searching within the Indian military and, quite likely, greater expenditures. New Delhi also fears the prospect of a two-front war with China and Pakistan that it is not well prepared for. Addressing such concerns will overstretch India’s military, further drain Indian coffers, and impede the development of Indian maritime capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. India’s great-power aspirations are also hampered by the entanglement of the government’s relations with Pakistan with domestic politics in India. Indian leaders and the country’s jingoistic media are constantly espousing hostile anti-Pakistani rhetoric, in a show of muscular posturing meant to appeal to a domestic audience. And yet, this fixation with Pakistan serves as a distraction from focusing on the kinds of policies and strategies needed to narrow India’s military and economic gap with China. A broken relationship with Pakistan also comes with economic costs. India could get greater access to Afghanistan and Central Asia through Pakistan, and better fuel its growth. Instead, it chooses a policy and rhetoric of hostility.

As long as India remains locked in a crisis-prone relationship with Pakistan, the two sides will continue to obsess over each other and waste precious resources in trying to outmaneuver the other. U.S. attempts to prop up India will produce the undesired outcome of keeping Islamabad wary of Washington’s intentions in the region while doing little to help India look beyond Pakistan and focus instead on China. To escape this invidious dynamic, Trump should encourage these South Asian rivals to engage in dialogue with the goal of addressing outstanding disputes that have sparked military crises in the first place, including differences over incidents of terrorism, the disputed territory of Kashmir, and now water (following Indian threats to abandon a treaty that has regulated water distribution between the two South Asian neighbors since the 1960s). India’s reluctance to start such a diplomatic process, either with external mediation or just bilaterally, flies in the face of American interests.

Coexistence, Not Competition
Pakistan has irked some in Washington by drawing closer to China, including by purchasing Chinese arms and winning significant Chinese investment in infrastructure projects. Such moves seem to confirm that Islamabad has chosen to drift into Beijing’s orbit. As a result, many U.S. officials have thought it prudent to double down on their bet on India and ignore Pakistan. But this approach constitutes a misreading of Pakistan’s position.

To be sure, Pakistan greatly values its economic and strategic relationship with China and would likely now tilt heavily in China’s favor were it left with a purely binary choice between Washington and Beijing. But it has been taking pains to signal to both American and Chinese officials that it does not want to be put in such a situation. In 2022, Pakistan released its first-ever National Security Policy, which insisted that Pakistan should resist joining geopolitical camps. Islamabad has stayed the course ever since, trying to patch up relations with Washington. That is why Pakistani leaders responded enthusiastically when Trump offered an opening earlier this year.

Why America Should Bet on Pakistan | Foreign Affairs

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/why-america-should-bet-paki...

Pakistan’s stance is born of sheer necessity. The country’s economy is too heavily dependent on both China and the United States to walk away from either. Moreover, although the warming of U.S. ties with India in the last few decades has increased Pakistan’s dependence on China, Islamabad continues to count on American goodwill for indispensable financial support through multilateral institutions, most notably the International Monetary Fund, to bolster its weak economy.

In truth, Pakistan’s relationship with China should not threaten the United States but rather offer it an opportunity. Pakistani officials nostalgically recall their country’s role in orchestrating the original breakthrough between Washington and Beijing during the Cold War, when Islamabad facilitated the secret 1971 visit of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to China, which paved the way for President Richard Nixon’s visit thereafter. Pakistan could again be a kind of fixer in the region, helping the United States and China see eye to eye.

Take, for instance, the realm of connectivity and transportation infrastructure. China’s investment in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, a major plank of the global Chinese infrastructure program known as the Belt and Road Initiative, has alarmed the United States in that it promises to provide China a foothold in the Indian Ocean.Recognizing American concerns, Pakistan has insisted that its deep-water port in Gwadar, envisioned as CPEC’s outlet to the world, will remain a purely commercial facility with no military uses. Beijing, for its part, has been careful not to force Pakistan to choose between China and the United States.



On counterterrorism, too, the two powers could find ways to work together in the region. Both remain mostly concerned about militant groups that target their respective interests. A spate of killings of Chinese citizens in Pakistan over the years, many of which Pakistani officials have accused India of supporting, has complicated matters further by prompting China to seek permission to deploy private Chinese security personnel on Pakistani territory. At the cost of annoying Beijing, Islamabad has so far resisted, fearing that such a concession might only stoke suspicion and hostility in Washington.

Pakistan’s vision for the region offers a solution to prevent further deepening these fault lines. Its National Security Policy seeks to convert Pakistani territory into a crossroads for U.S., Chinese and even Indian economic interests. Although admittedly ambitious, such an approach could offer a transformational outcome for the two billion people who live in South Asia.

The principal arena in which great-power competition can be transformed into great-power collaboration is connectivity. American unease with CPEC could be assuaged by parallel investments by the United States in intersecting regional corridors that would share the same road, rail, and maritime infrastructure. The United States has long supported the goal of greater connectivity between South and Central Asia, for instance. And allowing Central Asian countries greater access to Pakistan’s ports would reduce their dependence on Russia. Pakistan would have a natural interest in ensuring that its territory does not become a zone of conflict for the great powers and would discourage China and the United States from crossing each other’s redlines—for instance, through the deployment of a Chinese security presence in Gwadar or U.S. support for India’s claims that the CPEC is illegal because it passes through disputed territory and therefore violates Indian sovereignty. Moreover, improved relations between India and Pakistan would allow India to use Pakistan’s land corridor to connect with Central Asia, a long-standing interest of New Delhi.

Why America Should Bet on Pakistan | Foreign Affairs

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/why-america-should-bet-paki...

Pakistan’s vast reserves of critical minerals should also draw U.S. attention. The United States has already expressed interest in the Reko Diq mine, home to some of the world’s largest undeveloped copper and gold deposits. Chinese companies are also invested in various projects in the area and interested in supporting operations at Reko Diq, which is located in Pakistan’s restive Baluchistan Province bordering Afghanistan. Baluchistan has been racked by terrorism and insurgency in recent years; combined U.S. and Chinese assistance could help Pakistan stabilize the province and prevent violence.

A pragmatic coexistence between the two great powers in South Asia may be the best outcome the United States can achieve in light of India’s limitations as a partner and as a hedge against China. As they consider this future, Washington and Islamabad would do well to set realistic expectations from the get-go. Pakistan should make clear to the United States that its current economic realities do not allow it to choose between Beijing and Washington; it needs both. The United States must accept that China will remain a critical partner for Pakistan—indeed, trying to push Pakistan away from China will only backfire. And Pakistan must accept that India will remain an important U.S. partner, no matter their current differences.

To be sure, such a reset in U.S.-Pakistani relations represents a significant departure from Washington’s approach in recent years. But Trump’s willingness to overturn the apple cart may, in this context, prove useful. After all, if the United States chooses to stick with its current India-focused policy, it could lose not just Pakistan but also South Asia in the years ahead.

Chinese voices interpret Ashley Tellis’s downfall as America’s self-inflicted wound, and a sign that India’s “special” status was never unconditional.
SANA HASHMI


https://theprint.in/opinion/eye-on-china/in-china-ashley-tellis-arr...

The arrest of Ashley J Tellis—long regarded as the intellectual face of India-United States strategic cooperation—has sent shockwaves through Washington and New Delhi’s diplomatic and strategic circles. A senior adviser in the US State Department until recently, Tellis has been charged with holding classified documents and maintaining contacts with Chinese officials. Almost overnight, he has shifted from being a symbol of partnership to a subject of suspicion.

In China, his arrest has sparked online discussions, with users highlighting unease about US strategy and global power dynamics, as well as a perceived downward trajectory in India-US relations.

A Trump-era recalibration?
On the Chinese internet, discussions of Tellis’s arrest stand in contrast to the discourse in India, where his recent writings have had limited resonance. Many Chinese observers interpret Tellis’s fall as evidence of the fragility of US-India trust and the apparent end of America’s “strategic altruism” towards India.

----------------

AI Overview
The FBI's surveillance of Ashley Tellis began as early as September 2022 when he was observed at a dinner meeting with Chinese government officials. The surveillance was later "stepped up" following additional meetings and suspicious activities in September and October 2025.
The specific dates the FBI focused on in its affidavit include:
September 15, 2022: Tellis was observed arriving at a dinner with Chinese officials carrying a manila envelope and leaving without it.
April 11, 2023: Tellis had another dinner with Chinese officials.
March 19, 2024: Tellis dined with Chinese officials again.
September 2, 2025: Tellis had another dinner with Chinese officials where they gave him a gift bag.
September 12, 2025: Video surveillance at a secure Pentagon facility (Mark Center) captured Tellis directing a colleague to print classified documents.
September 25, 2025: Tellis was recorded accessing a classified computer system at the State Department, printing hundreds of pages of a sensitive Air Force document under a false file name, and later deleting the file.
October 10, 2025: Tellis was allegedly captured on video concealing printed documents, including Top Secret material, inside notepads and placing them in his briefcase before leaving a secure facility.
The surveillance and the subsequent execution of a search warrant at his home on October 11, 2025, led to his arrest and charges of unlawfully retaining national defense information.

Trump Created Chance for Pakistan's Diplomatic Tsunami


by Robert Manning


Stimson Center Washington DC

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/23/pakistan-diplomacy-india-trump...


It’s hard to say which is a bigger achievement for Islamabad’s diplomacy: U.S. President Donald Trump’s shift toward Pakistan or the buzz over the recently announced Saudi-Pakistani “Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement,” both of which are reverberating across Southwest Asia—though the U.S. tilt may prove ephemeral.

The accord highlights a tsunami of near-Kissingerian diplomacy in just the past six months: a stunning reset with the United States—at India’s expense, boosted defense and trade ties with Turkey, a defense accord with Malaysia, a trade and energy deal with Iranthat was announced during an August visit by the Iranian president, and the expansion of already strong ties to China during Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s September trip to Beijing.

Pakistan’s buoyancy is all the more remarkable considering that last spring, as the country got its 24th bailout from the International Monetary Fund, the financial world’s worry was that Pakistan might become a failed state. The sense of surprise among South Asia wonks at how swiftly technocratic officials have stabilized their economy rivals their amazement at Islamabad’s diplomatic bounty. All these achievements come despite growing terrorist insurgencies in Balochistan and among the Pakistani Taliban along the country’s border with Afghanistan.

What does this mean in the long term? The proximate cause for the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact appears to be Israel’s bombing of a Hamas office in Qatar. The idea that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had license to attack Qatar—the host of the largest U.S. air base in the Middle East and a close U.S. partner—stunned Riyadh and other Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia is now pricing U.S. unreliability into its regional security strategy. Pakistani officials have said that the door is not closed to other Gulf states also joining the defense pact. Yet the recent NATO-like security guarantee that Washington made to Qatar and reports that a similar accord may soon be reached with Saudi Arabia suggest that the United States got the message and is doubling down on its regional security role.

Alternatively, the Saudi-Pakistani deals may match up with Trumpian objectives. If reports of a new U.S. defense strategy of retrenchment—and prioritizing the Western Hemisphere—are correct, then Washington may welcome Islamabad playing a greater role as a Gulf security provider, perhaps as an extra layer of insurance. Pakistan’s supportfor Trump’s Gaza peace plan will help keep Islamabad in his good graces.

Trump Created Chance for Pakistan's Diplomatic Tsunami


by Robert Manning


Stimson Center Washington DC

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/23/pakistan-diplomacy-india-trump...

However, Pakistan’s deepening Gulf ties may risk ensnaring the country in regional conflicts such as Yemen’s civil war or in a peace stabilization force if Trump’s plan for the Gaza Strip is realized. The Saudis—major oil suppliers to India who have their own strategic partnership with New Delhi—may have some tough choices in a future India-Pakistan confrontation.

Some argue that the defense pact is more of a formalization of long-standing Saudi-Pakistani military and economic ties than a seismic event—and suggest that it may be a form of extended deterrence, with a Sunni Muslim nuclear weapon breaking Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly. In his 2024 book War, American journalist Bob Woodward quotes Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman telling a U.S. senator, “I don’t need uranium to make a bomb. I will just buy one from Pakistan.”

A Saudi-Pakistani joint statement used NATO-like language to describe the agreement, stating “that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” How either the Saudis or Pakistanis respond to any given security threat has not yet been tested.

Saudi-Pakistani defense ties stretch back to the 1970s. Pakistani commandos helped the Saudis quell a terrorist attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and the Pakistani military now has some 2,000 troops in Saudi Arabia training and advising Saudi troops. Pakistan, meanwhile, needs Saudi money. Riyadh has extended and rolled over loans—$3 billion last December—and reportedly finalized approval for a long-discussed $10 billion oil refinery in Gwadar, adding to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

Yet the most remarkable result of shrewd Pakistani diplomacy—in the Richard Nixon-to-China category—is the resurrection of atrophied U.S.-Pakistan ties, diminished since the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, while also fracturing the U.S.-India connection. India fears that Trump’s Pakistan shift is upending 25 years of careful cultivation and trust-building of distinct U.S.-India ties. Before this administration, India had increasingly been viewed in Washington—with strong bipartisan support—as a key partner, a counterweight to China, a pillar of what was then the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy.

Islamabad’s new entente with Washington depended on a serendipitous chain of events that began in March, when Pakistani intelligence helped the U.S. capture the Islamic State-Khorasan operative responsible for the Abbey Gate bombing at Kabul airport that killed 13 U.S. soldiers in August 2021. The U.S. Centcom commander, Army Gen. Michael Kurilla, praised Islamabad’s “phenomenal cooperation” in counterterrorism following the operation.

Against that backdrop, a testy phone call between Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi precipitated a rift in U.S.-India ties, creating an opening for Pakistan. In his quest for a Nobel Peace Prize Trump claimed credit in May for the cease-fire that followed clashes between Islamabad and New Delhi, saying that he had “solved” the most intense Indo-Pakistan conflict in 30 years. He followed that with an offer to mediate in the Kashmir dispute, crossing India’s firm red line against third-party mediation.